What is happening in the states of the Arab spring, especially in Egypt and Tunisia? From which wide or narrow window are we overlooking the political scene in the states of the Arab spring? Does the return of acute confrontations and alignment on the street, along with the gathering of large crowds on the squares and in front of the presidential palaces, mark the beginning of a new era of political polarization in light of the non-commitment to the pledges and the disregard of the popular demands for which the revolution erupted? What happened in Egypt following President Mohammad Morsi's announcement of the Constitutional Declaration and the breaking out of demonstrations and marches expressing the rejection of his decision by all popular forces, thus leading to the emergence of civil alliances and new partisan formations all chanting against the Muslim Brotherhood's policy and hegemony? Will the popular mobilization end, and will the mudslinging between the loyalists and the opposition on the Egyptian street calm down following the president's retreat and annulment of the Constitutional Declaration? Or will the ceiling of the demands rise and reach popular calls for Morsi's toppling via the slogan "the toppling of the Guide's rule?" How will the situation evolve in Tunisia in light of the mounting popular disgruntlement? Indeed, the youth demonstrations are still sweeping the streets of Tunisian cities in protest against the deteriorating economic situation and the rise of unemployment, which constituted the main reasons behind the eruption of the Jasmine revolution two years ago. This is also why President Moncef al-Marzouki asked the government to present its resignation, assuring that the Tunisian youth were right to feel despair and that the country has reached a dead-end. It thus seems that Tunisia is preparing for a new revolution, in case the government does not act to fix the situation. In addition, Libya is still troubled, while Libyan towns and cities are witnessing assassinations, settlement of scores and armed clashes between outlaw militias and the security bodies. For their part, some Libyans are saying that the situation has not progressed in a palpable way, at a time when the tensions are increasing between some tribes. In Yemen, nothing has changed and the situation is still bad, frustrating and alarming, pointing to imminent mayhem after the poverty-ignorance-disease trio besieged the Yemeni waist, with the help of the rebellious movements, Al-Qaeda, the Houthis and Ali Saleh's group. This reached the point where the country is about to turn into a failed state, which will affect its neighbors. But how will the situation be in Syria? What will the region's political map look like after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime? How will Iran be doing after the exit of its most important strategic ally in the region, especially since the battles have grown close to the Damascus airport and since Moscow is talking – after two years of obstinacy – about Al-Assad's powerlessness? Any observer can see the snowball growing on the Arab street against the Muslim Brotherhood and the organizations of political Islam, due to their rush to monopolize power and the decision-making process. This means that the aftermath of the revolutions will last a long time, unlike what many might think, considering that one cannot judge the consequences during the last couple of years solely, even if the situation is temporarily appeased in the spring states. There is no doubt that Morsi's last speech harmed him on the Egyptian street, just like his decision which he later annulled after it was only met with acceptance by the MB and the Salafis and was rejected by the elite, the judges, parties, civil unions, the workers and the peasants. This is due to the fact that Morsi did not introduce solutions as much as he cloned the rhetoric of his predecessors, as though he did not draw the lessons from the people's revolution against his own predecessor. What is certain is that the Arabs do not learn from history and its lessons and do not feel the real pulse of the street until after it is too late. This was said by Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali when the people besieged his palace:"Now I understood you!" Remember there are three expressions which are strongly present in the Arab spring: "The revolutionaries have besieged the palace. The president rejects any breaches or attempts to violate the law. The government's description of the oppositionists as being infiltrators, conspirators and terrorists." In the end, the president is chased away, and appears on television screens exiting a hole after the palace's doors are destroyed and the tombs dug out. This scene might be witnessed once again in Syria, so keep an eye on the small screen! The hopes of the Arab populations were high vis-à-vis the presence of Arab democratic climates and archetypes which followed the wave of the Arab spring, meeting the aspirations, ambitions and demands of the people, feeling their pulse and avoiding the use of power to suppress them. But reality is better described by the hegemony imposed by the MB over the authority in Egypt! What is certain is that the Arab states are still swimming in swamps of conflicts, clashes, confrontations and intellectual and ideological liquidations which are quickly summoned by all the opponents whenever a dispute or divergence occurs, thus allowing the prevalence of ideological and sectarian rhetoric over nationalism, fueling exclusion at the expense of diversity and causing the slogans of all the movements and parties demanding change and reform to collapse. [email protected] twitter | @JameelTheyabi
