In 1976, Lebanon knew a phenomenon called the Arab Deterrent Force, which soon turned into a purely Syrian detachment after the rest of the Arab troops left it. That force, according to the official designation, was required to safeguard security and assist the Lebanese government to stand back on its feet, after two years of civil-regional infighting. That force did not fulfill the task entrusted to it. Its mandate was inaugurated with the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt at one of its checkpoints. After that, fighting resumed in Lebanon, time and again, and the Force returned to Lebanon, time and again, to help the Lebanese government... stand up on its feet. What really happened was that the Deterrent Force, upon the orders of its commanders in Damascus, was undermining as much it could all the bases of recovery. Indeed, it forged alliances in a manner that furthered Lebanese divisions, making it a force of deterrence to peace and all its prospects. In order to perform this mission, it was necessary to institutionalize and systemize Lebanese strife. Thus, since the early eighties, the establishment of Hezbollah and its Iranian-Syrian sponsorship occupied center-stage in that system and institution. Even if the Lebanese were able to get rid of Syrian ‘Deterrence', they would not be able to do away with the Lebanese proxy deterrent force, with the inception of Hezbollah. In this context, the weapons of Hezbollah, which was given legitimacy and longevity by its resistance against Israel, is a clear statement that the war has not ended, and will not end, even after Israel's withdrawal in 2000. Those who dare to seek a radical end to the war will soon be confronted by the weapons of the ‘reservist' deterrent force that complements or acts on behalf of Syrian deterrence. The assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005 was the clearest translation of that equation: Those who venture to end Lebanon's wars will face certain death. Hezbollah, then, was the biggest fruit borne out of the incestuous marriage between the Syrian regime and the Lebanese civil contradictions. Consequently, the departure of Syrian troops from Lebanon did not end the war posture, and the machine gun gifted by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah to Syrian intelligence officer Rustom Ghazaleh was not without important significance and hints in the direction of the two sides' complementarity. But with the fragmentation caused to the Syrian regime by the revolution, the progeny are now returning the favor to their parents, by deterring the Syrian people and its chances to attain peace founded on justice. This inseparable part of the regional structure of the Mumanaa, the so-called “resistance axis", is moving to the same rhythm as the rest of the parts: Deterring people and deterring peace so that they can remain, to no end, in a state of no war and no peace. This may help explain the unprecedented military involvement by Hezbollah in Syria, the funerals it holds which are no longer a secret, and the coffins of young men and adolescents whose lives were taken away from them. However, Syrian deterrence of the Lebanese was backed by an iron regime, while the Lebanese deterrence of the Syrians is backed by nothing but fragmentation that makes it only an additional reason for Lebanese infighting. Furthermore, the world has changed. Syrian deterrence received cover, encouragement, and blessing from the whole world – the Western before the Arab. As for Lebanese deterrence of Syria, it lacks cover except from Russia and Iran. This is while bearing in mind that they, in Moscow and Tehran, are themselves in need of cover.
