It has become clear that a Muslim Brotherhood crescent is taking shape in North Africa, from Morocco to Egypt going through Tunisia and Libya. On the other hand, Algiers' only option is to do what it is doing today, i.e. flirting with its neighbors - especially Rabat and Tripoli - in preparation for what might be produced by its parliamentary elections that are expected to be held next spring. These elections might constitute a spring for its Islamic movements, if they know how to unify their ranks. The Islamic tide extending from the shores of the Atlantic Ocean to the coasts of the Red Sea now has its crescent, which is covering around two thirds of the Arab world's population. New regimes will surface, and the identity of countries will change sooner or later. In the meantime, no matter how much the regional and international powers were to boast their role in accompanying the train of change or hastening it, the change has forced and is still forcing these powers to move fast and reconsider their strategies. It even generated a great flaw at the level of most of the strategies related to the Great Middle East. The West, at the head of which are the United States and Europe, rushed to deal with the Arab action by providing it with all forms of support. These countries sided with the powers of change to protect their vital interests and earn a prominent role in shaping the new regimes which will in turn determine the shape of the political, economic and security regional order. For their part, Russia and China decided to oppose this wild action for several reasons related to these two countries' domestic arenas and the network of vital interests and foreign relations they enjoy in the region and on the international scene in general. And regardless of what is said about the extent of their influence over the Arab action, the challenges affecting them due to this change can clearly be seen in the ongoing conflict over the region and its connection with the greater conflict in other areas of the world. And while the United States is clearly announcing that change in Syria will address a strong blow to Iran, the latter considered - and still considers - that the Arab spring baffled the United States and its strategic ally Israel and that the rising Islamic regimes will not be submissive to Washington, the way Hosni Mubarak's, Muammar al-Gaddafi's and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali's regimes were. It also believes that its role and influence are growing in the region. At this level, it is enough that Tel Aviv is concerned about the victory of the MB and the Salafis in Egypt and about a possible change in Syria which will expose its northern border to all possibilities. It is also enough that Hamas – Tehran's ally – assessed the advantage of the Islamists in Egypt and several Arab countries, saying that this victory will be a “source of support to the Palestinian cause and the actual restoration of Arab and Islamic depth to it.” A neutral look at the regional arena would clearly show that the Arab action not only surprised the international actors, but also the regional ones. Moreover, it affected their policy with a strategic flaw which must be taken into account. For example, Turkey that based its entire approach on a zero-problem policy with the regional states is facing problems undermining the foundations of this policy. Indeed, the doors with Israel are closed and the Arab Spring created a great rift with Iran against the backdrop of Ankara's position toward the Syrian crisis and its deployment of NATO's missile shield radars network on its soil to face the Iranian rockets arsenal. Consequently, the controversy is ongoing between both countries and Tehran is not concealing its public threats to target this network if it is the object of an Israeli or American attack. Moreover, it is reiterating its threats to Ankara against going too far in pressuring President Bashar al-Assad's regime. Turkey is reconsidering its policies, and as much as it is reassured about the changes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and even Morocco, it is hastening change in Syria in the hope it will be similar to its antecedents. It is relieved by the arrival to power of the Muslim Brotherhood, because this will bring the keys of this great gate back to it and allow it to politically and economically reintegrate the Levant and its entire Fertile Crescent. This is exactly what is concerning Iran, fearful of seeing the collapse of its own crescent if the regime in Damascus meets the same fate as other regimes in the Arab countries. Hence, it may be too soon for Iran to claim to be reaping the fruits of the Arab Spring, just because it perceives the arrival to power of the Islamists in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya as being a blow to Washington and its ally Tel Aviv. True, the latter Islamists flirted with the Islamic Republic for a long time, back when they were being subjected to their regimes' oppression. But today, they are announcing that their archetype is the Turkish Islam, not the Iranian one. Moreover, their support of the action in Syria is a stand against Iran, the biggest supporter of President Al-Assad's regime. Eventually, this MB crescent will not complement the Iranian crescent, and might even replace it in the Arab Levant if the Syrian opposition succeeds and if the reforms and elections in Jordan open the door before the Muslim Brotherhood of the Hashemite Kingdom. This strategic flaw dropped the dirt over the Arab regime which was already faltering before the action, on the beat of the Iranian-Turkish-Israeli competition. The repercussions of the Arab action converged with the challenges imposed by the Iranian expansion to prompt the Gulf Cooperation Council to assume the initiative in the entire region. The Council went against what prevailed prior to the action and the escalation of the confrontation surrounding the Iranian nuclear file, as it was proceeding toward the building of a unity which would distance it, if not completely exclude it from the circle of the Arab League and the concerns of the Arab East and Maghreb. The six Gulf States thus rushed into an ambitious and hostile policy which did not settle for the establishment of a network of relations with a number of superpowers, as well as with Turkey and Pakistan which backed them up for a long time and linked the security of the Gulf to their own. These states also drew up their own path by calling on Jordan and Morocco to join the GCC and mobilizing their troops to protect Bahrain, at a time when they had not yet digested what they considered to be massive losses caused by Iraq's fall under the Iranian cloak, before being followed by Lebanon and Syria. They also turned toward Sana'a to arrange power transition in it, and before that led the international community in the battle to topple the Libyan regime. Today, they are heading a solution course in Syria to secure its exit from the space of the Iranian crescent, due to the necessity to correct the flaw generated by Iraq's entry into the heart of this crescent. Prior to the Arab action and in light of Iran's growing military strength, the expansion of its influence and the escalation of the conflict over its nuclear file, many wagered on the fact that the Gulf states will eventually resort to a policy meeting Washington's wishes and facilitating Israel's aspiration to see a settlement with the Palestinians. It was as though the underlying Western wish was for Tel Aviv to deploy its nuclear shield in the face of the Islamic Republic's missile and nuclear arsenal, or at best to see the six states surrendering the command to Turkey. But based on the developments of the crises from Libya to Yemen and Syria, it seems that these states tried and are still trying to exit the circle of the conflicts over the region, whether between Tehran and Ankara, Tehran and Tel Aviv, Ankara and Tel Aviv, the West and Iran, or between the United States, Russia and China. Therefore, they put forward initiatives and voiced positions and policies going in line with the current winds of change. They also pushed the Arab League to respect their current strategy and the international circles to support their initiatives. In summary, the GCC and its League are now on stage with the remaining actors, while it would be too soon for them to rest or disappear behind the curtain in light of the repercussions which might be carried by the MB crescent in North Africa, by change in Yemen and Syria and by the surprises of the tension pits in the GCC, on its outskirts and in the heart of the Iranian crescent, from Iraq to Lebanon. It will not be easy for Iran to regain the primary historical role which was played by the regime of the Shah at the level of the Gulf, the Middle East and Central Asia. On the other hand, it will not be easy for Turkey to constitute a substitute for the Arab regime which has started to materialize, at a time when the superpowers will no longer be able to make easy deals the way they used to do during the days of the deposed regimes, without this meaning that change will topple their interests and relations. It is now time to wait. The MB groups in North Africa, from Morocco to Egypt, are facing the governance test with its political, economic and security troubles and its complex regional and international relations. This test cannot be compared to sitting in the opposition chair or on the squares and streets to seek people's support with slogans and banners. It is a test which will impose dealing with the Iranian crescent and the Turkish insistence on its influence and on the implementation of its archetype!
