There is no use going back to vilifying Saddam Hussein and his regime. The regime has evaporated and the man is lying in the grave. He will appear before the court of history after he appeared before an Iraqi court. The atrocities committed by his regime do not need further evidence. However, the court of history might also look at what happened after his death and perhaps ask about the perpetrations of those who advanced in rank through calculations smaller than Iraq's surface area. Those are the ones who busied themselves with strengthening their positions above the rubble instead of working towards building an Iraq that would be large enough for all its constituents. This is a long story. There is no use going back to vilifying occupation. George Bush's decision to assassinate the Iraqi regime under false pretexts; Paul Bremer's decision to dissolve the Iraqi army and deracinate the Baath party…. All this is a thing from the past now. Let us not forget that among the slanderers today are those who facilitated the assassination. There is now an occupation looking forward to withdrawal. It would be really shameful to beg the occupation forces someday to come back in order to prevent Iraqis from destroying each other. Iraqi forces and parties have the right to drown in the preparations for the coming parliamentary elections – in the coalitions, divorces, alliances, and settlements of accounts. But the question is whether these elections are enough for solving the problem, as they were held with a logic prompted by sectarian sensitivities, albeit with assembling slogans. Iraq does not need elections that remind it of demographics. It needs elections that remind it of Iraq as a country, a state, and institutions that are able to embrace Iraqis regardless of their sectarian or racial affiliations. Yesterday I read declarations by Iraqi PM Nouri al Maliki in which he expressed his surprise at the fact that neighboring countries host “assassins and criminals”. He was speaking about the new crisis between Iraq and Syria based on confessions and accusations following Black Wednesday. His declarations reminded me of what I had repeatedly heard from Iraqi officials and politicians on “the attempts of neighboring countries to turn Iraq into an arena for its ambitions, policies, and contribution in passing weapons, fighters and suicide bombers, and even assassination teams”. It would be naïve to think that the neighboring countries of any country are charity institutions. The void caused by the demise of Saddam Hussein's regime is naturally attractive. Moreover, neighboring countries in a situation similar to Iraq's have their fears, calculations, and interests. It is hence self-evident for them to prefer to defend themselves outside their borders and drain the others outside these borders – especially when this is in relation with a US attack that seemed comprehensive before it was aborted in Iraq. I do not mean to say that such interventions are natural or justified, but this is what states do in this part of the world. Al Maliki had experienced the story of the neighboring countries during Saddam's era. The void period allowed the neighboring countries to infiltrate in various proportions the Iraqi fabric or reserve cards inside the Iraqi structure. In this context emerged policies and interests that would be uncomfortable towards the attempt to close the Iraqi arena in their face. In fact, it can be said that Iraq was a dangerous player during Saddam's era and has turned into a dangerous arena after his demise. In order to close the Iraqi arena in the face of international and regional interventions and dictations, it is not enough to build military and security institutions. The first item in restoring Iraq's immunity as a state resides in true national reconciliation. This means that the Iraqi Shiite should feel that his Sunni neighbor is closer to him than any other external side, and vice-versa. True reconciliation means equality, comprehensive national institutions, rule of law, the prevalence of national authority above all else, and an Arabism that includes Kurds. This implies compromises on gains that worry the losing partner and on illusions that increase the loser's losses and push him to make suicidal wagers. Only true reconciliation can entrench Iraq against Al Qaeda and interventions and restore Iraq as a natural player after it had turned into a booby trapped arena. If the Iraqi forces remain captive of narrow calculations, this would put Iraq itself on the road to failure. Should this happen, it would be awful and horrendous. How will Shias and Sunnis coexist in other places if they are unable to do so in Iraq? How will Kurds coexist in the neighboring countries if they are unable to do so in Iraq? Many maps will bleed if Iraq fails. The same can be said in case Lebanon or Yemen's failure is confirmed.
