For Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to advocate, during his visit to Tehran the other day, and during his meeting with the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Sayyed Ali Khamenei, a quadripartite alliance among Syria and Iran, with Iraq and Turkey joining, and for Khamenei to support this, since such an alliance would benefit the region, indicates the following: the regional movement to create formulas for adjusting to the evolving international situation, due to the policy of a new US administration, has forced states to think about formulas that can take into consideration the coming phase, based on each retaining its previous alliance, in parallel with searching for changes in old policies. Al-Assad's visit to Tehran confirmed the solidity of the Syrian-Iranian alliance, although some conflicts have appeared in the behavior of each in a number of fronts, such as Iraq and the peace process with Israel. The two states and their leaderships continue to need each other, even if the challenge before each country involves reacting to the promised ramifications of US policy, which include openness, engagement in dialogue or negotiations, and sometimes pressure… instead of open confrontations and wars, which characterized the previous administration's policy and held sway over the entire international political scene. As we await the openness of practical steps by the Obama administration, whether with regard to the Arab-Israel conflict or the Iranian nuclear issue, most of the region's concerned states are trying to retain all of their cards. Thus, there is talk of continued cooperation between Iran and Syria to support resistance movements in the region, mixed with comments by al-Assad and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, such as “the doors of the international community will be open to Syria and Iran, more so than in the past,” as the former said, and “today's world has realized that it needs the cooperation and support of Syrian and Iran,” as the latter put it. The idea of moving from the existing quadripartite cooperation between Iran and Syria, and Turkey and Iraq, toward an alliance is one method of adjustment to coming developments. The four countries already have formulas of cooperation that have been enshrined by practice in recent years, particularly since the US invasion of Iraq. These are based on joint interests in dealing with issues like the Kurds in these states, and on offering mutual security and political services to the benefit of the regional role of each of this quadripartite alliance. Iran benefits from Turkey as a channel with the Americans and the west, and from Iraq and Syria as a means of its regional expansion. Iraq benefits from the three others as support for a minimum level of stability; Syria benefits from Iran as it strengthens its negotiating cards with the west, and in the Palestinian and Lebanese arenas, and boosts its position vis-à-vis other Arab states, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. From Turkey, Syria benefits by guaranteeing more stability domestically and along its borders, and covering its back from Israel, through Ankara's role as mediator between it and the Jewish state. The quadripartite cooperation among the four states permits contradictions in their policies on a number of regional issues, and perhaps moving in the direction of an alliance would reduce these differences; key events take place, requiring each party to engage in settlements or deals with the west and the United States. This alliance would help render these settlements comprehensive and not partial, or in favor of the interest of one of the four, at the expense of another. Turkey can play the pivotal role in such a formula. However, this regional quadripartite alliance, like the current cooperation among the four countries, leaves out influential countries in the region, which play roles in the regional issues on the table before the four. The leading countries here are Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Cooperation becomes a means of ignoring the roles of the two states and their pivotal impact on these issues, leading to settlements and deals that are deficient. Does a quadripartite alliance, along the lines discussed by the Iranians and Syrians, eliminate the justification for Arab reconciliations that have taken place in recent months, under a slogan of “let Arabs take care of Arab issues”?
