In the middle of November, the secretary general of the United Nations, Ban ki-moon, issued his report on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, and on the missions of UNIFIL peacekeeping forces in South Lebanon. Ban said that he would be conducting a “strategic review of UNIFIL's missions,” and that he looked forward to carrying out a strategic review of the Lebanese Army's ability to begin taking over a larger level of security responsibilities, based on the resolution, to facilitate the transfer of responsibilities gradually from UNIFIL to the army. At the time, the launch of rockets late last month, or the bombing of French UNIFIL troops in the southern city of Tyre, which left five people wounded, had not taken place. Certainly, these incidents will affect the strategic review, whose results will be presented by Ban to the Security Council at the beginning of next year, or in less than a month's time. Most Lebanese officials are keen to see the international presence in the south remain strong, providing political and security protection to confront the possibility of another war on its territory between Israel and the resistance. But on the other hand, influential countries are keen on seeing these forces remain in place because they have an interest in seeing stability continue in Lebanon. Tension is spreading in the region, and these countries do not want to see an escalation, by the opening of a new front on the Lebanese-Israeli border. This possibility has been raised by political groups opposed to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which have expressed their threats by targeting UNIFIL, and more recently, when Syrian President Bashar Assad's cousin Rami Makhlouf said that Israel's stability was linked to Syria's stability. Ban's twice-yearly reports have been characterized by the language of diplomacy and equivocation, in laying out the difficulties and obstacles faced by UNIFIL as it operates. The reports have avoided a rhetoric of confrontation vis-à-vis the party that manufactures these difficulties, while they make repeated references to Israeli violations of Lebanon's sovereignty the Hezbollah leadership's repeated declarations that it is armed, and the Lebanese government's failure to eliminate non-state weapons outside Palestinian refugee camps, which would implement one of the decisions reached by Lebanon's National Dialogue process, by describing them as violations of 1701. However, in their meetings with officials, member states of the Security Council and UN diplomats have always lamented the laxity of the Lebanese Army, as it safeguards the presence of Hezbollah's military and security presence in the area of UNIFIL operations, and provides cover for the demonstrations by local residents against UNIFIL patrols, when the former pelt the latter with stones and impede their efforts to search for non-state weapons. In his most recent report, Ban discussed the "stagnation" in implementing 1701, while the events of recent weeks have prompted the commander of UNIFIL, Major General Alberto Asarta, to remark several times that these incidents have revealed that there are still non-state weapons and hostile armed elements in the area of UNIFIL operations, which is a violation of the most important provisions of the UN resolution. This conclusion has become a prime element of the strategic review of UNIFIL that Ban is carrying out with member states. Meanwhile, military leaders from countries participating in UNIFIL are pressuring political leaders over the need to take this into consideration when reviewing the principle of their presence in the south. Asarta's statement that the Lebanese government is responsible for the security of UNIFIL signals a desire for the Lebanese Army to take on more missions, in preparation for the gradual reduction of the number of UNIFIL troops next year. The principal countries concerned with the south are hearing Lebanese officials condemn what their units are being subjected to, and some of them even complain that they are responsible for treating the matter, before UNIFIL. Each time the international peacekeepers suffer a given incident, or the security of the south is shaken by the launching of rockets, the Lebanese Army suffices by taking certain measures for a period of time. Then, the army and security forces return to a state of laxity, as the commanders of UNIFIL units complain that their troops have merely become “doormen,” unable to play an effective role. These countries believe that if Hezbollah is responsible for the situation in the south, and if the party is the backbone of the current power structure in Lebanon, the government must – through its army, which is in total harmony with Hezbollah – take control in the south, whether this is in order to avoid a confrontation with Israel, or as a part of preparations to engage in a confrontation with the Jewish state. UNIFIL troops are present in order to make the region south of the Litani River free of non-state weapons, while the rule that governs dealings with the party involves seeing these weapons remain hidden. This is a fundamental change in the mission, which has been cemented by a government ruled by facts on the ground. Those responsible for the situation in the south should pay attention to another item: if UNIFIL soldiers are hostages, as the allies of Damascus and Iran say, then why do they remain there, if the prevailing policy is one of “freeing hostages” by seeing them return to their home countries, which is taking place today in Iraq?
