President Barack Obama announced a new defensive strategy, while Iran was announcing a second, third and fourth round of maneuvers in the Gulf waters. The president's step is natural and necessary, in light of a series of developments and facts, the most prominent of which probably being the economic and financial crisis sweeping the United States and its partners in the European Union. The president will thus use the military budget cuts as a weapon in the race to renew his term, by giving the voters the impression that he is dedicating his effort to the handling of the social repercussions of the crisis. Nonetheless, there are valid reasons that imposed this strategic reviewing, namely the withdrawal of the American troops from Iraq after eight years of occupation which cost America more than 4,000 dead and around a trillion dollars, and the preparations for the pullout from Afghanistan. This new strategy should have dealt in another way with the threats being issued by Iran, in parallel to the repeated maneuvers in the Gulf waters and its threats to shut down the Hormuz Strait that constitutes the vein for the flow of oil toward the West. However, President Obama chose to focus on Asia and the Pacific Ocean, without forgetting Washington's commitment to stability in the Middle East. He turned eastward to face China's hopes of breaking the military monopoly in the region, after he had paved the way before this inclination by seeking the enhancement of the American military presence in northern Australia, where the American troops were offered bases to facilitate their deployment in the region. This is not to mention the permanent support offered to Taiwan and the efforts to secure a commercial trade combining the countries of the Pacific Ocean region and excluding China which is trying hard to impose its hegemony over this area. It is as though the roar of the Iranian military machine in the Gulf, Iran's threats to shut down the Hormuz Strait – i.e. the main vein allowing the flow of oil into the West – and the Iranian construction of its missile force which is underway, did not concern Obama despite all the statements of instigation being issued in America and Israel. He thus settled for pointing to Washington's traditional commitment to stability in the entire region and chose to focus on the Far East, in which the new and upcoming conflict is starting. In reality, ever since his arrival to the White House, Obama never gave the impression that he was inclined to adopt a military option in the confrontation with Iran. He even sent two messages to the Iranian people, while his Republican opponents attacked him when he remained neutral or cautious in dealing with the Green Movement that broke out in the Islamic Republic following the presidential elections two and a half years ago, and which the reformist leaders considered they were falsified to ensure the renewal of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's term. Hence, President Obama is acting based on the fact that the primary strategic threat is the rising China. As for Iran, the United States has coexisted with its threats without downplaying the importance of the challenge posed by the Islamic Republic vis-à-vis its security arrangements in the Gulf and the Middle East region in general. He is probably aware of the fact that no matter how far Tehran were to go in its escalation, it cannot risk crossing the line of the abyss or sliding toward a destructive war. He might even be aware of the fact that his rival is still fearful of the Spring awakening and knows the depth of its problems and disputes which are keeping it from provoking war or triggering wide-scale regional confrontation. Among the valid goals of the repeated Iranian maneuvers in the Gulf is probably to keep the troops and the Iranian street mobilized. Indeed, President Ahmadinejad's government is well aware of the fact that keeping the sirens on high alert is a successful method to sustain the rallying around the regime in the face of an alleged confrontation with external sides. The conflict in Tehran is no longer limited to two movements, i.e. the conservatives and the reformists, as there are now more than one wing within the ranks of the conservatives and several wings within the reformists. In the meantime, the republic is also preoccupied with regional cards which always constituted a source of strength to it. At this level, Syria – the strategic ally – is facing a critical turn, while Iraq is boiling and facing the threat of seeing the return of violence in a way that could topple the government's authority and influence. In the meantime, the Palestine card is gradually returning to the Arab lap, as it used to be between Jordan and Egypt. Lebanon on the other hand is living day by day, on the beat of what is happening on its eastern and northern border. Consequently, the rejectionism alliance that was heralded by President Ahmadinejad on the day of his visit to Lebanon is now facing strong winds that are shaking its walls and very foundations. At this level, Qatar's handling of the file of dialogue with the Taliban with American and European support did not come as good news to Iran, considering it cannot possibly want to see this movement's return to participate or maybe even control the Afghan decision. There is no need to bring back to mind the nature of the relations between the Islamic Republic and this movement prior to 2001, while the Iranians still recall the challenges raised by its policies before Tehran to shift its attention away from the Gulf or disperse its strength. In this context, its execution of around ten Iranian diplomats at the end of the nineties remains a nightmare from the era of President Ahmed Khatami, who abstained from responding at the time to avoid drowning in the Afghan mud. There might be some exaggeration at the level of the United States' exit from Iraq and Afghanistan and turn toward the Far East. Certainly, it will not leave the Middle East and especially the Gulf regardless of its economic and military problems, and will not follow in the footsteps of Great Britain the day it decided to withdraw from the eastern part of Suez at the beginning of the seventies due to the economic crisis it was facing. Back then, Washington expressed its regrets toward this withdrawal that exposed the region before Soviet influence. Hence, it immediately filled the void left by the United Kingdom and worked via an alliance which included Iran under the Shah and the Gulf countries, at the head of which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. But soon enough, the Shah's fall constituted a lethal blow to the foundations of the American strategy to protect the interests in the oil wells and passageways, and America rushed to provide full support to Saddam Hussein in his war against the Islamic Republic, until Khomeini accepted the ceasefire. And when Saddam carried out the Kuwait invasion adventure to play the role which Khomeini was trying to assume in the Gulf, an international military alliance led by America was established to force him to retreat. Later on, a decade and a half later, Washington worked on the toppling of his entire regime. Based on that, it would be difficult to imagine any American administration easily relinquishing the security of the Gulf - as some might believe - in light of the defiance shown by Iran on a daily basis. It is known that since the Carter Doctrine, Washington decided to enhance the deployment of its troops in the region. This has been ongoing in various forms for about four decades, from the missiles network in the Gulf region to the bases in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar among others, thus reflecting the return to the policy of direct intervention and containment. The focus was on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf region, and Washington now realizes that the armament race launched by Iran in the region is threatening its historical security system in the oil seas and passageways, especially the Hormuz Strait and what it represents in terms of the main gateway for the flow of oil across the Indian Ocean. Nonetheless, since the establishment of the Republic, it did not hesitate to maintain military balance in a way that does not allow any side to undermine it as easily as some might believe, even if Obama were to decide to transfer the strategic weight to the Pacific Ocean region, i.e. the Chinese space. Indeed, the consecutive American administrations have tightened the links between the energy security, the Gulf security and the West's vital interests. The question today might not be about the United States' ability to wage two or three wars following the cuts ratified by Obama, about whether or not Iran will risk leading America toward war or whether or not there will be a confrontation between Washington and Beijing. The question is rather the following: Will America's new strategy be able to contain Russia, China then Iran? In other words, will NATO be able to tighten the siege around Moscow, while powers in the Pacific Ocean form the nucleus of a wider alliance that would expand the deployment and secure fast action by the United States to limit the momentum of the Chinese Giant? Beijing might be able to amend the balance of powers in its favor, in case the military cuts were to impact the American superiority and in case Chinese economy is not affected by any setbacks or recessions! As for the Islamic Republic, it is enough for it to maintain cards which it managed to collect in light of the military adventures of the administration of President George Bush Jr. and whose collapse might be looming in light of the spring whose end does not seem to be imminent.
