It has become futile to talk about a possible settlement to stop the war in Syria and those awaiting the outcome of the dialogue between Washington and Moscow, or between it and Tehran, will probably have to wait much longer until all the elements of the deal are available, considering that it includes numerous pending and intertwining files. In the meantime, nothing points to the fact that the conditions and required components of a great accomplishment or a breakthrough are present. At this level, it is enough that Iran – which has become the number one player in this war – is becoming more and more convinced that the international community is unable to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear bomb. And if the American administration is afraid to militarily intervene in Syria due to what its forces faced in Iraq and what they are facing in Afghanistan, how can the Islamic Republic believe in the seriousness of the threats to use the military option? Iran thinks that the international community might deal with its bomb as it dealt with the Indian, Pakistani and North Korean ones. What the international community wants from it, and what it wants itself, is to become engaged in the international action to protect peace in the Great Middle East, from the Mediterranean to Central Asia, and build a system that would ensure stability and the protection of the international interests. The dispute however is over the definition of the Islamic Republic's role and the limits of this role, so that it is not a mere involvement in the American project over the Palestine and Gulf fronts among others. And what enhances the Iranian position is that it coincided with Russia's ambitions to regain its presence in this region, protect its interests in it, ensure its share in the weapons market and dissipate the fears over the missile shield which NATO has started to deploy in a way tightening the noose around it. These ambitions extend to Southeast Asia, where it converges with China against the new American policy in the area. In light of these factors, it seems futile to talk about a possible transitional phase, transitional government, or peaceful power transition in Damascus. Indeed, the opposition does not believe in dialogue with the regime because that would mean the acceptance of a settlement with it - at a time when it wants negotiations paving the way before its assumption to power. Moreover, the regime cannot offer any meaningful concessions since this would will definitely cause it to offer more, until it is forced to leave. Beyond these two positions, issues which were suppressed for a long time by the security bodies emerged to the surface of the crisis. We thus saw the “alliance of minorities" (Christians, Alawites and Druze) and the “independence" of the Kurds in their regions, at a time when the Sunnis with most of their factions and classes, are becoming more involved in the ongoing war. In light of this divide, and the massacres, displacement, eradication, and destruction caused by the confrontations, how can the picture be put back together? How can confidence be rebuilt between these components? There is an experience which conveys this situation, i.e. in Iraq, where confidence is lost in this country that is still seeking unity since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, but to no avail. It would be futile to wait for a domestic settlement in Syria, at a time when war is fueling the repressed sectarian conflict throughout the region. And one look at part of the map extending from the shores of Beirut to the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates, can reveal the friction lines along which sectarian groups that have put their fingers on the trigger are engaged in confrontation. But the most dangerous facet of this alignment is probably the fact that one spark, miscalculation, or bad assessment, could trigger wide-scale war along these lines. It has become clear that the Syrian regime and its Lebanese allies are focusing on a long line, extending from Adlib to the Golan, going through Homs, its Rif, the coastal strip until Damascus – or its western part – and linked northward and westward to Hermel and the Bekaa which host the largest Shi'i groupings. This line will not only provide a safe haven for the regime in case it is forced to exit the capital, but will also isolate the Lebanese Sunni blocs, especially in the North, from their Syrian counterparts, and prevent them from supplying the opposition with its elements of strength. In the meantime, the Iraqi government, its apparatuses, and the Iraqi forces allied with Iran are trying to sever all lines of communication across the border between the Sunni blocs in the eastern part of Syria, and the ones in the western part of Iraq. Hence, there is more than one trap in the region as each side is trying to pressure and corner the other between the hammer and the anvil, or between the two sides of an accordion as it was said by Yasser Arafat on the eve of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It is no secret that Syria and Iraq are determined to keep the border open between the two countries to allow the flow of anything that is needed by Damascus from Iraq and Iran, at a time when the Al-Anbar population threatened to sever these supply lines and the Free Army gained control over the main passageways. For that end, the government in Baghdad did not hesitate to publically implicate its troops to prevent the imposition of the siege on Syria from the eastern side. It is also no secret that there is a similar Syrian-Lebanese determination to keep the Damascus Road open between the two countries to ensure such a free movement. This reveals that the decisive battle which everyone is talking about in the Syrian capital might not be imminent, and that the claims regarding the retreat of the regime to the coastal line are exaggerated. True, the regime's leaders are preparing for such a scenario in case the noose is tightened around them and they are forced to evacuate the capital, but what is also true is that their exit from Damascus would cause them to risk the loss of their “legitimacy," and that such a situation would not help the allies sustain their support. In addition, this exit might generate disputes and divisions within the close and wide circles surrounding the president and his administration, considering that there would be no point in them continuing to back up a president which led the sect back to its geographic base, after it had expanded throughout the country and exceeded the border to reach the neighbors on all four sides. In parallel to this Lebanese and Iraqi implication in the war, the American-Russian stalling and Iran's insistence on the stay of President Al-Assad in the People's Palace in Qasioun, of Hezbollah in the Government House and the State of Law Coalition at the head of the Cabinet in Baghdad, the axis opposing Damascus and Tehran is trying to regain control over the initiative. At this level, the decision to grant the opposition coalition Syria's seat at the Arab League was only the first step, one which was preceded by a change of positions on the border with Jordan and Turkey to fix the flaw affecting the balance of power between the two warring sides. And it is likely that the action will escalate across that border in case it appears that Syria is heading towards further division, in a manner allowing the rise of extremist powers. This is due to the fact that the ability of the international players to wait and stall is not similar to Jordan's and Turkey's, especially if their neighbor turns into another Somalia or Afghanistan. The opposing axis is pooling its strength to take up the challenge. The Gulf states headed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were able to contain the crisis in Bahrain, but their cooperation with the international wish to give more time for a political solution in Syria went on for much too long, thus making them appear as though struggling to break the Iranian siege extending from Yemen to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Therefore, this axis did not just face the Iranian and Russian supply bridges to Al-Assad's regime with a field bridge via more than one gate. It resorted to other tools, namely the Gulf Cooperation Council General Secretariat's delivery of a clear message to the Lebanese officials, which regardless of what was said about its content, featured a warning against the country's implication in the Syrian war to support one side at the expense of the other. These states did not remain silent towards the position of the Lebanese foreign minister at the Arab League, and will not remain silent towards the attacks launched by officials or political leaders participating in Najib Mikati's government against Gulf countries. Indeed, the latter enjoy many pressure tools, from the non-renewal of the work permits and visas of the Lebanese nationals working there, to the discontinuation of the aid offered to the state's treasury, the ending of the funding of joint or specific projects, and the imposition of sanctions similar to the ones imposed on Syria and affecting the country's financial transfers, oil exports and investments. The Gulf pressures are not expected to induce change in Lebanon, as the government will remain in power as long as it is serving Iranian-Syrian interests. In addition, the parliamentary elections might be postponed unless the sides participating in this Cabinet come up with an electoral law guaranteeing a majority for them in the next assembly. Lebanon, and despite the participation of its two bickering sides in the ongoing war in Syria, remains a main and open gateway allowing the Syrian regime's officials to elude the sanctions imposed on them, whether at the level of the movement of funds, products or individuals via the Beirut Airport and other outlets, with the government's cover and help. However, the GCC's position towards Beirut might rebuild the broken bridges between the allies in March 14, after they suffered an acute divide that was not only due to the position towards the Orthodox Law, but also to a series of considerations related to the lack of clarity affecting the vision or the plan advocated by Damascus' and Tehran's opponents in regard to many files, at the head of which is the Syrian revolution. And from Lebanon to Iraq, it is clear that the Arab and especially the Gulf support offered to the wide and mounting action in the Sunni provinces is embarrassing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and pushing him to distance himself from his dubious positions and proclaim his real role in supporting the Syrian regime. It is also confirming the fact that many Arab states will not tolerate Baghdad's submission to the Iranian project, although it seems that Washington has accepted this reality. Hence, even if they are unable to resist this Iranian expansion, they will not allow it to dwell in comfort, peacefulness, and quiet. But the alarming question in light of these opposite sectarian lines is the following: Will the Syrian war remain limited to its current border, or will it invade the entire region and spread divisions that will serve the neighboring superpowers, at the head of which is Iran and not just Israel?
