The Syrian crisis is expanding beyond Syria's geographic map and the conflict has started to find daily echoes in the Levant, Gulf and Arab spaces, but also in the wider international space. As to those eager to see the regime's collapse or the reaping of the fruits of the security option, they will have to wait, maybe even for a long time. On the other hand, the threat of seeing a slide toward civil war is not only threatening the Syrians but also the entire region in parallel to the escalation of the sectarian tensions which are flowing across the border. Indeed, in Tripoli in the Lebanese North, the lethal temperature is rising between the Alawite Jabal Mohsen and the Sunni Bab al-Tabbaneh, thus heating up the domestic situation which is already standing on a tight sectarian string. And in Al-Ramadi, the center of the Sunni Iraqi Al-Anbar province – unlike Baghdad and its government – the religious scholars and clan leaders promised their brothers on the other side of the border two days ago to provide them with assistance, threatening that Al-Anbar was marching and pledging to fight “terrorism and the enemies of Allah among the Persians, the Americans and their aides.” The Iraqi Interior Ministry said in this context that a “number of Iraqi Jihadists headed to Syria,” while Ayman al-Zawahiri was calling on the “lions of the Levant to carry out Jihad” and on the Muslims in the neighboring states to rise to their help. In Jordan, the government is setting up additional tents to host the refugees, at a time when its Islamists have called for the support of their brothers in the North. But the tensions are exceeding the Levant's direct border and the alignment inside and outside the region is at its peak. At this point, there is no need to recall Turkey's and Iran's positions, although there seems to be some sort of truce or convergence which might be temporary between the two states in order to overcome the sectarian tensions in Baghdad, which suddenly moved from the street to the hallways of power. The Gulf Cooperation Council states for their part do not wish to annul the Arab League, but also do not want it to expect their support as they are preoccupied with their own domestic situation and do not wish to fall under the noose that is almost fully locked around the neck. Early on, the Gulf countries drew red lines toward which they cannot show any leniency. They thus overcame their internal sensitivities and border and non-border related disputes, annulled those borders and headed to Bahrain whose security has become an inherent part of the security of the six states. They also headed to Yemen and came up with a way for it to exit the crisis, recognizing that they offered donations to its people and aid to Manama and Muscat in order to free them from their social burdens. In that same context, they called on Jordan to enter their organization, and grew closer to Syria's border to become implicated in its crisis and break a key link in this rejectionist belt led by Iran, seeing how they are incapable of turning the clock backward in Iraq. On the other hand, the six states do not need to pull the Arab League member states to their rank, as the newly-established Arab Spring governments in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt are growing closer to the line of fire. The most dangerous aspect about this local-regional confrontation is probably the fact that it has become part of a wider battle among the various actors. Indeed, when Russia looks at its close surrounding, all it can see is military deployment and rocket shields on its threshold, from Croatia to Turkey going through Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Georgia. At this level, the annexation of two mini-states from Georgia is not enough to correct the flaw affecting the balance of powers, let alone its presence and the facilities it enjoys in many Central Asian states and former Soviet republics. As to the rehabilitation of the Taliban to bring it back to power in Kabul – if the negotiations conducted with it by Qatar and Saudi Arabia succeed – it constitutes a disturbing nightmare to both Iran and Russia. All the West's attempts to convince Russia to join the rocket shield have failed. Russia did not trust such “good intentions,” while its officers and the veteran Soviets know that the logic of power in any confrontation is the actual stake and not the intentions. This is why it has opposed and is still opposing this shield, at a time when strategic observers believe that although it is apparently directed against the Iranian missile arsenal, it also constitutes a safety net in the face of the Russian and Chinese arsenals. Hence, Beijing was prompted to oppose the special draft resolution on Syria at the Security Council, not to risk provoking the hostility of most of the Arabs or to humor Moscow, but because it can see the belt nearing its space as well. How can it be reassured in case Russia were to succumb to temptation and join, or even consider joining this shield! For years now, Russia and China have been watching the United States going through its most dangerous internal division since the civil war and suffering its worst economic crisis since the collapse of the New York stock market at the end of the thirties of last century. This economic turmoil will carry deep repercussions at the level of the American empire's ability to move abroad and protect its vital interests throughout the globe. Only yesterday, President Barack Obama ratified new military budget cuts which will prevent the military machine from waging two wars at the same time. Hence, China is closely monitoring the American activities in Asia and the Pacific Ocean, the new bases secured for it by Australia, Japan and South Korea and the arms deals to Taiwan. And while Beijing perceives with satisfaction the inauguration of the new building it offered to the African Union a few days ago, it did not forget the warnings issued by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to the African Continent against the Chinese expansion in it, but also her warnings to the Africans against what she dubbed a new colonialism. In the meantime, Beijing is working with Tripoli to restore what it lost following the collapse of Muammar al-Gaddafi's regime, but might find trouble in the two Sudans, i.e. the oil-rich and the non-oil-rich Sudan, after Khartoum had been opening its doors to it for more than two decades. Beijing is aware of the fact that the emergence of an Islamic rug, i.e. regimes run by the Islamists from North Africa to the border of Iraq, is not only stirring the feelings of Muslims on its own soil – although they are few – but also posing a dangerous threat to its economy whose rise relies on oil to compete with the United States on the political level during the current stage, and maybe on the military level in upcoming stages. In the meantime, it is hastening the modernization of its armed forces and wagering on the construction of its own Navy and the first aircraft carrier to exit its Great Wall for the first time in its history. How can China calm down if the United States successfully imposes its influence over the oil rug, from North Africa to Persia? This would mean that Washington and its allies in the Middle East and North Africa will have the upper hand in determining the oil prices and destinations. Will Beijing accept being at the mercy of this alliance? Will it allow such a development although it is the largest foreign holder of American debt? Last November, the experts of the Economic and Security Review Commission at the Senate presented a comprehensive report in which they accused China of undermining the efforts deployed by the international community to prevent Iran and North Korea from proceeding with their nuclear programs. They also pointed to Beijing's fear over the possible “collapse of the North Korean regime and the consequences this would have for China's economic, social and geostrategic interests.” They also pointed to the fact that the Iranian energy sector constituted an exceptional destination for Chinese investments and that Beijing was among Tehran's main suppliers with refined oil products and weapons, including ballistic missiles. So will Beijing remain idle in the face of the attempts to control Iran's and Iraq's oil? The timing of the Chinese objection is justified, not by its support of President Al-Assad's regime, but rather by its deterrence of the winds of containment launched by Washington. The same goes for the Russian timing, as Vladimir Putin is aware of the size of the growing opposition on the domestic arena, one which is no longer duped by the maneuvering around the constitution and perceived the announcement made early on by the leaders Putin and Dmitry Medvedev regarding the exchange of their positions in power as being a disregarding of the democratic process. According to the opposition, which decided to have its say at the level of domestic and foreign policies, the elections have become meaningless. This is why Putin does not only need to win from the first tour, but also needs a foreign battle with which he could titillate the feelings of the Russians who boast their country's status as a great empire. In the meantime, the Russian vanguard experts have started to accompany the arms shipments to the Syrian combat fields! The Gulf leaders are struggling to prevent the closing of the Iranian siege and becoming engaged in the Syrian crisis in preparation for a duel which might be decisive in Iraq. This duel was launched early on by the Iraqi government and opposition forces in light of what is facing Damascus and its ally Tehran. For their part, the United States and its partners are fighting to prevent the Islamic Republic's monopolization of the decision at the level of the Iranian and Iraqi oil, i.e. the second largest reserves after the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As to Russia, it is fighting to prevent the closing of NATO's siege and China is showing rejectionism in the face of the containment policy to limit its losses, in case Washington were to occupy the oil and Islamic carpets. The war is open in and on Syria on more than one front, without its results being defined by the outcome of a battle here and a round there. Hence, those anticipating the settlement will have to wait.
