Ever since the outbreak of the crisis in Syria, the solutions being proposed have fluctuated between the “Yemeni model" and the “Libyan model." From the beginning, everyone ruled out the possibility of solutions according to the Egyptian and Tunisian cases, as the brutality of the Syrian regime is incalculably greater than that of the regimes that used to govern in Cairo and Tunis. Only a few months passed before the conviction began to grow about the difficulty of applying the Yemeni model, because the calculations of states with influence over the Syrian regime, especially Russia and Iran, were very different from those of states that backed the prompting of Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh (namely Gulf countries, the west and the United States) to hand over power to his vice president. They did not intend to keep the crisis open to regional and international bargaining, as is the case with Moscow and Tehran when it comes to Syria. These two countries are searching for the price that should be paid before President Bashar Assad steps down, and do not accept seeing it paid afterward. This has caused both to become directly involved, in practical and in military terms, on the ground in Syria, defending a regime so that its fall does not take place in exchange for nothing. The Yemeni model remained a hope of the international community, since the Libyan model could not be applied. This is not only because of the Russian-Chinese veto in the United Nations Security Council, but also the west's failure to engage in a military adventure of intervening, which could lead to a confrontation with Iran. Even though the fall of the Syrian regime for these countries is the alternative to a military confrontation with Iranian regional aspirations, it automatically heads off a solution. Only Assad is reminding people of the Libyan model, through his rhetoric. Instead of Gaddafi's "rats," "vermin" and "cockroaches," for Assad it is "germs," "spies" and "takfiri Islamists." Both have used the specter of al-Qaida and terror since the beginning of the uprisings in their countries. Assad, moreover, has outdone himself in separating himself from the reality of what is taking place on the ground in Syria, and outdone Gaddafi, who mocked the rebels, asking: "Who are you?" Assad expected before his recent speech, when he put forward a three-stage solution, that the opposition would reject the proposal. He did not take the trouble to wait for the result of his maneuvers, to allow his opponents to reject it. He outdid himself in terms of denial, which has characterized his policy toward the crisis since the beginning. He repeated, during his speech on Sunday, the items that he claimed to have carried out during his earlier speeches or television appearances (six of them) and his stances over the last 22 months. He had claimed to organize a conference on dialogue (headed by Vice President Farouq al-Sharaa, amend the Constitution (with its charade of a referendum that approved it), issue a general amnesty, form a government includes the opposition, and issue new laws on political parties and elections. Assad recommitted himself to all of these steps, as if they have not taken place. It is an implicit acknowledgment that what he used to take credit for achieving have only been charades, which boosts the credibility of the opposition, which considered them as such. Assad "out-Gaddafied" Gaddafi in confronting his opponents, alley by alley, as the Libyan leader once said, because the latter did not use explosive barrels to bomb civilians and destroy cities and towns. Also, Gaddafi did not use weapons and gunfire to bomb civilians, unless it was in a confrontation with NATO – and no one is sorry. In his recent speech, Assad did away of the remaining delusions of some mediators, including the United Nations-Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, and those leaders who still believe a Yemeni-style solution, or something similar, remains possible. Assad put forward what he called "ideas," which are less than the six-point plan or the Iranian plan; this allowed Tehran to say "come and let's discuss our plan with you." Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi did just that. The Iranian ideas contain a role for the UN, to supervise the half of violence and military operations, in parallel with Brahimi's plan for the transitional stage, which includes the issuing of a UN Security Council resolution and the sending of peacekeeping troops to guarantee security and a transition, while Assad rejected everything that goes beyond "Syria's sovereignty." Assad's speech was merely a pass to Iran, to allow it to use the phrase "under UN supervision," which appears in its plan, and renew its attempt to link a solution in Syria to a recognition of its influence in the region as a whole, and including Iraq and Lebanon. It is no coincidence that in Damascus, Baghdad and Beirut, there are discussions of a transitional phase, which would resist an Iranian role in these three capitals, in different ways. The transitional phase in Syria was drawn up in the Geneva meeting of 30 June last year, with Iran's absence. Tehran certainly does not want this to be a precedent for designing the transition in other countries, unless its role is taken into consideration. Some time will pass before the Iranian attempt is exhausted, and we will then see a move to a "Syrian model" for solving the crisis in Syria.
