The Arab League initiative for a transitional solution in Syria, which it has been said the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Coucil (GCC) stand behind, has represented a painful diplomatic blow that has struck two targets at the core: the Syrian regime itself and its Russian ally, which has been fervently defending it and has so far prevented a UN Resolution condemning it from being issued at the Security Council. Damascus has been forced to “dig out” its Foreign Minister Walid Al-Muallem, who had “disappeared” ever since he presented to journalists the infamous fabricated videos a few weeks ago, so that he may attack the initiative and assert that “we no longer want Arab solutions to the crisis”, after he had repeatedly declared that he welcomed and clung to an Arab solution, repeating what Assad himself had said in his speech about the security solution being a “popular demand” and about the inevitability of settling the confrontation by force with those who demand change. But what was it that upset the Syrian regime so much? Damascus felt that it had fallen in the trap of its own stances. Indeed, it had focused all of its diplomatic efforts in the past period on rejecting any foreign interference in its affairs, and had urged its allies, great and small, to denounce attempts to apply “the Libyan model”, whether through direct military intervention or through the establishment of safety zones to protect Syrian civilians. This is because it had been reassured to the fact that some Arab countries such as Egypt and the Sultanate of Oman would be hesitant and maintain vague stances, while others such as Lebanon and Algeria, and perhaps Iraq, would maintain a position of refusal, which would prevent any unified Arab decision from being taken that would directly address the issue of the Assad regime stepping down and call for a gradual and peaceful transition of power in Syria. Yet it was taken by surprise by the success of GCC diplomacy at achieving the formation of Arab consensus, with the exception of Algeria's partial objection and of Lebanon “disassociating itself”, in order to put forward an initiative based on a past experience that has proven its effectiveness in Yemen, a country that has entered a transitional phase thanks to a political settlement that put a stop to the hemorrhage resulting from the regime's use of force to confront the protests demanding its departure, and one that guaranteed change. However, Syria's immediate and complete rejection of the initiative also means that Damascus is leaving no other option but to head to the Security Council and internationalize the issue, and that the tension felt by the regime has reached such an extent as to prevent it this time from trying to maneuver by accepting some of the clauses, rejecting others and negotiating over others yet, as it had done with regard to the observers' protocol. As for Russia, for the support of which Muallem appealed and which he deemed unlikely to accept the recommendation of the Arabs, embarrassment dominates its position after its Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov “made a mistake” in his calculations and predictions, and defended in numerous press conferences the “Yemeni solution”, which Moscow assures that it effectively participated in and which it considers to be an example to be followed in Syria – because Lavrov in turn believed that the Arabs would be unable to agree on a similar stance, after they had left Yemen to its Gulf neighbors. Yet it is even more embarrassing for Foreign Minister Muallem to declare Russia's rejection of the Arab League's initiative before any comment was issued by Moscow itself, as if he held the reins of Russia's decision-making, especially after signs of impatience at Damascus's obstinacy have begun to appear in the statements of Russian officials. But if the Secretary-General of the Arab League and Qatar's Prime Minister succeed in their efforts at the United Nations to ensure presenting the Arab League's plan for Syria for adoption at the Security Council, in parallel with the movement of Europe and the United States to issue a resolution that would support the initiative and threaten to impose sanctions on Damascus, it will be very difficult for Moscow to justify continuing to reject what it considers to be “foreign interference” in Syria's affairs, after it had promoted an Arab solution it considered to ward off interference by NATO. As for those who have been hasty in criticizing the Arab League's initiative and considering it to be below the standard required, they have overlooked the fact that the Arabs do not in practice have the means to implement their initiative, that the suggestion to impose sanctions on Syria has led to division within the Arab League, and that it would be preferable at the moment to move forward with gradual, but effective, diplomatic efforts.
