Russia's position last week, namely that the country's stance “has not and will not change" on the crisis in Syria, was correct. It came in response by the comments by the deputy foreign minister, Mikhail Bogdanov, who appeared to be heralding something new when he said the opposition was controlling more and more territory, and did not rule out the fall of the regime. All that Bogdanov did was describe developments on the ground and anticipate what they might produce in the coming weeks. It was a description that he would not make except in coordination with Sergei Lavrov, the foreign minister. However, this does not prevent us from registering something “new" in Moscow's position, namely: 1-Russia reserved itself a seat in the discussions of a possible settlement over Syria with western countries, with whom Moscow has differed in its view of the crisis in Syria. More than a year ago, Russia said it was not committed to Bashar Assad, and that it was concerned with Syria's future. This is what was reiterated on Thursday by Vladimir Putin. Not being committed to Assad has been used by Moscow in its international diplomacy rhetoric, so that it can enter the negotiations aimed at drafting a new political formula in Syria following the fall of the regime. The new element here is the developments on the ground, which indicate that the fall of the regime is imminent (although it might not be in the next days or weeks). Russia's gradually shifting position allows Putin to deny his anxiety about the fate of Assad and affirm his concern for Syria, as he did on Thursday. He used the dictionary of Russian diplomacy, which can ladle out an expression that is appropriate for the current phase. Putin did not use terms such as "terrorists," "arming the opposition by neighboring and western states, which complicates the crisis," and "rejection of foreign intervention," etc. 2-Another new element is the draft for a solution put forward by the Turkish leadership to Putin, when he visited Ankara on the third of the month, and the meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his American counterpart, Hillary Clinton, in Dublin, three days later. There was also the meeting between her deputy, William Burns, and his opposite number, Bogdanov, in Geneva, in the presence of the United Nations-Arab League envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi. During these encounters, two similar draft plans were broached, to outline the preparations for the post-Assad era. They have in common the formation of a government of national unity. One of them proposes that it contain technocrats who satisfy regime loyalists and the opposition; Assad will turn over his powers during the first three months of 2013, paving the way for holding general elections later on. Thus, Moscow considers this draft creative, in a reference to its positive stance. The second proposal stipulates that a national unity government will have total power. The Russians have described this as being "the highest authority," meaning that Assad will have no authority if he remains as president, provided that it organize parliamentary and presidential elections in a few months' time; this means he will step down before the end of his term in 2014. Brahimi was tasked with bringing Assad around to the second proposal, but the latter continues to avoid setting a date to meet with the Algerian diplomat. The opposition and some Arab countries concerned with the Syrian crisis have rejected a solution that sees Assad remain in power for a few more months, because they are confident that developments on the ground, which are outpacing the attempts at a political solution, will settle the matter of the regime's collapse. 3-The attempts to promote the Turkish draft have been met with total rejection by Assad, since he continues to believe that he can crush the popular and armed uprising. Meanwhile, a third new element lies in the position of Iran, which has responded to being shut out of the discussion of the post-Assad era. It believes that any proposal that is agreed to will lead to Moscow's support for a Security Council resolution covering the sending of peacekeepers from Arab and Muslim countries. This prompted Tehran to dispatch its deputy foreign minister, Amir Hossein Abdollahian to Moscow on Monday, carrying a six-point plan that is based on dialogue between the regime and the opposition. This would create a reconciliation committee, followed by the formation of a transitional government. It goes against the Burns-Bogdanov proposal, where the new government would be the "highest authority in the state." News from Moscow indicates that Russia believes developments on the ground have outpaced this six-point plan, and this explains the Iranian official's reference to a reaction by Hezbollah, which will be "effective and significant." This was preceded by the labeling of Vice-President Farouq al-Sharaa's proposal of the formation of a national unity government as an expression of Iranian disapproval of the international discussions over Syria. The difference between the Russian and Iranian stances has now become a dispute. Any international agreement over Syria that deprives Tehran of using the Syrian crisis as an entry-point to negotiations with the west over pending issues in the regional arena, and with regard to Iran's nuclear program, will serve as a new chapter in the crisis.
