When Syria and Iran began their coup in Lebanon with the assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005, then completed it with the invasion of Beirut and the Chouf, and finally the removal of Saad Hariri from the post of Prime Minister, their actual target was not just Saudi Arabia and its regional role, but also this country's broader Arab umbrella, with the intention of making it part of the axis of “opposition" which they represent. Rafic Hariri was never opposed to the role played by Syria and Iran in his country. In fact, he was the first Sunni political leader to grant legitimacy to the role played by both, by taking great care to maintain good relations with both Damascus and Hezbollah, with the aim of minimizing damage. In spite of this, he was assassinated, and a blood-spattered campaign was waged to put an end to his political legacy, because he was considered to be an “obstacle" to the march of this very axis, which had moved to the phase of attack and expansion. Yet the rulers of Damascus and Tehran did not expect that the factors at play would begin to change, and that their alliance would be forced to take a different path within a mere two years – the two years since the start of the Syrian uprising. However, it is still too early to say that this axis, which has shifted to a position of defense, is really on the verge of collapse. As a matter of fact, one should expect it to show even more resistance, especially as the situation in Syria is still far from settled, and as Bashar Al-Assad's regime is not, unfortunately, in any immediate danger of falling. The main reason behind the possibility of the ruler of Damascus “withstanding" in the foreseeable future is the fact that the world's major powers have not yet reached a negotiated solution that would precede the fall of the regime and would ensure securing the chemical and biological weapons held by the Syrian army and not allowing them to fall into the wrong hands. Until then, the decision to bring him down will remain suspended, especially after the failure of the attempt to send two UN inspectors to investigate the use of chemical weapons, which could have represented a practical start of the process of reaching such a solution. And certainly the United States' insistence on reconciling Israel and Turkey falls within the framework of arranging for a way out, which may require a long wait. Thus, excessive optimism about Hezbollah having been defeated in Lebanon, merely because nominating the Prime Minister is back in the hands of the March 14 Alliance, after Hezbollah's own media contributed to portraying the matter as a “Saudi coup", does not reflect the reality on the ground. In fact, the process of forming the prospective government will show that Damascus and Tehran still hold the power to obstruct if they were to feel their influence threatened. Indeed, Lebanon's stability, which Hezbollah claims to take the utmost care to preserve, is subjected to its own notion of it, which is that it remains standing as long as it serves Hezbollah's interests. And when the latter considers the game of stability to be eating away at its influence and its control of the state and of its institutions, it will not hesitate to shatter it through means it has successfully tried in the past. The example of the July War of 2006 and its reshuffling of political cards remains fresh in memory. It is said that Hezbollah has refused, and continues to refuse, to comply with Damascus's request to raise the tension at the security level in Lebanon, and that there are discrepancies in the stances taken by the two sides on the political process in this country. These are mere media bubbles behind which stands Hezbollah itself, being completely engaged in the Syrian civil war and willing to go all the way to defend the regime and its policies, over which there is no disagreement. Coordination between the two, through a joint Iranian-Syrian operations center, is active and ongoing. As for the “flexibility" that appeared in its accepting a candidate other than its own for Prime Minister, it does not depart from the framework of the “ambush" policy at which it is so skilled.
