The head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has clearly determined the kind of change that he wants when he criticized the experience of the March 14 coalition, and announced his decision to join ranks with the president of the republic “who is the sole guarantor in major matters”. However, Jumblatt had repeatedly stressed in the past that it was the March 14's vision of the state that would be the “guarantor” of everyone. This project, regardless of the gaps, mistakes and the shortcomings that engulfed it, and the nature of the forces under its umbrella, is a strategic vision for Lebanon, where the sects currently compete with the state to ensure the rights and the duties of the citizens. As for joining ranks with the president, regardless of the great ambitions that President Suleiman carries, it is a temporary political position. In this sense, one should scrutinize Jumblatt's motives behind his criticism of the March 14 coalition along with himself, and also the motives behind his modification of his slogans in this period, and at this current political moment - as he sees it and determines its bold lines. This political moment started on the 7th of May 2008, when Hezbollah - backed by the Amal Movement and its allies – used its arms in Beirut and the mountain to face the March 14 forces, including the Progressive Socialist Party and its Druze supporters. Ever since the first moment of this armed confrontation, Jumblatt realized that he cannot withstand the burden of a military confrontation with Hezbollah. This is not only because of the unequal balance of power, but also because Hezbollah would not hesitate to manipulate this imbalance in order to reduce what little influence remains for the Druze leader and his supporters. Also since the outset of the confrontation, his main concern became the need to cease the confrontation, prevent its reoccurrence between the two Shiite parties and the Druze party, and to reunite the Druze under a formula that bypasses the current division in Lebanon. Jumblatt, who provoked the crisis of May 7 by threatening to bring down Siniora's government unless it issues the two infamous decrees – against which Hezbollah and its allies responded by using their weapons – has been working on two tracks ever since that time. While he maintained his relations with the leader of the Future Movement Sa'd al-Hariri, he went on cozying up to the Amal Movement and its leader Speaker Nabih Birri and Hezbollah before eventually meeting with the latter's Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah. All of this happened in the context of his self-criticism during the previous period, with the results of this criticism leading him to adopt the general policy lines of the 8 March coalition. At the same time, Jumblatt attempted to reach out to his traditional Druze opponent Deputy Talal Arsalan, and then his other Druze opponent former Minister Wiam Wahhab, all in order to avoid any explosion within the sect itself, and to unite the latter on the political basis formed through his dialogue with Hezbollah. During his speech at the opening of the General Assembly of his party last Sunday, Jumblatt denounced sectarianism and animosity against other co-citizens, which he was insinuating to have been the product of the 14 March coalition. But by that time, he had already completed the process of safeguarding his Druze sect from the potential threat posed by the Shiite expansion - which he had repeatedly criticized in the past – even if this comes at the expense of his traditional alliance with the family of Hariri and by extension, the Sunnis that they represent. In this vein, the recorded footage in which Jumblatt attacked the Christians and the Maronites specifically, and which was subtly leaked, was only a prelude for the campaign he waged on his previous allies in the March 14. This was in order for him to distance himself from them, especially the former President Amin Gemayel whose name is associated with the 17 May agreement with Israel, and Samir Geagea whose name is associated with the civil war and the war of the mountain. As such, the sectarian “protection” of the Druze became complete, through a rapprochement with the developing Shiite forces and through moving away from their opponents who gathered under the March 14 group. Meanwhile, the criticism of sectarianism loses its meaning in the context of the project for a state that embraces and protects everyone. However, the feelings of concern about oneself can turn into sectarian calculations that amount in their damage to the sectarianism dreaded by everyone, if not being worse. Maybe it is alright to disguise these calculations with talks about Arabism, Palestine, resistance, and Arab backwardness, so that the echo of self-criticism may reach to where real protection lies, along with real influence over the different Lebanese sides that are now portrayed as the source of all fears. As for the left and its present forces which Jumblatt has always despised and considered as a mere tool in the political conflict and not an expression of the struggles and the demands of unions and syndicates, it is in fact an argument against all factions in Lebanon, and not only the March 14 group. This is because all forces in Lebanon have dealt with the social issue as a mere extension of the political conflict, and the sectarian concerns and attempts for domination. This will however remain unchanged as long as the division in the country is of a sectarian nature. With [Jumblatt's] withdrawal from the March 14 coalition, defending his decision to join ranks with the president remains simpler, and safer for the possibility of his return to March 14, than if he had joined the March 8 coalition.
