The United Nations-Arab League envoy to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, is not to be envied for his mission; he has given sufficient indications that he believes this, when he noted it was a near “mission impossible." However, the long-time, patient diplomat, who has recorded achievements on earlier missions regionally and internationally, is facing a personal challenge this time, one that exceeds those of his previous missions. These challenges include Brahimi's task of convincing his friends who advised him to not take the job as the United Nations secretary general's personal representative; Brahimi later agreed to the post, after conducting some study. Meanwhile, his friends are wagering that a change on the ground will follow Brahimi's decision to accept the mission, and that this will lead a change in the stance of countries concerned with the conflict in Syria – thus, things will move from stalemate to solutions. Brahimi also faces the challenge of his ending his diplomatic career with a success as a long-serving diplomat who has amassed huge experience, and not a failure, as with his predecessor Kofi Annan, who also recorded failures in earlier missions. Brahimi's first step begins Friday with a meeting with Syrian President Bashar Assad, while there are other challenges that the diplomat will face in terms of content and not form this time. The first of these involves his ability to accommodate to a rare type of political method. Brahimi is aware that Hafez Assad was a master of saying yes as a way of saying no; the late Syrian president did this with a skill that would see his interlocutor conclude whatever he wanted, if Assad wanted to evade decisive answers. The elder Assad was also aware of the importance of clear, decisive answers, if this was necessitated by circumstances, and he would adhere to such answers very strictly. However, Brahimi does not know Bashar Assad well; the latter is someone who gives decisive answers and then gives instructions to do the opposite as soon as his meeting with a given figure ends – unless such instructions are issued even prior to the meeting in question. Perhaps Brahimi has learned from what transpired with his predecessor that Bashar Assad lives in his own, virtual world, and believes that the facts wielded by his interlocutor are the result of a virtual world that is distant from reality. However, Brahimi will experience this state of affairs directly. The veteran Algerian diplomat is getting involved in the Syrian crisis liberated from the previous frameworks and documents associated with Annan's six-point plan, the resolutions of the Arab League, the Geneva Plan, and the resolutions of the UN General Assembly. These can be useful items to build on, but not necessarily rely on as the basis for a solution. They did not allow Annan to achieve any progress in treating the Syrian crisis, which led to his pull-out from the mission. If Brahimi is liberated from the Syrian Action Group's plan, there are two reasons for this: The first is that the principles of the Geneva plan are clear in defining the steps of a political transition; these begin with the formation of a transitional government with "full executive powers. It could include members of the present government and the opposition." However, this item was understood in different ways by western counties, which believed that it would not include Assad and his team, but rather leaders from the regime and the Baath Party, and by Russia (and China), which believed that the transitional government would include Assad, even if the solution would lead in the end to Assad's departure. The second is that the mechanism adopted by the Geneva plan for halting violence depended on the work of international observers, and the Security Council has issued a resolution ending their mission, since they were unable to halt the massacres, atrocities and revenge attacks by the regime. In light of the current balance of power, with the regime unable to defeat the opposition and the latter unable to bring down Assad and defeat his army, there is no change in the formula as Brahimi begins his mission. The "game" remains open-ended, until he formulates his vision for the coming steps, and the early indications are that he will be unable to achieve a break-through. While certain regime figures might indicate their readiness to revive the Geneva plan, the position of the core members of the regime is actually that Brahimi is beginning from scratch. Everything that came before has been cancelled, as he re-forms the UN-Arab League team that will assist him. As for the new aspect of Russia's position, it is actually an old one, more so than any observer of the situation believes. Moreover, Moscow wants to revive the Geneva plan via a Security Council resolution by that it adopts, with all this entails in terms of returning to square one (how will the item on an immediate halt of violence in order to arrive at a political transition, be implemented, since the UN observers' mission has ended?). More importantly, Moscow is suggesting that the opposition be given five or six names for the prime minister of the transitional government. The opposition will select one, while agreeing to see Assad continue to serve the remainder of his presidential term. As long as Moscow retains its old position, it appears that there is no way to facilitate the kind of international agreement that Brahimi is searching for, in order to succeed.
