Each party has its own scenarios for June 30 – and perhaps its own dreams as well. Understanding what lies between the lines of the plans to deal with this day, which has come to be eagerly awaited by both sides of the conflict in Egypt, required a round of visits to the leaders and prominent figure of both sides, leading to the realization that the issue is not restricted merely to what would happen on the commemoration of President Mohamed Morsi's ascent to the presidency, but also concerns what would come after that day – whether the President, his party, the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters were to remain steadfast, be toppled, or be forced to offer concessions reaching the extent of announcing anticipated presidential elections. One discovers that both sides are also wagering on the position taken by the army, which had announced that it would remain neutral, unless...! So while the presidency and the Islamists seek to prevent the army from having to march, the other side is redoubling all of its efforts to force the President to offer concessions, the party to back down, the Muslim Brotherhood to withdraw, the Islamists to yield, and the army to take to the streets! Morsi's camp is wagering on the failure of all opposition forces, across the spectrum and the different appellations, to gather crowds, masses, and segments of the population that would exceed its own numbers or would reach the kind of crowds that took to the streets and remained there in protest at the start of the January 25 Revolution. The Brotherhood believes that the opposition has the ability to gather crowds, yes, but that it will not be able to reach a sufficient number of protesters to bring about another revolution. The worst that could happen, from the point of view of the President and his supporters, would be for a few thousands to gather around the walls of the Heliopolis Palace and in Tahrir Square, as well as near the offices of the Muslim Brotherhood and of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in some governorates, especially in the Nile Delta. Violence will attract the cameras of satellite television and the usual nightly scene will repeat itself (Molotov cocktails, bullets, lasers, rocks, attack and retreat) between the protesters and the police, or between the supporters of Tamarrod and those of Tagarrod. Thus, time will pass without the matter turning into a popular revolution. The heat of the summer and the fast approaching holy month of Ramadan will be sure to let the storm pass with the President neither having to jump ship, nor to go down with it. For this purpose, those in power and their supporters have sought to draw the simple folk away from the commemoration of "the ascent" by fabricating conferences about "the water crisis" with Ethiopia here, and in support of the Syrian people there. Yet the outcome so far is not in their favor, as forums such as these remain of interest to the President's supporters alone, while they can in fact sometimes provoke some of those who are resisting their own neutrality! Those in power do not seem on their way to preempt the "promised day" with concessions that would absorb the anger of some. Rather, they are following the same methods as they always have: fortifying the palace, raising its walls, securing its gates, and gathering their supporters around the offices of the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood in shows of strength through Islamist million-man marches. All of this is being done in parallel with efforts to fragment the opposing camp and sow seeds of discord among its constituents. Indeed, this camp truly does suffer from ideological differences and organizational discrepancies, but has so far succeeded at being flexible with its contradictions, and has avoided delving into the issue of what comes after those in power are toppled until they are. Tamarrod supporters are wagering on the movement of the street, the anger of the masses, and the mistakes of those in power. They realize that the events will create themselves and become exacerbated as a result of the mistakes and behavior of those in power and their supporters. They believe that its clinging to power will drive the Brotherhood to use violence, which will eventually lead the army to intervene. They are also monitoring the stances of a branch of the Salafist movement that has voiced a great deal of reservations on the behavior and policies of those in power. They are putting a spotlight on mistakes that have led to crises of livelihood which have harmed large segments of the population, and are adopting methods that are simple yet innovative in order to achieve wider geographical distribution and greater moral impact. Both camps are waiting for June 30: the Islamists to announce the defeat of Tamarrod supporters and set the mood for further renaissance; and those who oppose them to be rid of the rule of a group of which the first year in power has shown that the renaissance it promised has led to nothing but a dam in Ethiopia.
