I went to inquire about another issue, but I found him up to his ears in his concerns for Syria. Al-Arabiya was carrying images of the developments in Homs, and he was following the broadcast with a mixture of interest and uneasiness. He asked me about my assessment of the situation in Damascus. My answer was that, by virtue of my profession, I am more in a position to ask than I am in a position to give answers. Then I remembered that the Arab politician before me knew Syria closely, that he has close ties with decision makers there, and that he is well versed when it comes to the problems of governance. After exchanging some small talk, I tried to move to the subject that I came for, but I failed. For one thing, he considers the developments in Syria to be the ‘most important and momentous' issue in the entire region. He believes that change there, should it indeed materialize, would be many times more important that the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime. He communicated this idea in brief by saying, “Change in Syria, should it materialize, will lead to change in the entire region, in its balances and its issues, and an eruption in Syria will lead to an unprecedented eruption throughout the region”. He said he had closely followed Bashar al-Assad's assumption of the office of the president, and sensed at the time that a large fraction of Syrians had pinned a lot of hope on the young president, who then indeed sent out many messages indicating he was aware that the regime needed reinvigoration and modernization. He added that the Syrians did not blame the young president for the sins of the bloody events that Syria had witnessed in the early eighties, or the harsh practices of the security services. He said that the demands of the people in that period did not go beyond calling for corruption to be tackled and the grip of the security services on the daily lives of the people be reduced. The people also wanted the economic situation to be addressed, as the economy had never been the first priority of President Hafez al-Assad, who gave priority instead to his vision of turning Syria into a key regional player. He expounded on this and said, “In the beginning of last decade, we witnessed what was called at the time the Damascus Spring. What happened was tantamount to a message stressing on the need for change, while already recognizing that the President had enough popular currency and the will to qualify him to lead a gradual transition process that would not do away with the foundations of the regime. The Damascus Spring was an opportunity for Syria and its president, especially that the one-party model had become obsolete with the collapse of the socialist camp. But the network made up of the security apparatus and the [Baath] Party feared for its interests, and hence portrayed the Damascus Spring as a conspiracy that must be quelled. The Islamists were also used as a scarecrow. I personally heard Abdul-Halim Khaddam making accusations against the members of the Damascus Spring, and said that he and his comrades would never allow the term of Hafez al-Assad to be put on trial. If I were in Bashar al-Assad's shoes, I would have chosen not to believe the reports submitted by the generals of the security services and the barons of the [Baath] Party”. He also said, “The decision to extinguish the Damascus Spring was a grave mistake. After that, Assad became preoccupied with the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, and then the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon and the July War. The security-Baath network succeeded in putting off any serious discussion of development and reforms, and stagnation reigned while economic troubles increased and the security services continued to count people's breaths under the pretext of protecting the regime. Thus, many successive years were lost, and the Syrian street soon erupted in line with the Arab Spring”. My converser concluded that returning to the situation prior to the outbreak of protests is not possible. He said that what Syria is currently witnessing is an impasse: Neither can the authorities stop the protests, nor can the current protests overthrow the regime. He believed that this impasse is deepening, that Syria is becoming ever more isolated, and that the wide-open confrontation may lead to the Syrian house imploding. This, he thought, would cause a civil war that would help rekindle the fire of Sunni-Shiite tension in the region. My converser then explained in detail the regional and international stances, especially in terms of the Iranian and Turkish movements. I was struck by the conclusions he reached, when he said, “There is only one way to avoid a major disaster. If I were Assad, I would venture to adopt it without delay. Assad [must] personally lead a shock approach to end the conflict. He should carry out the equivalent of a coup against some of the pillars of the regime. He should thus appear before the Syrians in something similar to a Statement Number One, whereby he would declare the abolishment of Article No. 8, which perpetuates the Baath Party's hold over the state and society; he would then announce the appointment of an opposition figure to form a national unity government, and the Ministry of Interior would be assigned to a neutral figure that would be given the power to decide over the work of the security services. The government would then be ordered to prepare the first pluralistic elections within a specified timeframe, under the supervision of observers from the Arab and Islamic worlds. Assad would also declare that Syria's foreign policy shall be based on strict respect for Arab charters and international resolutions, away from axis [alliances].” I was struck by my converser's talk and by his uneasiness. But I don't know whether this kind of ventures is still possible or even adequate.
