The change in Russia's stance on the situation in Syria has dispelled an illusion, or the claim to an illusion, held by authorities in Damascus, purporting that they are relying on a strong and unchanging front of foreign friends – which allows them to continue reiterating their narrative of the protests and the way they are dealing with them, while at the same time protecting them from a UN resolution. What is important about the new Russian stance is that it is connected to purely Russian motives and reasons – Moscow's admission as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and its strengthened relations with Europe through its pledge to support the Eurozone with 10 billion dollars, in addition to the domestic situation in Russia being the object of criticism following the parliamentary elections. It is also connected to the size of the violations committed against protesters in Syria – especially the report made by Navi Pillay before the Security Council, and the report of the Human Rights Watch (HRW) organization. In other words, the change in Russia's stance did not take place within the framework of eternal friendship and blind defense of Syrian authorities, as Damascus is trying to portray its foreign relations. It is true that the new Russian stance did not reach the extent of adopting the viewpoint and demands of the opposition. Yet its fundamental feature is that it is open to change on the basis of a new narrative, not that of the regime alone. This has set it on a new course, different from the one it had followed so far. In other words, it is open to heading towards a new understanding of the Syrian crisis, one that could perhaps be closer to the European and American stance on the issue. This represents a fundamental loss for Syrian diplomacy, which is relying on a Russian stance that is unchanging and permanent, one that would lead the stances taken by other countries such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa. The debate at the Security Council may be difficult, when discussing the Russian draft resolution, but the international axis which Damascus had wagered on has begun to weaken – first in terms of non-concordance with the official Syrian narrative, and second in terms of the solutions suggested. And here resides the importance of stressing the elements of the Arab League initiative in the Russian draft resolution, whether in terms of observers or in terms of sanctions. Thus the efforts exerted by the Syrian government to introduce modifications to the Arab League initiative, voiding it of its content in terms of the protection of civilians and of such protection being subject to observation, as well as its efforts to buy time, until it eradicates the protest movement, become factors that facilitate an internationalization Moscow had always rejected in the past – with everything this means in terms of the possibility of imposing such protection. The continued application of the security solution in Syria has led to weakening the front of international allies, perhaps after they have been embarrassed by the widening scope of violations and killings, which reached the extent of crimes against humanity, as they were described by international reports. As for the wager of the Syrian government on the front of regional allies, it might also be confronted with the particular considerations and interests of each of the parties to this front, and their ability to bear with the conduct of pure violence adopted by the authorities in Damascus. It is well known that Iran represents the main pillar of this front, as is also the size of Iran's political and economic investment in Syria. In view of the size of such an investment and of Iran's need for a location on the Mediterranean like Syria (and with it Lebanon), Iran will be concerned with saving such an asset, regardless of what the solutions in Syria lead to. And this is what Tehran seems to be trying to do, especially on the background of its repeated declarations about the need for reforms in Syria, and of information about it driving towards dealing positively with the Arab League initiative, until the situation clearly takes shape. And if Iran wishes to save its strategic ally in Damascus, it is following a pragmatic policy through which it seeks to save its interests and its investments, and is preparing to adapt, in case any surprise were to occur – especially with the regime's credibility collapsing, the protest movement broadening and the opposition organizing its ranks and its political discourse. Regarding Iraq and Lebanon, the two sides of the wager on the regional equation, they are similar as a whole in terms of their concordance with the Iranian stance, which holds the effective influence at the level of the government in both countries. In addition to this, there are active political forces in the two countries which, on the basis of social-sectarian divisions, oppose their governments' official stance on the situation in Syria, making complete support for Damascus a costly matter at the domestic level. In this sense, the change in Russia's stance, and with it regional considerations, indicates the weakening of the front Damascus has been wagering on, regionally and internationally. Will the Syrian regime then review these factors and reconsider its methods, as its illusions of foreign protection begin to collapse?
