The resolutions taken by the Egyptian president – through which he extended his control over all the state's authorities including the executive, legislative and judiciary authorities – speak of the extent of the illusionary victory following the revolution, especially if this victory lacks pragmatism. Morsi thought that his post allows him to confiscate the revolution. However, the majority of the Egyptians stood up to him reminding him that his victory at the presidential elections was not a massive one. Indeed, he did not win in the first round and the votes that he obtained in the second round only brought him 51 percent of the total votes. This means that the Egyptian president does not have a wide popularity and that he cannot pretend to be a symbol and guardian of the revolution. Morsi's decisions also revealed a political weakness that prevented him from benefitting from an exceptional “victory" moment that he had achieved through his appointment to bring the Israeli attack on Gaza to an end. Thus, the man who just a few days earlier had been showered with positive comments from Palestine, the Arabs, Israel, and the international arena, has now turned into the object of criticism targeting his dictatorial exclusionary actions in the practice of power in Egypt. Any democratic country cannot but criticize such actions. President Mohammad Morsi was expected to be wiser that he actually turned out to be through his latest decisions. He is aware of the extent of the polarization in his country as a result of the revolution's repercussions. This polarization is seen among those who feel they have won and those who feel that they lost their pre-revolution positions. Even if he does not like to admit it, Morsi is also aware of the level of cautiousness among large groups of Egyptians and non Egyptians concerning the Muslim Brotherhood, whom he represents. This cautiousness is caused by skepticism concerning the Brotherhood's acceptance of the opposing ideas and parties and their respect for the rules of the democratic game, which prevents monopolization of power and unaccountability. Morsi soon revealed the reality of the Brotherhood and their rejection of the plurality of opinions and multilateral political participation. Morsi has already had a confrontation with the highest judiciary authorities in Egypt concerning the dissolving of the People's Council. However, his latest constitutional announcement exceeded his earlier action since he blocked the way for any appeals of the president's decision pending the concluding of the new resolution and the subsequent election of a People's Council. This means that Morsi's aim during this phase is to mold the state's institutions in a way that serves his and his supporters' interests. However, the latest confrontation between Mohammad Morsi and his opponents, i.e. the majority of the Egyptians, has several advantages. Most importantly, the wide protests proved that no president in the era of the so-called Arab Spring will be able to practice power in a way similar to the power practice of the ousted regimes. The people have gained their momentum back and they now feel that they can decide their own fate. This is another mistake of Morsi, that of underestimating this popular pulse and misjudging the true meaning of the Egyptians' revolution against the regime of Hosni Mubarak. As for the second plus, its consists of Morsi's expressed readiness to take part in a dialogue with the Higher Judiciary Council and his willingness to revoke some of the powers he had allowed himself, and limiting them to the laws and decisions pertaining to sovereign acts. However, this does not negate the fact that a major rift has occurred between him and the majority of the Egyptians concerning the soundness of his decisions and his democratic convictions. This rift has uncovered the Brothers' true colors: this is a group that is ready to say one thing and act in a completely opposite direction, for the purpose of monopolizing power and pushing the opposition away.
