Calmly reading between the lines of the events that have occurred in Egypt a few days before the referendum on the draft constitution, during the voting process as well as in reaction to the results of the first round on the part of government loyalists and of the opposition, proves that the dark tunnel Egypt has been driven into as a result of the struggle between Islamists in general and those who oppose them from across the spectrum remains a long one, and that Egyptians will be living in it for a long time without ever seeing the light at the end of it, unless one of the two struggling parties were to undertake a strategic and qualitative change to draw closer to the other side rather than further away from it. On the whole, the preludes do not point to any happy endings, and if some had wished for the issue of the constitution to represent the start of a process of national reconciliation in which each side would assume their responsibilities, the climate today indicates that the crisis over the constitution will instead perhaps represent the start of a new kind of conflict. The truth is that there is not much difference between, on the one hand, the climate in which the first round of the referendum on the new constitution has taken place, and on the other what used to happen under past regimes before the Revolution, whether in terms of those in power wanting to win a big “yes", or in terms of the decrepit measures, “shameful" settings and “appalling" circumstances under which the voting process has taken place, as well as those that faced the people making sure to perform their duties or exercise their rights after a revolution of which the primary demand had been to achieve freedom. As for the methods used by the state, the ruling party or state and party supporters in order to facilitate the “yes" and prevent the “no", they are nearly identical to those which Egyptians had grown accustomed to under past regimes – starting from placing and concentrating supporters after gathering them at the front of the line in order for them to move slowly, so as for time to pass and polls to close before all opposition supporters have had the time to exercise their right to vote; through the traditional methods of fraud that have become part of Egypt's heritage, such as forging ballots or having ballots marked “yes" by electoral committee employees; and up to the presence of “sidekicks" to play the part of judges in some committees. There was even one who fled when he was surrounded by voters who pressured him to provide proof that he was indeed a judge! And naturally, decay, disorganization and neglect, whether intentional or simply the result of a lack of capabilities, are all factors that facilitate manipulation, abuse and fraud, just as ready-made justifications and “pre-packaged" responses increase despair regarding the possibility of reform or change. Thus, beginning to count ballots four hours before the end of the voting process becomes a mere error that can be overcome and overlooked, despite the presence of thousands of angry voters outside electoral committees! More important than all of this is the fact that the referendum process, regardless of its results, has shown that those in power did not enjoy unanimous approval and that their desires are not met with acceptance by all. It has also shown that the talk of some of the Islamist movement's most prominent figures about the ability of the remnants (of the former regime) to stir up events, about the small number of those in the opposition, or about domestic and foreign conspiracies against the Revolution, which the ruling regime is protecting, needs to be reviewed. Yes, the referendum has entrenched division among Egyptians, and the circumstances under which it has been held have reinforced the belief that President Mohamed Morsi, his party (the Freedom and Justice Party – FJP), the group he is affiliated to (the Muslim Brotherhood), and his Salafist supporters are moving forward on the path they have chosen for themselves, heedless of the reactions of the other forces that form the opposition. Yet such a path will not be cleared and paved, but rather rife with potholes and obstacles. As for the reactions of loyalists to what took place during the referendum, they so far do not indicate that the Brotherhood front is making sure to allow the President to exercise power in a normal climate, the people to live their lives under human circumstances, and politicians to compete for power in a normal way. The results of the referendum have, despite violations having taken place, proven that there was a dire need for a strategic change in the methods and the nature of governance that would ensure for the President and his regime of rule a climate different from the one in which he has governed for the past six months. And if the situation in Egypt witnessed civil infighting near the Ittihadiya Palace, such physical violence came after a phase of verbal violence and mutually exchanged accusations between politicians, and in fact even among the public, from the two sides. And if everyone has moved in accordance with a historically well-known “catalog", fears of entering the phase of “political assassinations" become serious ones. The issue is not one of a debate that will one day end with the defeat of one side and the triumph of the other, or the disappearance of one competitor while the other remains, even if the latter holds power. Rather, either all will coexist even on a background of competition, or all will suffer defeat.
