When the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces assumed the presidential authority in Egypt after President Hosni Mubarak stepped down, all the Egyptian forces – including those that keep calling for million-man demonstrations – agreed over this smooth transition of power and approved the roadmap drawn up by the council. They all participated in the legislative elections and the first round of the presidential elections. And despite the random criticism addressed to the military council's management of power and the objections voiced against some of its decisions which it sometimes reconsidered, it seemed that all the political powers – except for marginal and non-influential figures – accepted the rules of this game. This included the prosecution of figures from the former regime on charges of corruption and abuse of power, as well as the sentences issued during the process. True, this consent was not always smooth and featured skirmishes, demonstrations, demands and the fall of dead in more than one incident; and true, a fierce conflict erupted between some powers and the military council over internal political or constitutional issues. But what is also true is that none of the major and influential powers – especially the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis – opposed since the beginning the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces' handling of the country's affairs. Indeed, they all approved the roadmap it drew up, and apart from youth powers that criticized the management of the transitional phase, everyone dealt with the council as a legitimate authority and the guarantor of smooth transition to civilians. This consensus was enhanced by the legislative elections, which brought an overwhelming Islamic majority to the People's Assembly and the Shura Council. Even following the announcement of the results of the first round of the presidential elections and after the competition became limited to MB candidate Muhammad Morsi and the candidate of the military institution, General Ahmed Shafik, everyone continued to uphold the rules of this game in which they have engaged since Mubarak stepped down. As to the political campaign against Shafik, it came in the context of the electoral propaganda, and confirmed that the Islamists – along with a faction including various civil forces – did not relinquish their acceptance of the rules of the game, and were even widely engaged in it. The sentences in the case of the killing of the demonstrators provoked wide protests and prompted new political demands, going against the previous conditions related to the transition of power. Hence, the opponents of the previous regime went from being politicians promoting a certain course to being judges, sentencing the former president and his aides and determining the rulings based on their political opinions and positions toward Mubarak's regime, and not based on the laws in force. This took place in the context of what some dubbed “revolutionary courts," i.e. ones in which all the laws governing criminal trials in the country are violated and political trials are adopted. This, as it is known, fully contradicts all the previous procedures, and particularly the judicial laws. When the MB rode the wave of condemnation toward the last sentences issued against Mubarak, they not only attempted to exploit the state of anger, but also denied the conditions of their engagement in the political process. And if the MB candidate does not approve the presidential council – which would include him and two candidates who have lost the presidential elections – this would fall in the context of his refusal to share power with the others, and not in the context of his respect for the political process. It would have been extremely logical to see the proposal of the formation of a presidential council upon Mubarak's departure, in order to lead the country during the transitional phase instead of the military council. But clearly, the complete opposite took place through the recognition of the military council and the approval of the political map it drew up. Nonetheless, the mere proposal of the idea of a presidential council now, means the rejection of the entire presidential electoral process and all that was reached during the last stage, and constitutes a putsch against the transitional phase. However, this putsch was very late and its cost could be very high, especially after it turned out that the military institution will not easily relinquish what it has achieved since it came to power.
