In June 2005, no one would have bet one penny on the election of the quasi-obscure head of the Tehran Municipality, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as the president of Iran in the face of veteran Iranian politician former President Hujjatul-Islam wal-Muslimin Hashimi Rafsanjani. And while young engineer Ahmadinejad's credit did not exceed the level of his university teaching and then his successful management of the capital's affairs, the veteran politician had acquired an exceptional experience at the level of the main causes which were of interest to all of Iran. Hence he was the one who convinced Al-Khomeini to drink the “cup of poison" and stop the war with Iraq, the one who sponsored the rise of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to the post of Wali-e Faqih following the passing of the founder of the Islamic Republic, and the one who managed the internal stability and economic growth stage after the end of the war and the inauguration of openness towards the Iranian neighboring states, especially the Gulf ones. Despite all these qualifications, Rafsanjani could not hold his ground in the face of Ahmadinejad, who constituted in 2005 a point of convergence for the alliance between the Revolutionary Guard and the clerics. Indeed, during the two mandates of President Mohamed Khatami who succeeded to Rafsanjani in 1997, the Guard managed to become a major economic power due to its control over the main economic facilities, especially the oil. It also became an increasingly influential force, owing to the launching of the armament and training programs, including the nuclear program. For their part, the clerics managed to control the constitutional and legal institutions, in parallel to their relationship with the Bazaar and the popular influence they enjoyed via religious institutions and charities. Consequently, this military-religious alliance became the real shaper of public opinion under the Guide's umbrella, and is the one which beat Rafsanjani in 2005. Today the question is: What are Rafsanjani's realistic chances of returning to the presidency, after he presented his candidacy to the elections that are expected to be held in June, in the face of known figures enjoying wide relations domestically and abroad and belonging to Khamenei's direct surrounding? Was there any change at the level of the former president's status as one of the “heads of strife," as per the classification of the conservative powers controlling the Guard and the religious institution? Analysts believe that Khamenei's approval of Rafsanjani's candidacy means that the former president has become accepted by the Guide, which eliminates a major obstacle before his polarization of the voters. Still, one must wait for the filtering of the candidacies by the Guardian Council of the Constitution, to see whether Rafsanjani's candidacy will be accepted or rejected. In case it is rejected, this would practically put an end to the man's political life, but would raise major doubts over the seriousness of the entire process and could cause the repetition of the Green Revolution turmoil that followed the second round of the previous elections. This is why Rafsanjani will cross the threshold of the Guardian Council of the Constitution and launch the campaign that will enjoy great momentum and will be beneficial to the Iranian regime to show the extent to which it is attached to the voting process and is a popular choice. This would be done in the context of the efforts to gain a credibility it lost in the last elections. The campaign will definitely witness great enthusiasm and heat, in the context of the conflict over power within the ranks of the conservatives, but also between them and the centrist conservative candidate Rafsanjani. Nevertheless, the conclusion will depend on the results of the upcoming elections and the figure which the regime will try to draw from the ballot boxes to assume the presidential post. Will the purpose of Rafsanjani's candidacy only be to give these elections credibility, and will his role end with the announcement of the election of a conservative figure approved by the Guard leaders and clerics under the Guide's tutelage? In case Rafsanjani actually reaches the presidency, this would mean that great change has occurred at the level of the balance of powers within the regime, due to the consecutive crises linked to the major military programs supervised by the Guard, the political predicament in the country due to the stringency of the religious leaders, and the mounting economic crisis due to the mismanagement of the situation and the international sanctions. This change pushes towards the handling of the country's affairs by a veteran and pragmatic politician such as Rafsanjani. In that same sense, the former president is a necessity to lead the regime out of its predicaments and crises, after the man was forsaken by the regime, pursued with accusations reaching the point of arresting his close ones – including his two children – and classified as being one of the “heads of strife."
