Those in Iraq opposed to Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, and with them the regimes of neighboring countries, are waging a difficult battle to impeach him, transform Iraq's political orientation and remove the link tying Iran to Syria – in addition to diminishing Iran's influence in its neighborhood in the Gulf. Everyone knows that there are numerous obstacles preventing such a long-term strategic goal from being reached, most prominently the domestic alliances that exist between the constituents of Iraqi society, which have turned into political entities governed by delicate balances – meaning that any imbalance there could lead to a civil war. Maliki's opponents are relying on his former ally Muqtada Al-Sadr, who struggles against him for leadership, has become his rival, demands with others his impeachment, and accuses him of monopolizing power. There are several reasons for the dispute between the two men, some of them old, other having newly emerged during Maliki's first term in office, when the latter waged a campaign against Sadr's supporters and armed fighters in the cities of the South, and threw hundreds of them in jail. He still reminds of these events all those who accuse him of sectarianism, especially those who blame him for having made use of the judiciary to remove Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi. Yet despite his rigid stance against Maliki, and despite his pledge to his new allies to remain with them in their efforts to impeach him – which goes against the opinion voiced by his marja (religious authority of reference) Kazem Al-Haeri, who issued a fatwa deeming it unacceptable for a secularist to head the government – Sadr remains within the framework of his alliance with Iran, and his disagreements with others remain within the framework of domestic politics. Some place such disagreements within the framework of a personal dispute with Maliki, and of competition over the leadership of the National Alliance, especially after having marginalized Ammar Al-Hakim and restored Ahmed Chalabi to his normal size within this alliance, and after having shown his strength in terms of popularity, believing that this would allow him to obtain a greater share of power. Those who oppose Maliki face yet another obstacle to his impeachment and to turning Iraq's foreign policy from a strong alliance with Iran to an alliance with its opponents, or at the very least to a neutral position. This obstacle is embodied in President Jalal Talabani and his political party. Talabani has his own Kurdish considerations, the region where he holds influence is contiguous to Iran and he takes great care not to antagonize it. He believes that his friendship with Iran provides him with the space to maneuver in his struggle with the other Kurdish leader, Massoud Barzani, who is allied with Turkey and has managed over the years of US occupations to reinforce his leadership and to take control of matters in Kurdistan, while Talabani's party has witnessed a schism led by the party's second-in-command, Nawshirwan Mustafa, who now heads the Kurdish opposition. Transforming Iraqi policy from an alliance with Iran to opposition to it, or to neutrality, requires more than drawing in Sadr against Maliki, and more than convincing Talabani to stand alongside those who oppose him. Indeed, even if this were to happen, and if Maliki's opponents manage to impeach him, domestic alliances and balances will still prevent Baghdad from adopting a policy independent from its neighborhood. The era of Saddam Hussein will not be repeated in Iraq.
