President Mohamed Morsi does not need to read many reports to realize the magnitude of the deterioration taking place in Egypt. It is sufficient for him to open a window in his palace to see and hear what may well be cause for immense concern. The president can also ask his team to provide him with some figures. What is the number of tear gas canisters shot since he took office in June last year? What is the number of those killed in protests or clashes? How many strikes have taken place, paralyzing many sectors? And how many demonstrations have been held and investment lost? The president can also request a list of chants and slogans reverberating in Egyptian cities, and see how different they are from those heard and seen during the January 25 revolution. Chants like “Down with the Supreme Guide's regime," and “No to imposing Muslim Brotherhood ideology on the state," and articles speaking about the “new pharaoh" and “the transition from military dictatorship to Islamist dictatorship," must no doubt catch his attention. He must no doubt have also noticed some of the accusations against him coming from other Islamist factions that are supposed to be on his side. There is something even more serious than that: Ordinary citizens have lost faith in the Egyptian state, which is supposed to be built on a solid foundation of longstanding institutions. The president does not need to be told about the conditions of police and its relations with the people. Nor does he need to be reminded of the shaken reputation of the judiciary or the fears about the Muslim Brotherhood extending its control to the armed forces. Morsi does not need to be told that ordinary Egyptians are afraid. They are afraid for their livelihoods, their security, and their freedom. They are concerned for the principle of the peaceful rotation of power, for women's rights, and for “others'" rights. They fear for educational programs and their own future, as they now believe that the country has lost its sense of direction and that the situation is open to all forms of economic, political and security collapse. But the most serious aspect of the crisis in Egypt is the disconnection between the president and ordinary Egyptians who are not members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The president was unable to inaugurate an era of hope. He could not convince ordinary Egyptians that the battles he fought with the judiciary, the military establishment, and the opposition were in the service of building the civil state and its institutions, which would usher in stability and prosperity. True, the president did not take any risky positions in the relationship with Israel, and managed to maintain the U.S. desire to see him succeed. However, it is also true that the matter at hand goes much farther than that, and is much more complex. The true test lies at home. The president did not do a good job at making his case and explaining his program. The administration's actions have left the impression that decision-making fell into the hands of a team that has no program and no vision to address the challenges of a transitional phase, during which missteps only exacerbate the major burdens of inherited issues. If the president was able to provide a realistic, convincing and attractive vision in relation to the constitution and the political, economic and security issues, the opposition would not have dared to resort to the street and decide to escalate and boycott. It is no simple matter that the Egyptian street remains inflamed, while voices emerge to warn of bankruptcy, “Somalization," or even bloody Algerian-style strife if deterioration reaches such an extent that the army would be forced to return to controlling decision-making in the country. When Morsi entered the presidential palace, some in Egypt, the region and the West as well believed that we were witnessing an experience as important and consequential as the so-called Turkish model – or more so. They argued that being forced to manage a country with Egypt's size and composition would push the Muslim Brotherhood to adapt to the requirements of the modern state as well as international realities. Now, these voices are less hopeful. Egypt is not Turkey, and each experience has a different context. The party inherited by Erdogan had matured through long and bitter experiences under a secular constitution and the watchful eyes of Ataturk's army. Furthermore, Erdogan's record in office coincided with sustained economic growth and strict respect for the will of the voters. By contrast, Morsi took office in a country threatened by terrible economic collapse, and an unprecedented political crisis, opening the door to chaos, violence and what could be even worse. To be sure, Egypt is not Turkey and Morsi is not Erdogan, and the proof is that the Muslim Brotherhood received the Turkish visitor with much applause, but could not hide their ire when he spoke about a civil state and a secular constitution. Egypt is in the midst of a very different experience and one that is open to all hazards. This outlook has been costly at home, and has also had a toll on investments and foreign aid. President Morsi needs an urgent reassessment to save his tenure and the Muslim Brotherhood's experience, but more importantly, to save Egypt from the burdensome legacy of the past and the confusion of the present.
