It seems that resolving the crisis of forming the next Lebanese government cabinet will be very difficult, if not impossible. Floating at the surface of the crisis are two issues dominating the concerns of the Prime Minister designate and the political class as a whole, namely the shares of parties and coalitions as well as the names of their representatives in the cabinet, and what is referred to as regional consensus in Lebanon. These two issues are directly related to the notion of the next government, which has been dubbed the national unity government, meaning that it would include all of the parliamentary coalitions in its ranks. And in order to bring all of those conflicting parties together, regional parties must exercise their influence on those it affects inside the country, through pressures or through guarantees, so that they may sit together. And thus the matter goes round and round between the two issues. As soon as there appears a breeze of optimism over reaching a possible consensus on shares, it is blown away by the winds of regional divergence, or vice versa. This is accompanied by phenomena that reveal the depth and the roots of the predicament. Indeed, for the sake of a solution, all means are resorted to except that which should alone be the solution, i.e. the constitution. This applies to both the loyalists and the opposition, i.e. to the political class as a whole. If some speak in generalities about the necessity of abiding by constitutional principles, without abiding by them of course, others openly express their disregard for these principles in a crude manner. The degradation of political language is not only indicative of the state of those who use it, but also of the frailty of the relationship between them and the notion of public service, as well as of disengagement within the state, constitutional institutions and the principles by which they function. Ever since the results of the last parliamentary elections, which dictated a change of cabinet, were made public, and it appeared that the March 14 Alliance had retained a majority in parliament, enabling it to form the next cabinet, both the loyalists and the opposition have behaved as if the national unity government was one of dividing up ministerial portfolios, and not one where the majority invites to minority to participate in government on the basis of a vision and a program it has laid down, and where governmental and political decisions remain in the hands of the party that won the elections, as required by the principles ruling the work of government institutions. That is the core of the problem, which has snowballed from an obstructing one-third to shares to sovereign ministries to imposing certain names on the Prime Minister designate, who has not made use of his constitutional right to set a program and form a cabinet, but has rather let himself be driven into this endless cycle. Had Saad Hariri made use of his constitutional rights, like any Prime Minister designate, he would have been confronted with the complex of the cabinet's faithfulness to the National Pact, as he would not have been able to appoint significant Shiite political figures as ministers without the approval of Hezbollah, the Amal movement, or both, knowing that he is not lacking in either Sunni or Christian cover. Thus the process of forming the national unity government cabinet has gradually turned into one of trade-offs between sects and communities, concealing complex contradictions and calculations, and of increasingly relinquishing constitutional guidelines. Such a matter reveals that no one, either among the loyalists or in the opposition, is concerned with restoring the dignity of those principles, which were infringed during the period that preceded the elections to avoid the worst, in light of the crises that were raised in the face of the previous government headed by Fouad Siniora and the election of President Michel Suleiman. Taking such distance is linked to fears that ending the crisis might come in the form of a military victory in a civil conflict by the party that is strongest on the ground. This is in fact what the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, has expressed. Indeed, any threat, be it substantial or hypothetical, from an internal party of a military victory in a civil conflict would deepen the crisis over constitutional principles, at it would in itself be a breach of all these principles. In other words, the current governmental crisis has revealed the regression of unified political standards for all Lebanese, their detachment from the notion of the state and its institutions, and the elimination of the one link between them, which makes every party have its own standards and its own links. It has also revealed the presence of leaders that are strong on the ground and within their sectarian communities, to the point that they impose their political stance and its regional extensions as a priority over the constitutional principles that are usually set down in order to organize disagreements and to have everyone submit to them. Furthermore, it has revealed the lack of statesmen in Lebanon who can overcome the instincts and practices of the street, with what this involves in terms of the coming difficulty, and even the impossibility, of engaging in the process of political and administrative reform which Lebanon needs after years of crises. Because the matter is such, it is better to speak of a sectarian federation government and of leaderships that have imposed their own self-rule, at the expense of the state and the nation, than of a national unity government, where none of the conditions needed to form a cabinet are available. And this is where the crisis lies.
