Iraq will be going through a delicate phase in terms of security until a consensus is reached by competing coalitions over the Prime Minister, a consensus that might in turn be one of the “surprises” and outcomes of the recent elections. Because gradual – not complete – stability is part of the cycle of justifications for US military presence in Iraq, the personality of the Prime Minister is important, not just for the Iraqis, but also for the regional players as well as the great powers, for strategic and oil-related reasons. Indeed, oil availability in Iraq will not be complete before 2014 or 2015, and such availability is of the utmost importance in international and regional strategies, knowing that Iraq holds the second largest crude oil reserve and enough natural gas to appeal to major countries. Moreover, the situation of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the nuclear map relies heavily on the shape the future of Iraq will take, knowing that China and Russia both have oil interests that are essential for their strategies and that the ruling establishment in the United States clings to Iraq regardless of whether President Barack Obama is aware of this or is ignoring it. What can be celebrated is Iraq having eluded dispersal and division and having remained united despite divisions within it. International and regional disputes have failed to paralyze Iraq, and in fact there are high odds of it recovering to later become a model of democracy. Iran does not own Iraq as it imagined to after having been handed it as a “gift” by the US war in Iraq. Indeed, Tehran today is suffering in Iraq, and what the elections have resulted in is an indication of this. Turkey is benefiting from the international and regional state of affairs, and it is reinforcing its roles in Iraq as a regional Sunni leadership, as a party opposed to the growth of the Kurdish position at the level of Iraq and the region, as a partner of one kind or another for Syria as it regains its role in Iraq, and as an international player that formulates trade-offs and deals between the United States and Iran, including what resembles the sharing of influence in Iraq. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, the decision taken by the US about Iraq is one of strategic, oil-related and military interests, as well as of those of “positioning” itself as world leadership. This is what other major countries are aware of and have an understanding over, either in terms of complementarity or competition. Indeed, they are all buying time while waiting for oil availability in Iraq and all want gradual stability. And it is for this reason that the personality of the new Prime Minister is important in international and regional equations, not just local ones. The new directions taken by Iraq indicate the possibility of it emerging from the phase of political and ethnic sectarianism and religious control, and heading towards building the state and its institutions, especially those concerned with security and stability. This means looking for an independent national alternative, in the wake of elections that have produced the dismantling of large sectarian or ethnic coalitions. Hence some consider that what will follow is the search for a person over which national consensus would be achieved to take on such a task, and that such a search will be arduous and might lead to a state of complete halt, and then to surprises. Recurrent talk of a US-Iranian-Saudi-Syrian agreement over the head of the Iraqi National Movement list Ayad Allawi may clash with a different reality, especially if Iran considers the outcome of the elections to be an indicator that is not in its interest. Allawi, the secularist Shiite who has appeared as a leader for the Sunnis, has come as a pleasant surprise, as he represents an important sign of the decline of religious and sectarian control. Nevertheless, he might not be able to gain the agreement of the other coalitions, necessary for his candidacy to the post of Prime Minister. The State of Law coalition headed by incumbent Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki insists on putting forth Maliki as candidate for a second term in office, but there are major reservations over Maliki taking on a second term, at the level of Iraq, the region and the world. In fact, Syria, as has been reported, has informed Iran of its opposition to another term for Maliki, and has played a significant role in supporting Allawi, over which it agrees with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America. All of these parties have their reasons for opposing Maliki, knowing that Syria's reasons are the accusations leveled by Maliki against Syria of overlooking Baathists crossing its borders to get involved in the bombing of government centers in Iraq. The Iraqi National Coalition is the third winning force in the elections, and it wants to put forth its own candidate for the post of Prime Minister. The most prominent candidates for the post from among the National Coalition are Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) headed by Ammar Al-Hakim; Ahmed Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress (INC); and Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, head of the National Reform Movement (Islah). Chalabi's candidacy is nearly impossible, considering the tremendous debate surrounding him, his role and his striking relationship with Iran. Jaafari has previously assumed the post, as have Maliki and Allawi. Adel Abdul-Mahdi would seem like an acceptable candidate, had not his partners within the Iraqi National Coalition been such fierce competitors of his. Indeed, one day before the elections, Muqtada Al-Sadr, who is affiliated with the Iraqi National Coalition as is Ammar Al-Hakim, in a striking move, issued a statement in which he put forth the current Interior Minister, Jawad Al-Bulani, as candidate to be the next Prime Minister. The Iraqi Unity coalition headed by Jawad Al-Bulani did not participate in the elections under the umbrella of the Iraqi National Movement led by Ayad Allawi, perhaps for reasons related to Bulani's desire to be the “settlement candidate” after the coalition battles following elections. If the Iraqi National Coalition is bound to its internal competition, undermining Adel Abdul-Mahdi's chances, if the return of Nouri Al-Maliki to power is unlikely, and if there is great resistance against Ayad Allawi assuming the position of Prime Minster, some consider that the possibilities of resorting to Jawad Al-Bulani would offer noteworthy scenarios. According to them, Maliki could resort to putting forth Bulani for the position of Prime Minister if he himself were to fail to obtain the necessary consensus over his candidacy to the post. That is one possibility. Bulani could also be the choice of the Iraqi National Movement list if it reaches the conclusion that its candidate would not be agreed upon. Furthermore, the Iraqi National Coalition has expressed, through Sadr's statement, the possibility of putting forth Bulani as candidate to overcome the crises. Thus, in their view, Bulani might become prominent as candidate for any of these three coalitions, under the pretext that his allies are present in both the lists of the Iraqi National Movement and the Iraqi National Coalition. However, there is yet another scenario which those close to Bulani consider possible, if his candidacy does not come at the hands of one of the three forces, which would be after matters have reached a state of complete halt in negotiations and alliances between coalitions. Then Bulani would come as a “settlement candidate” to resolve the coming problems, resulting from the repercussions of the past and those of the future. Those are scenarios. What does Jawad Al-Bulani prefer? It is difficult to predict, but those close to him believe that he would prefer to be the settlement candidate. They say that the three former Prime Ministers – Allawi, Jaafari and Maliki – came from outside of Iraq, and that “the Iraqis now want a Prime Minister from the interior”. Those who know Bulani well say that he does not have the complex of Sunnis and Shiites, and that he asserts Iraq's Arab identity and does not consider Iraq's Shiites to be followers of Iran. Bulani considers Iraq to be an important Arab country, one that should return to playing a strategic role in the region, which requires open and sincere dialogue with Arab countries, as he considers that Iraq's interest does not lie in standing outside the Arab community. He wants Iraq's relations with neighboring Arab countries, as well as with Turkey and Iran, to be good relations based on respecting sovereignty and not interfering in each other's affairs, relations built on the basis of the development of interests. Those well informed about what Bulani is thinking say that he wants a qualitative shift to take place in Iraq's relations with Arab countries, or to “reinvent relations” with countries such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. Bulani wants the relationship with Iran to be part of the new arrangements for the region. He wants a solution to border problems between Iraq and Iran, and to work to prevent the fabrication of crises. Iran does not want Bulani in power, but it might not want to be provocative and might accept him to harmonize with the United States. Bulani, on his part, considers Iran to be Iraq's most important strategic partner in the future, and considers this relationship to be important at all different levels, including what Iraq needs in terms of international support. Indeed, he wants a true partnership with the strong world – i.e. the United States, Europe, China and Russia – for many reasons, among them Iraq's debts, bringing it out from under Chapter VII and restoring its power in terms of oil. In other words, Bulani wants to reequip Iraq, at the level of security and politics, to take its place and standing in the world of oil. Indeed, he considers that Iraq should be the real alternative to what the world faces in terms of crises with Iran and with Venezuela, for example. Interest in the Iraqi oil industry is a cornerstone of his ambitious political program, because he believes that this could represent a sustainable source of oil and gas stability in the global market and in the world. Kirkuk always comes up when talking about oil in Iraq, and with Kirkuk comes up talk of Kurdish blocs and of what is required by settlements and coalitions as well as by domestic and regional factors. Turkey does not want the President of Iraq to be Kurdish, and some Sunnis have begun demanding that the presidency be Sunni Arab and not Kurdish. Bulani considers that there is a need for an Arab-Kurdish resolution of the issue of Kirkuk, and he does not agree with Turkey about the presidency. In fact, he is most likely to cling to the current President, Jalal Talabani, if he indeed obtains the candidacy to the post of Prime Minister. What will happen after the elections, during the period that precedes the formation of a government, will be the responsibility of Interior Minister Jawad Al-Bulani, at the security level. However, what those closely informed of what Bulani is thinking are saying is that he is determined during this period to intensify political efforts so as to gain prominence on the political scene as a man of security who clings to the ironclad nature of the state and of the law, who fights corruption and political sectarianism, and who speaks of a program to build state institutions. Indeed, he is positioning himself to be the settlement and surprise candidate. This phase between the elections and reaching an agreement over the Prime Minister will not be easy for the Iraqis, yet Iraq has so far emerged from the bottleneck of division and dispersal. And despite the fact that security in Iraq has not yet been achieved, the portents of maintaining of its unity and the emergence of democracy there are encouraging indications.
