The transitional Libyan administration is struggling over the ways to deal with the arrangement of the future situation. Indeed, each position it is adopting is being recanted, whether at the level of social or electoral laws, the integration of the militias or the polarization of regions and tribes. And despite the exceptional political performance of some among its elite during the fight to topple Muammar Gaddafi's rule and the instatement of political power in the hands of the National Transitional Council, the country and its forces are still lacking an alternative project for that of the former regime, which practically annihilated all the facets of the Libyan state. In other words, the Libyans have not yet managed to set the foundations of the new state, agree over the shape of the authority and how this authority should be practiced. It is believed that this complex and intricate situation is basically linked to the nature of the forces produced by the confrontation with the former regime, as well as the repercussions of this standoff. On one hand, there is the political elite with an overall modernist and liberal inclination, one which engaged in a diplomatic battle and earned the Arab and popular support which contributed to the hastening of the regime's collapse. And with the proclamation of liberation, these forces appeared to be without a strong domestic backing to proceed with the internal program they had promoted during their diplomatic campaign. On the other hand, there are the armed militias or the so-called revolutionaries. They are the ones governing the situation on the ground, especially thanks to their regional and tribal belonging. Moreover, these militias, which stem in general from the Islamic opposition against Gaddafi, are advocating a simplistic ideology featuring the insistence on political Islam based on the field control imposed by its armed forces. Hence, there is contradiction between political powers seeking the reconstruction of the state on modern foundations at the level of the constitution and laws, and armed forces that are controlling the security situation and reacting whenever they believe that some laws and constitutional articles go against its ideology and authority on the ground. The current Libyan situation might be understandable due to the heavy inheritance left by Gaddafi, whether in terms of the numerous problems, his attempts to deplete Libyan society and its political powers, and his dismantlement of the state throughout decades during which he governed with violence and tyranny. But a few facets of this Libyan situation might also be seen at the level of the transitional phase in Egypt, despite the great divergence between the nature of the transitional stages in the two countries, the experiences of the political forces in them and the inheritance left by both former President Hosni Mubarak's regime and that of Colonel Gaddafi. In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is the one responsible for the state and its interests in the face of a mixture of powers controlled by the Islamists. The army was often considered to be the modern force in Third World societies, particularly in our region. This belief is the one that allowed that catastrophic series of coups to strip the conservative and liberal powers of their authority. Later on, this alleged modernism turned out to be a mere crust with which the military were able to govern and which is now being confronted by the Islamic powers in Egypt. Clearly, two issues are now the main object of controversy in both Libya and Egypt, i.e. the elections and their laws and the nature of the upcoming constitution. This reality reveals that the so-called revolution in the two countries is not a project of change sponsored by experienced political powers with a great and convincing popular presence, but rather features the accumulation of waves through which the sides tried to register the widest presence. And that is all. In this context, the current presidential campaign in Egypt does not go against that conclusion, seeing how the general situation was unable to reach foundations recognized by all, which leaves the door wide open before surprises and setbacks. This was seen at the level of the constitutional committee, the presidential candidacies and other issues, while not one day goes by without seeing similar setbacks in Libya. The two former regimes in Libya and Egypt collapsed before the materialization of the project of change which is the object of a tug of war between quasi-modern powers that do not have the necessary popular base to confirm their legitimacy, and traditional and Islamic conservative powers that have not experienced the authority and have not adapted to the requirements of the modern state.
