Lebanese leaders, especially the groups making up the government of Prime Minister Najib Mikati, are mired in an unending Byzantine argument, which has no usefulness other than to cover the true reasons for their disputes and crises. They are taking this debate as far as they can so that the excuse put forward by one side, in any issue, is governed by contradictions, which raise no eyebrows; they get lost issues that are tangential to their main contested issue. The leading example of this situation is the debate now underway about legalizing a rise in the ceiling of expenditure to LL 8,900 billion (around $6 billion). The Lebanese have become fed up with hearing this number, and they have also become fed up with hearing about the figure of $11 billion, which was spent by the Fouad Siniora governments between 2006 and 2009. In fact, Lebanon's domestic crisis, which has been growing since 2005, since the Lebanese institutions had to vote on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, is what the Lebanese believe is the puzzle behind the legislation of the LL 8,900 billion. The hint that the Lebanese Treasury will not be able to pay the salaries of state employees, and the talk about the need to audit the spending of $11 billion, is a red herring, to hide the reality of the struggle between two sides. The March 8 groups refuse to legalize the spending of $11 billion by Siniora's governments, because this means legalizing these governments, which used Treasury advances or the figures of budget drafts that it presented every year during this period, but were not endorsed by Parliament. However, the Parliament's convening was rejected by March 8 groups during that period. They considered Siniora's government illegitimate, while the March 14 groups refuse to legalize the LL 8,900 billion if the spending of $11 billion isn't legalized as well, in the same fashion. The March 8 camp, and especially the Free Patriotic Movement, believes that linking the two items will deprive it of the ability to continue its campaign against Siniora, under the pretext that there is no legal cover for what was spent by his government. Meanwhile, legalizing this period means that March 8 will lose the weapon of accusing its rival of illegitimately spending, and "stealing", "wasting", and squandering money. This is the accusation that the FPM needs against its rivals, to be used in next year's parliamentary elections, even though its allies Amal and Hezbollah took part in this spending, while the FPM was a part of some of these Cabinets (the one following the Doha Accord, in 2008 and 2009). Moreover, its current partners from Walid Jumblatt's bloc of ministers also took part in the governments of this period. Hezbollah also requires the "weapon" of this accusation to keep its rivals, especially Siniora, on the defensive, countering the Future movement's campaign against "Hezbollah's weapons," and the role of weapons in the coming elections. It also requires this "accusation" to counter the indictment by the STL. Both sides are saying many things in the debate, diverting the public away from the real reason lying behind it. The debate is linked to a former period of struggle, and symbolizes the essential issue, more than any figures. It symbolizes the struggle over "who governs" in the current ruling alignment. There is a growing belief that this is the essence of the matter, in the swamp of the current debate, when the dispute heats up over legalizing the spending in the government itself, between President Michel Suleiman and Jumblatt's ministers, and those of Hezbollah, Amal and General Michel Aoun. It is like the dispute among members of the government over the election law, or revamping the electricity sector, or public sector appointments to sensitive posts, etc. Thus, the complaint over "governmental paralysis" because of the dispute over spending is cover for the dispute over "who governs" within this government. The March 8 team continues with the same energy that produced this government, by virtue of a Syrian decision to bring down the Cabinet of Prime Minister Saad Hariri and distance his group from power, and overturn the majority that supported it. If it was natural for the allies of Damascus to believe that they now enjoyed decision-making power, especially since they relied on the imbalance in power on the ground that was proven by their military campaign against Beirut on 7 May 2008, then the 14 months of the Syrian crisis have convinced the other camp that something has changed in the formula that pushed forward the current ruling coalition. However, this is pushing the former group to behave as if nothing has changed, and as if the Syrian crisis is "over," and won by the regime. Therefore, they still hold power. This camp believes that even if they should acknowledge that the Syrian crisis has changed Syria's position, then this does not change the balance of power in Lebanon. This is prompting them to continue their waging of battles on issues other than the central one. It is no wonder that paralysis then is taking over the domestic scene.
