The recent developments affecting the Syrian crisis will not change the reality of the ongoing war. They will also not break the balance of power on the ground, one which is continuously extending this war, fueling the anarchy that has started to expand in the region, and pushing the situation in several of the region's countries towards the epitome of tensions and escalation, while increasing the speculations and wishes. But these are mere illusions, considering that neither the regime in Damascus is on the brink of the abyss – although it is known that it will never stand on its feet again – nor is Turkey heading towards war, although parliament authorized Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government to mobilize the army to carry out operations across the border. Moreover, Iran is not about to collapse or trade the discontinuation of its nuclear enrichment program with the lifting of the economic sanctions, no matter how much the riyal were to falter. Also, Lebanon has officially not turned the page of “abstinence" even if Lebanese forces have become implicated in the fight in favor of this or that side. As for Jordan, which is attempting to contain its dangerous domestic situation, it is not showing any willingness to engage in escalation with its neighbor, although some speculated that this could earn the authority some strength on the internal level and more external support in the face of its Islamic detractors. Since the eruption of the revolution in Syria, it became clear that the region will not be spared by the chaos and the tensions. As for the emerging domestic crises in the concerned countries, they proved that this revolution has become part of the internal political action in the neighboring states, which will deepen these states' inability to provide the necessary elements for a regional settlement, or at best motivate them to ensure the right climate that would allow Special UN-Arab Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to seal a deal without which there will be chaos. This might be the “creative chaos" which they heralded and from whose womb the new regional order will surface! In 1999, it was enough for Turkey to mobilize its troops on the border with Syria in order for Damascus to surrender Abdullah Öcalan to it. At the time, the political and military commands convened under the chairmanship of Hafiz al-Assad and looked into all the options, including responding to Ankara's threats and raising the challenge in its face. But President Hosni Mubarak intervened, conducting a quick visit to Riyadh and then to Ankara, which gave him a tape revealing that the “wanted man" is living in Damascus, and conveyed a serious warning. The late president consequently had no other option but to appease his war leaders and assign his security body to arrange the exit of the Kurdistan Workers' Party chief from the country, to allow the Turkish security to track him down and detain him. And this is what happened. Hence, over a decade ago, Turkey threatened to use force, as it could not tolerate the consequences of the Syrian support offered to the PKK's operations and what this ensued in terms of the undermining of domestic stability. Today, it is repeating the same scenario, but under different circumstances. Indeed, President Bashar al-Assad has not stopped trying to export his crisis across the border, probably thinking that by leading Turkey towards a field confrontation, he would pave the way before the intervention of others in the ongoing war. At this level, his wager on the intervention of his Iranian, Russian or Chinese allies might be misplaced, considering that it is unlikely that the latter would implicate their troops in the confrontation to defend his regime. Moreover, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government does not wish to slide towards the Syrian quagmire, seeing how the repetition of the border incidents between the two countries and the ramifications of the ongoing flow of refugees and armed opposition groups sweeping the streets of the Turkish towns and villages near the border, are provoking disgruntlement in the ranks of the Turkish citizens and some political forces on the domestic arena. And all these factors are increasing the tensions on Ankara's government. This is why Erdogan had no other option but to raise the challenge and threaten with his willingness to engage in war. He is not only concerned about the harassment carried out by the Syrian regime and attempts to drag him towards confrontation, but also by the growing animosity shown by the opposition parties and some Turkish components towards what his government is offering to the Syrian National Council, the Free Army and some armed groups. The man does not wish to lose that internal and external glow he reaped during his party's last conference any time soon, especially as he is preparing for local elections, and then for parliamentary and presidential ones next year. He is even more alarmed by the flow of groups of Mujahedeen and extremists into Syria, and the threat that this could constitute on Turkey itself in the future. Ankara is not ready to see Jihadist groups positioned a few meters off its border, and attempting to repeat the Iraqi experience witnessed in the mid nineties. As for the Syrian shells which fell on the Turkish village, they were not the only ones that alarmed the Security Council, as its fears were also fueled by the recent explosions in Aleppo and what they revealed at the level of the future of the situation in Syria. These fears are also shared by Ankara which insisted since the beginning on monopolizing the card of the Syrian political and military opposition with all its forces. Indeed, it does not want to lose what it built throughout a year and seven months, without this meaning that Ankara wants war and is awaiting the right pretext to carry out intervention on the field. Since the beginning, it warned against a slide towards the Syrian quagmire. Nonetheless, a mistake at the level of the Syrian regime's calculations could push it to engage in actions against its will, knowing that intervention features numerous and non-domestic calculations, whether at the level of NATO, Russia or Iran! This heat, which was triggered by the Syrian crisis on the Turkish arena, was not far from the mounting internal tensions in Iran. Indeed, Tehran that is living to the beat of the stringent international economic sanctions, saw its troubles increase and the disgruntlement heightened following the announcement made by some of its leaders in regard to logistic and financial support offered to Damascus. True, the nuclear file is the main headline of the conflict between Tehran, Washington and its allies, but what is also true is that the excessive Iranian support offered to President Al-Assad's regime has turned the Syrian crisis into an open front in this conflict. To the Islamic Republic, Syria's loss not only means the collapse of a major position which will undermine all the credit it has built and in which it has invested throughout decades, but could also instigate and encourage the Iranian street to draw inspiration from the Arab spring. The Iranian support to the regime in Damascus will certainly not be halted. And no matter how high the value of this support were to get, it will not rise to the level of the losses endured by Iranian economy, especially following the entry in force of the embargo on the oil sector. Still, this aid is provoking people's anger, as they are suffering from the collapse of the riyal, the rise of the unemployment rates, inflation and the spread of poverty, and is fueling the open conflict between the conservatives with the imminence of the presidential elections in June. So far, the only constant is that no power or side in Iran is willing to compromise over the nuclear file, no matter how hard American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton tries to trade the discontinuation of the enrichment activities with the lifting of the sanctions. Indeed, the course of this file for the last ten years confirms that the nuclear project enjoys national consensus. And while it is unlikely to see the fall of the regime due to the stringent and ongoing sanctions, the mounting division within the ruling elite over the ways to handle economic collapse, the possible rebellion of the poor who have been acting as the regime's cornerstone in the face of the Green Revolution in 2009, or even the occurrence of a surprise at the level of the Syrian crisis – such as the fall of the regime – might push Tehran to reconsider its position, calculations and conditions vis-à-vis dialogue with the superpowers, especially the United States. Such a development, if its conditions are ripe, might result in some sort of deal which will not be tackled by the command of Guide Ali Khamenei for the time being, especially as the term of its archenemy Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is nearing its end. Furthermore, the American administration is now willing to engage in any dialogue with Tehran in light of the imminent presidential battle, and would rather postpone it until the election of a new Iranian president, and after the sanctions cause further confusion and exhaustion, which is already being seen now. In the meantime, the war option with which Benjamin Netanyahu is still threatening in the context of his domestic battles is completely excluded! Until mid next year, who can guarantee stability along the border between Syria and Turkey? Who can guarantee the containment of the street in Iran? And more importantly, who can control the developments in Syria and the sustainment of the current balance of powers? What if war were to break out along one of the fronts of the open conflict between the United States and Iran in the Great Middle East? And finally, what about Russia's calculations?
