Some have asked the question: why did the Revolution in Tunisia succeed, while the Egyptian Revolution continues to fail? A convincing answer would not be restricted to the fact that Tunisia has chosen “the constitution first”, while Egypt is heading towards “parliamentary elections first”, because the fear held by secular Egyptian forces of the Islamists obtaining the parliamentary majority has actually taken place in Tunisia, where the Islamists have leapt to the forefront despite “the constitution first”. There are therefore other reasons that have made Tunisia move forward with the political process and reap the fruits of the Revolution, while bringing Egypt to a juncture at which it seeks a way out, in vain so far. The Egyptian elections, which begin today, may represent a way out for part of the political crisis, but it certainly will not put an end to it, and in fact there are fears of it making it worse. And it is when one searches for other ways out and reasonable solutions that the major predicament arises – that is, the fact that no solution will meet with the approval of all parties, and that some will continue to reject and oppose it. Thus the crisis will worsen, the problem will grow more complicated and the snowball will increase in size. Egyptians often say that their Revolution brought out the best in them, and that is true. But it also brought out the worst! And perhaps what was most produced by the successive crises that have occurred ever since the Revolution erupted on January 25 is the absence of trust between most parties. Indeed, none are reassured anymore to what comes out of other parties in terms of decisions, statements and pledges, remaining convinced that the stances voiced by these parties differ from their real stances. Increasing the effect of the absence of trust is the fact that each party is behaving as if it were the only influential one, and as if the remaining parties had no influence at all! When probing the stances of all parties to the political game, one finds that there is no exception to this rule. Indeed, the Military Council behaves without any consideration for the reactions of political forces of various strands, and imagines that every decision, measure, statement and constitutional amendment it makes should be accepted and welcomed. Even when it meets with prominent figures of the opposition, political forces or youth coalitions to discuss something, it comes out at the end with a decision that contradicts the demands made by the majority of those present, if not all of them! It is true that the military has sometimes sought to satisfy this or that party in order to avoid a reaction that would turn the tables or complicate things, only to be surprised by other parties voicing their rejection, but the army's style in managing the transitional period has made all parties angry. And it is not just that they are dissatisfied with the way it has managed the transitional period, as they also shed doubt on its intentions, are suspicious of its stances, and fear “games” that could have the ultimate goal of keeping the army in power forever! Islamists of different groups and parties, for their part, consider that their “religiosity” should be sufficient to reassure the other forces. Thus the Copts, for example, should be reassured, because they will find nothing better than the rule of Islamists! On the other hand, one aspect of the Egyptian crisis is connected to the fears of numerous movements that have come to be referred to as “secular forces” – fears of the Islamists in the future completely controlling the parliament, and therefore the government. Those same secular forces sometimes behave without consideration for the fact that there is an Islamist movement that enjoys notable popularity in the street, and have therefore displayed conflicting feelings, between their desire for the military to leave and for the parliamentary elections to be delayed, so that they may connect with the street for a while and gain the ability to compete against the Islamists! Perhaps the step taken by secular forces, which have a great deal of influence in Tahrir Square now, and to which most of those present in Tahrir are affiliated, to form a “national salvation government”, comprised of names the Islamists do not approve of, represents evidence for such an analysis. If not, what would happen if the Islamists took the step of organizing a million-man march in Tahrir Square or any other square and announcing the formation of an “Islamist salvation government” to confront the “secular forces government”? Such is the predicament: every party acts on its own without consideration for the circumstances, fears and influence of the other parties, and without taking care to reach common grounds, as they had all agreed before on toppling the Mubarak regime. It is no secret that the military sought to select a Prime Minister for a national salvation government that would meet with the approval of all parties, but it failed. Indeed, every time it would inquire about a certain name, it would find those who oppose it to the extent of making threats. Everyone's punishment was therefore the appointment of Doctor Kamal Ganzouri.
