Moscow bears an equal measure of responsibility to that of Bashar al-Assad's regime, for prolonging suffering of the Syrian people and for their ‘massacre', a word used by Qatar's Prime Minister in his address to the Security Council. For one thing, it is Russia that is blocking an international condemnation of the security approach pursued by Damascus in response to its people's call for change. In truth, Moscow has been supporting this approach from the outset, by supplying the regime with the military materiel required for the crackdown, and by blocking collective international sanctions against Syria, while pontificating and offering political defense for the survival of the current regime, regardless of the atrocities it has committed. The Syrian people are ‘collateral damage' to Moscow's stances. The Russian approach to the Syrian question is in fact a part of a comprehensive political-military strategy that perceives the crisis in the context of the conflict with Western NATO nations, a conflict in which Damascus occupies a prominent position. For Moscow, the number of victims who fall every day in Syrian cities and villages is not important. In fact, neither is President Assad, given that the Syrian Foreign Minister denied that the latter was an ‘ally' of his country, and said that Moscow is not insistent on Assad staying in power, but is instead concerned by what Syria represents in the context of Russia's broad strategy. The actual problem lies not only in keeping the naval base in Tartus, as important as that may be, or in the arms sales to a country that cannot afford them, but also in Syria remaining, in its entirety, a forward base linked to the network of Russian interests. This is in the context of what Russia perceives as a necessity to counter a Western ‘siege' of Moscow, being applied from every side. Losing the Syrian ‘pawn' in this game of global chess may lead to the subsequent fall of the Iranian pawn, and the possible repercussions this would have over the current tug of war with the West in Central Asian republics like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, in addition to Georgia, after Russia had all but lost the Western European front. There is then a complete dichotomy between, on the one hand, the Arab countries seeking to implement an interim solution in Syria to stop the tragedy and ongoing bloodshed, being the party most concerned with Arab affairs, and what Moscow is sparing no effort to prevent from changing, on the other. Deliberations at the Security Council have demonstrated that it is not possible to reconcile the two projects, or to persuade Moscow of the wisdom of a gradual solution, despite both the Arab and international emphasis on ruling out the idea of military intervention. Although the continuation of the Syrian uprising is not pending Russia's approval or the Security Council's agreement over a resolution, a tightened international siege on the Syrian regime may precipitate its collapse and limit human and economic losses. This conflict between the Arab and Russian concerns leaves no other options to the Arab countries, having exhausted almost all diplomatic means of persuasion, except to perhaps resort to other means such as a political and economic boycott. Despite the fact that annual trade between Russia and the Arab countries combined does not exceed $ 12 billion, a large fraction of which being with Syria itself, a boycott may have a significant moral effect, especially as the Russians seem keen on developing ties with the Arab world, in particular the Gulf countries (for example seeking to hold ‘trade week' events in some GCC nations soon). The Syrians are paying a price in blood for a battle they have nothing to do with, waged by the Russians for the sake of their own interests. So let the Russians pay a price as well then.
