For matters to deteriorate into a military confrontation between the Free Syrian Army (FSA), or militias that claim to represent it, and armed Syrian Kurdish groups in the province of al-Hassaka, is no longer a remote possibility. In truth, a conflict as such in Hassaka or Aleppo, or in both and in between them, may deteriorate beyond the narrow factionalist scope to the broader ethno-sectarian one. If this happens, then it would be no less detrimental to the revolution and the future of Syria than a Sunni-Alawi conflict which, in turn, is earth-shattering by itself. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the Arab-Kurdish relationship, which covers the northern border of the country, is the most crucial strategic and geopolitical intra-Syrian relationship. To avert a dangerous scenario as such, there must be an early compromise that inevitably involves each group taking into account the demands and sensitivities of the other. To be sure, Arab leaders and activists, when they ignore the existing differentiation in the name of Syrian patriotism and “brotherhood", are not doing the truth any favours. These voices sometimes promote, albeit sometimes unwittingly, an authoritarian mentality that does not take into account the particularities of smaller ethnic and religious entities. In this sense, and in the context of a simple and outdated notion of patriotism, there is a lack of criticism of the sensitive nature of the deployment of the FSA in Kurdish regions, and there are reservations regarding the participation of Kurdish groups which want to keep their independence in the Syrian revolution. In truth, there should be a welcoming Arab attitude towards the participation of such groups from an independent position, which would constitute a seed for a combined vision of a future Syria as a pluralistic and decentralized entity, and an exercise that is conducive to that perception, at the same time. The perception of Syria as a country with a pure Arab identity is forever gone now, and along with it the myths of “brotherly" subjugation that Syrian Kurds have long paid the price for. On the other hand, especially in the current political situation, and if a useful conclusion is to be reached, there must be complete political separation between the Syrian Kurds and the Turkish Kurds and their respective concerns. To be sure, the Turkish Kurds have chronic and complex issues with their regime, problems that require endless debates and discussions. What is certain is that this should concern Syrian Kurds less than the current Syrian need for Turkey should, whether Turkey is ruled by Erdogan or not, in order to topple the Assad regime. This is almost a self-evident and incontrovertible truth. If the Syrian Kurds are seeking after their national rights in Syria, then they must also pay heed to their national duties towards the country. This is not limited to distancing oneself from the terrorist practices of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), but also involves abandoning the delusions of transnational Kurdish nationalism - which are nothing more than the anti-theses of transnational Arab nationalism. If what is required of Syrian Arabs is to break the centralized and tyrannical form of patriotism in favor of another that is more welcoming and accommodating, then it is also required of Syrian Kurds to subscribe to this new form of Syrian patriotism, and place its interests among their top priorities. This is today embodied by the bid to topple the regime. The fact of the matter is that good intentions do not always guarantee preventing guns from being aimed in the wrong direction, i.e. to where the regime that must be ousted wants: This is how we end up facing a shameful scene where Arabs battle the “separatism" of the Kurds, while the Kurds battle the Arabs' “collaboration" with Turkey, all while Bashar al-Assad rubs his hands and revels in what he sees.
