Once again, Hezbollah committed a public mistake by linking the Gulf position towards it to the relationship between the Gulf Cooperation Council states and the United States. The mistake does not reside in deducing the existence of special ties between the GCC states and America, considering that these ties are old at the level of politics and the two parties' vital interests. The mistake – which may be intentional – resides at the core of the problem between a party proclaiming its representation of the Shiites, its organic connection with Iran and its strategic relationship with the Syrian regime, and these states that are mostly Sunnis, clashing with Iran and hostile towards the Syrian regime. By neglecting this main facet of its current image among the Arab public in general and the Gulf one in particular, Hezbollah is jeopardizing the already deteriorating Sunni-Shiite relations and leading them to the point of no-return, knowing that the mutual Takfiri tendencies do not require further sectarian instigation to witness the great explosion. There is no need to recall the founding of the party, its jurisprudent reference or opinions in regard to political and governance affairs, in order to establish its responsibility for the Gulf position towards it. Indeed, the party is announcing by all available means that it is a Shiite Party - with all that is featured in the Shiite subconscious - in parallel to the image generated by the negative relationship with the Sunni institution throughout history. Khomeini's revolution tried to lead the Shiites out of their countries and states, and Hezbollah constituted a successful archetype of that exit for reasons related to the geographic area in which it evolved and the Syrian role in protecting it. But other failed models were seen in the Gulf, where officials do not hesitate to connect these failed models to Iranian networks. This prompted the depiction of the Shiites as being outside their countries and states and linked to a non-Arab country trying to undermine Gulf stability to serve its interests. Regardless of its intentions, Hezbollah should have tried to change this image that is ruining the citizens' relationship, especially since it has been reiterating that it is above sectarian cleavages and seeking inter-sectarian dialogue. But more importantly, this party evolved in a multi-religious and multi-sectarian Lebanese environment, which should have made it especially sensitive to its image among others. But the party, especially since 2005, seemed to no longer care about its image as a group fighting the Israeli occupation of a Lebanese land. It rather tended to the enhancement of its image as a Shiite group linked to Iran, especially when it wanted to respond to those criticizing its political affiliation. No one is opposing the selection of whichever religious reference, as long as it remains in the context of loyalty to the country and its state. The problem is when this reference turns into a political loyalty outside the context of the state and the country. At this level, one can recall the experience of the late Lebanese Imam Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddin in the Arab Gulf states, as he advised the followers of the Shiite sect to hold on to their loyalty to their countries, undertaking more than one mediation to deter the threat of importing the Iranian revolution. On the opposite side, Hezbollah is instigating the Shiite citizens in the Gulf countries to go against their countries and states, and is suspected of militarily training elements among them. Its participation in the Syrian war and the motives with which it is justifying this participation, give it the image of a purely transnational sectarian militia. In that sense, the measures which the GCC threatened to adopt against the party's interests might affect the Shiites in the Gulf states. And what is even more dangerous is the talk about the fact that the party revealed its true face, which confirms the image it wanted for itself and the Shiites during this critical stage in the region.
