Arab regimes that reigned throughout the 20th century are now crumbling, making way for new ones. But some do not hesitate to publically call for the partitioning of certain countries, believing that this is the “optimal" solution for these countries' problems. Yet these voices overlook the fact that the primary cause of the problems is bad governance that has failed to reach a social compact among the components of the people, and then between this people and its rulers. In addition, the previous regimes relied on repression, the deliberate lack of transparency, and preferential treatment to a sect or ethnicity at the expense of others, amid abject poverty blighting large segments of the people, and obscene wealth in the hands of a minority. Despite the fact that several Arab countries are under risk of partitioning, Sudan remains the only Arab country to have actually undergone it. In truth, the major powers play an important role in these transformations, where oil is a common factor in many instances. Everyone needs oil, and oil revenues are a crucial part of economies in the region. Interestingly, however, partitioning or its omens create many new agendas and problems of a rather local character. Here, the disputes revolve around how to export crude oil, distribute it locally, and the demarcation of provinces, especially those which hold promising oil reserves. Even the distribution of water resources is subject to disputes. All these agendas will dominate outstanding problems, from modernization to the improvement of living standards in the country, and defending economic interests and sovereignty – not to mention the difficulty of establishing a transparent system that curtails the culture of corruption. But because the world is heading towards creating larger economic and political blocs, it is not going to extend any interest to mini-states that may well become the first victims of the historical race that we are witnessing. In recent weeks, Sudan and South Sudan reached a deal on the sharing of oil revenues, whereby Juba pays Khartoum about USD 3 billion in compensation for economic losses caused to Khartoum since the secession in July 2011, and USD 9 in transit fees for each barrel of crude oil exported through Sudan's Read Sea ports. Needless to say, the mere fact that an oil deal of this kind has been reached is a “victory", in the eyes of local politicians. Yet as this experience – and other ones – shows, the deal is not ready for implementation. For it to come into force, many political and security-related issues must be resolved, including an agreement over the fate of the disputed region of Abyei, in addition to Khartoum's approval to facilitate the flow of food and humanitarian material from its Red Sea ports to Juba. Juba has suspended crude oil production (about 350,000 barrels per day) due to the recent military conflict between the two countries, which halted production until the end of the year. This means that the deal will not be implemented until crude oil exports resume and revenues are collected again. The suspension of production also means losses in the hundreds of millions of dollars. There is another hurdle facing this deal: Juba is currently in the process of studying the construction of a pipeline to export crude oil to the Indian Ocean via Kenya, which practically gives Juba, in the event it is built (at a cost of about USD 3 billion), the opportunity to ignore its agreement with Khartoum. However, it does not appear that Khartoum will sit idly by with regard to this pipeline, and may resort to putting various forms of pressure on Juba to impede or even stop it, which may threaten the current deal. A similar situation exists in Iraqi Kurdistan, where the Regional Government (KRG) decided to build two pipelines through Turkey to export crude oil and natural gas “whether the government in Baghdad likes it or not", according to the Minister of Natural Resources in the Kurdistan region Mr. Ashti Hawrami. But building the two pipelines to export Iraqi oil and gas cannot happen without the consent of the Iraqi government. No matter how bad the dispute between an Iraqi group and the government in Baghdad gets, as is the case today with the government in Erbil, this must never undermine the interests and sovereignty of the country. The first repercussions of this have begun to emerge, albeit they remain limited to statements such as Baghdad's threat to carry out an economic boycott of both Erbil and Ankara. We must not forget that the creation of mini-states is the result of wars and tragedies that spanned decades. This is the case in Sudan, Iraq and to some extent in Syria and Yemen. More conflicts are expected, possibly resulting in reduced quotas of water resources and bombings against crude oil and natural gas pipelines. In Yemen, the liquefied gas (LNG) plant was shut down following the bombing of the gas pipeline that feeds it, twice in the past three months. The plant is the biggest and most important economic project in Yemen. Meanwhile, a pipeline carrying crude oil from Iraq to Turkey was bombed twice in the past few weeks. In chaotic situations under weak governments, acts like these become “normal", when in effect they are very costly for the country, with the losses being in the hundreds of millions of dollars at the very least. But the worst fear here is that the disputes over “economic interests" may escalate to devastating civil wars, which is happening in a number of countries now. * Mr. Khadduri is a consultant for MEES Oil & Gas (MeesEnergy)
