In modern Egyptian history, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Islamists by extension, comes across like an invisible entity, or at best, a mysterious one. They can be seen through the lenses of three eras, although it is difficult to match or attribute any one of them to a specific political meaning. At times, the Islamists focused on preaching and sermonizing, which is particularly true of the early years that followed Imam Hassan al-Banna's founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Ismailia in 1928. And at other times, you see them focusing on terrorism and paramilitary activity. This is particularly true of the establishment of the terrorist organization called the 'Secret Apparatus,' which branched off from the Muslim Brotherhood in 1940, and then with the wave of political assassinations that targeted, among others, two prime ministers, namely Mahmud Fahmi Nuqrashi and Ahmed Maher, before the response came with the assassination of Banna himself, in 1949. This central position in the history of terrorism reared its ugly head once again through the fascist activities of the Brotherhood along with the Young Egypt party shortly before the coup of July 1952, and then later on with the ideas of Sayyid Qutb in the sixties leading up to the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 and the mushrooming of the infamous jihadist movements. The Muslim Brotherhood also had a longstanding history of oppression and injustice that the group suffered at the hands of Gamal Abdel Nasser ever since his assassination attempt in 1954, and then with Sadat in the second half of his term, all the way to Hosni Mubarak's long tenure in power. In this manner, their image as victims was solidified, camouflaging their other two realities and diminishing them. The few times that the Muslim Brotherhood was dealt with in a quasi-political manner spanned very short periods. This transient characteristic applies to the alliance forged with them by King Farouk (and Sheikh Maraghi, Aziz Ali al-Masri and the Young Egypt party) in what was known as the crisis of February 1942 with the British, and then the alliance with Nasser and his Free Officers which lasted less than two years. In addition, there was an alliance with Sadat in the first half of his term. In the last two cases, the matter ended up, as is well known, turning into fierce repression. Then the January Revolution finally made the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Islamists in general, a visible force. They are now at the heart of the political scene and at its forefront, both as rulers and as subjects. They have become tangible entities after having for long been ghosts or corpses. It was illogical, if not unnatural, for many elements to go on to strengthen the Islamists, particularly in what involves official policies and the state's failure to fulfill its functions in providing services, and yet, expect them to remain at the same time outside of the political scene and political visibility. In this way, the January Revolution broke that huge paradox in modern Egyptian history, and to some extent, in the Arab one. This has meant that many outstanding issues could now be raised about tangible entities, rather than ghosts and bodies, such as: Will the Islamists abide by the political game? Will the Islamized society, their society, make reason and interests, not the sacred, the criteria for their future choices? Will it be possible to build a modern country, state and nation with them, or will it be set apart as a religious nation and people, with every entity and person that stands outside it becoming a purely outsider? This is itself a major achievement, even if the Egyptian revolution will bring about no other achievement. So one can only imagine what the situation is like with the rich events experienced by Egypt, which makes answers, both good and bad, compete in a manner that until a few months ago, was very difficult to predict!
