Ever since Imam Khomeini expelled the first President of the Republic Abu al-Hasan Bani Sadr until a few weeks, the domestic political life in the Islamic Republic of Iran remained disciplined under the supreme guide. The recent presidential elections and the announcement of Ahmadinejad's victory for a second term represented the blast that detonated this disciplined situation. Understanding the reasons behind this explosion lies in the past four years of Ahmadinejad's first tenure, and the major change this tenure went through in the nature of the authority and its forces. The supreme guide has always enjoyed powers that go beyond institutions, as well as absolute obedience, in parallel with elected institutions whose powers were specified by the Constitution. Ever since Imam Khomeini deposed the first elected president for the Islamic Republic, Abu al-Hasan Bani Sadr, the controversy between the elected president and the supreme guide started to surface. Divergences have also appeared between Khomeini's heir, Imam Ali Khamenei on one hand, and Presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami who were elected during his tenure, on the other hand. But none of these differences reached the level of estrangement and expulsion, like what happened with Bani Sadr. Rather, any differences were resolved in the framework of settlements by referring to the institutions some times, and yielding to the desire of the supreme guide at other times, as well as to the network of relations that infiltrates the Iranian social and economic fabric now and again and to the historical reputation of men of power in the religious establishment. In other words, the authority in Iran still had room for all the sons of the revolution, and was still capable of providing an opportunity for coexistence among them, be they reformists or conservatives, including the movements between them that push into this or that direction, according to circumstances. The domestic situation remained under control and the elections remained an effective tool to reproduce the powers of this authority, even though the coexistence of these powers had passed through difficult tests. In other words, the authority remained capable of containing and embracing the sons of the revolution. The figures that were sidetracked prior to the elections – through the Council of Guardians – were mainly ones whose allegiance to the supreme guide was questioned. This did not include the sons of the revolution with their various allegiances, and hence, the base of authority had room for almost everyone. At the same time, and during the 16-year period of Rafsanjani and Khatami's tenures, a new political power started to be formed around the revolutionary guard and its establishments. This power started to grow gradually, through its complete control over security and political dossiers and through its economic expansion in many sectors. The new power deepened its alliance with the religious establishment and its symbol, the supreme guide. It also pushed its representatives and spokesmen to the forefront of the political action, the most famous of whom is Ahmadinejad. The latter's election, four years ago, was an indication for his well-experienced political rival Rafsanjani that the new security-religious power wants to unite the authority under its control. During Ahmadinejad's tenure, the security-religious establishment managed to tighten its grip over the authority, sidetracking the reformist figures from the decision-making centers at the first stage, and then from the government circles [at a later stage]. Herein lies the core of these sides' objection to the reelection of Ahmadinejad and the accusations they leveled at the revolutionary guide of meddling in favor of his interests. They also accused members of the Council of Guardians of promoting Ahmadinejad during the election campaign. Thus they accused [the authority] of forging the elections in favor of Ahmadinejad, and strongly objected to sidetracking the sons of the revolution completely from power. In this sense, the emerging dispute reflects the major change that occurred to the nature of the Iranian authority and its forces, and is not a mere protest against election fraud. The fate of the reformists hinge on results this change will bring about. The reformists realize this fact and seek to convince the supreme guide that his continued support of Ahmadinejad – as an expression of the security-religious establishment – will eventually lead to changing the nature of the regime, which all sides had agreed to maintain until the recent elections.
