The debate has waned over the nature of the political system that will rule Egypt after the transitional period, as political forces have agreed that the constitution would focus on the fact that the system of rule would be a mixed presidential and parliamentary system. Thus the President would be charged with the tasks of foreign policy and national security issues, while the government would handle the issues of people's daily lives and domestic policy. Yet Egypt's problem has gone beyond the issue of the political system's form, to the circumstances that would allow such a system to govern in the first place. And because the Military Council has insisted on moving forward with the roadmap it has laid out for the transfer of whatever powers it still holds to a civilian president, and rejected the growing demands for it to leave power to a civilian council or a temporary president, the Egyptian scene will remain the same until the new president swears the constitutional oath next May or June. Until then, those opposed to the military will escalate their protests, and will devise means other than those they have been using for a whole year of military rule. They will not be satisfied with million-man marches on Tahrir Square, or protests aimed at the Interior Ministry, the Parliament or the headquarters of the Military Council, and they will not put a stop to their campaign on social media websites, and on satellite television channels or shows that sympathize with or support them. On the other hand, state institutions, such as the Military Council, the Parliament and the Judiciary, will all move forward in implementing their roadmaps, until the next president comes and the new constitution appears, without defusing the conflict between those institutions and the momentum of the street, led by Liberal, Leftist and non-traditional political movements, as well as young people unaffiliated with any political forces. It may seem in appearance that the issue is only natural, and some may consider that the passing of time and the completion of the military's roadmap – in addition to “revolutionary forces” being reassured to the fact that the army will leave, the Council will hand over power to the new president and will not turn against democracy or lust after power – will be sure to resolve contradictions, and that the remaining demands of the Revolution will be carried forward by the new president and the government he will form from the political party holding parliamentary majority, and will be implemented in phases through a government and a president elected by free popular will. But this is oversimplification that ignores what could result from the persistence of such a situation for the future of the country, and the impact of this on the ability of the next government to resolve the problems and complications of the past, as well as to deal with the changing circumstances of the next phase. It also ignores the state of confusion and the problems that will face the new president, will keep him busy away from the tasks he is supposed to be in charge of, and will have him engrossed in seeking to close files left open by the military, and to mend holes that represent for him and for the next government tunnels, from which they emerge only to delve into others. The Military Council may be convinced that it is moving in the right direction, preserving the integrity of the state and resisting its disintegration or collapse. And the Muslim Brotherhood, along with its political arm the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) which holds the parliamentary majority, may believe that “messing with” the roadmap, shortening it or introducing modifications to it could perhaps reshuffle the cards and cause harm, or obstruct the country from reaching good civilian governance. Yet this does not mean that duty and logic dictate that the military or the Brotherhood should pave the way for the coming of a president whose ascent to power cannot be questioned, as well as facilitate the work of the next government and remove the obstacles that stand in its path before its formation, and ensure that the president is accepted by the people, so as to make those who oppose him not reject him, and those who oppose the government not lie in wait for it and work to see it fail. Revolutionary forces reject drafting the constitution under the rule of the military, or holding presidential elections under its supervision, despite admitting to the fact that the army did not interfere in the parliamentary elections. That is the predicament the Military Council must settle before leaving – so as for the president no to face, before even coming to power, obstacles that precede his constitutional oath; or for the new government not to find that there is no difference between itself and the governments of Essam Sharaf and Kamal Ganzouri; and so as for the phrase written on a banner raised by one demonstrator in Tahrir Square not to come true: “Down with the Next President”. It will only be natural for the policies of the next president to be met with objections from political forces, popular groups or revolutionary movements, yet this should arise in view of his conduct, his management of affairs and his policies after he comes to power. It is also very logical for the government to meet with objections and criticism, and to be subject to assessment every time it takes a decision or moves forward with a measure. But for the president to be rejected before he is elected or for the government to be objected to before it is formed, that is the predicament.
