It is difficult to predict what the popular movements which are currently being witnessed by some Arab countries, and will perhaps be witnessed by others later, will lead to. Moreover, the outcome of such movements remains shrouded in obscurity in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the current process expresses a state of explosion more than it does a state of change, and this is why improvisation and confusion prevails, whether among the authorities or those who oppose them. This is true in Tunisia and in Egypt, where change has taken place at the top of the hierarchy in power, as it is in the other countries, where the authorities are facing off with protesters in the streets. Indeed, in all of these cases, the authorities have not been able to adopt a method that would meet with the necessities of reducing tension and launching initiatives that would have credibility among the opposition and the potential to be a basis for restoring calm and paving the way for a political debate. Similarly, the opposition has not been able to lay down realistic slogans and to set a credible program that could represent the main substance of such a debate. In fact, all, or most, of them set sail on instinct. In other words, they improvise in dealing with developments without this having anything to do with a clear goal. All, or most, of them are managing the crisis much more than they are seeking to find a solution for it, making violence nearly the only language likely to be used in this crisis, the first of its kind in the modern history of Arab countries. Such a state of affairs is rooted in the way power and opposition have been exercised over the past decades, especially in terms of the loss of democracy and peaceful alternation of power, transforming the relationship between those in power and those in the opposition from political rivalry to existential enmity. This has made those in power restrict their concern to eradicating the opposition, while the latter has restricted its concern to uprooting the former. This is why there is currently a near complete lack of trust between the new structure in power, in each of Tunisia and Egypt, and the popular movement in both countries. That is because this power structure represents, in a way, an extension of the former regime, and because the opposition in turn is reverting to practices it had adopted before the change. Such a state of affairs can be noted in Egypt, which represents a model, whether in terms of the popular movement that led to removing the President or in terms of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces running the country's affairs. It is at the moment difficult to clearly distinguish between the methods of the former regime and those of the new power structure, with the exception of the strong desire to stop the protest movement in the street. Indeed, those in power remain the same and those in government remain the same, after a period of obscurity in their stance on the former President before his removal. At the level of decision-making, the decisions taken reflect announcements that follow the direction of the slogans raised in the street more than they express a political methodology with clear goals. This is especially apparent in decisions to combat corruption and negligence, charges that have been pinned on particular individuals. Those individuals may bear personal responsibility for corruption and abuse of power, yet the matter, in combating corruption, this difficult task of the utmost importance, requires targeting a comprehensive system of values and political practices, much more than placing a former minister under investigation with the aim of absorbing popular resentment. In parallel to this, some confusion has appeared in how to deal with contradictory demands about heading towards a secular constitution. Indeed, on the one hand, Constitutional Committee members have been selected in a manner that favors the direction taken by political Islam, while on the other there is stress on equality between all citizens. And it is this kind of confusion that has made Cleric (Da'iyah) Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, known for his political views, lead Friday prayer in Tahrir Square, with what this could raise in terms of domestic implications. Confusion and hesitancy was also noted within the Military Council in its first experience in foreign policy, through the decision to allow passage for two Iranian warships through the Suez Canal. There is no less confusion to be found among parties to the opposition in its various segments and prominent figures. Indeed, neither is the state of affairs of the youth clearly defined, in light of a large number of designations and references, nor are political figures able to take action. As for political parties, with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood, they seem almost absent from the picture, after an uneasy dialogue with the former regime. Even the Muslim Brotherhood, the group with the greatest influence, organization and ability to maneuver and the clearest vision, finds itself confused in its slogans and goals. Indeed, it does not want to clash directly with the new power structure and does not want to spread fears from its power and ambitions, while it at the same time continues to cling to its traditional program.
