The ongoing competition in Tahrir Square over the inheritance of Hosni Mubarak's regime has its justifications. Indeed, each of the forces that participated in toppling the said regime has its own political program and aspirations for the future of Egypt, which differ from the vision and aspirations of other parties. Mubarak's absence has left a great vacuum in the prime seat of power in the largest (most populated) Arab country. Filling such a seat will have a major impact not just on Egypt alone, but also on the future of the revolutions of the Arab Spring, still raging in many places. Among competing forces in Egypt, the army seems to be the only one that considers itself to have the greater right to such an inheritance. Indeed, the leaders of the Military Council feel that they should be the first to be thanked for the success of the Egyptian Revolution. They consider themselves to have protected the revolutionaries on the field, that their tanks were pioneers in raising the slogan “down with Mubarak”, and that they thereby laid the foundation for the smooth and almost peaceful transition of power, in comparison with what took place in neighboring Libya and what is taking place in Yemen and in Syria. Had it been otherwise, or had the army played a different role, the Egyptian Revolution would have perhaps taken a direction quite different from what it is now. This explains the doubts voiced by revolutionaries over the army's goals. Such doubts have lately been reinforced within broad circles in Egypt, spread across the various political parties. Increasing these doubts over the intentions of the Military Council were the contents of the document that has been dubbed the “supra-constitutional principles document”, which considers the army to be the guardian of constitutional legitimacy, placing it in a position above that of elected institutions, where it would enjoy immunity unmonitored by the People's Assembly with regard to its spending and its budget, being kept above legal accountability. This is a strange situation in a country where the Revolution arose with the purpose of restoring power to the people. This is aside from accusations voiced by forces that participated in the Revolution of the practices employed by security forces having remained the same as they were under Mubarak, indicating that the security mentality that dominates the country remains unchanged, as if the Revolution had never taken place. This is why last Friday's (November 18) protest took on the characteristics of a direct clash with the Military Council. Islamist features dominated the crowd gathered in Tahrir Square, as if Islamist movements of different trends, ranging from conservative to Salafist, sought to send a message to the Council that they were most likely to win in the coming democratic process, in addition to being the chief protectors of the civilian nature of the Egyptian state, in the face of what they consider to be a power-grab by the military, as well as in the face of the faltering of civilian forces that took part in the Revolution and have now chosen to distance themselves from the frontline of the confrontation of which the Islamists are raising the banner before the army. And after accusations of partiality had been leveled at the army by liberal political parties at an earlier stage, of pandering to the Islamists, on the basis that they were the most powerful force, able if it so wished to provide cover for the Military Council's ambitions, the supra-constitutional principles document, which has become known as the “Selmi document”, named after Deputy Prime Minister Ali Selmi, has come to drive Islamist movements to flex their muscles and prove their presence in the street, even if at the expense of both the army and the forces of other political parties put together. Egypt's youth had ten months ago gathered around the revolutionary slogan “let him leave, we are not leaving”, insisting on Mubarak stepping down. The same slogan has returned to be reiterated now, yet this time threatening to take the confrontation against the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and its Chairman, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, to its utmost – this on the basis of accusing the SCAF and its Chairman of preparing Egypt for a phase in which the army would lead the state from behind the curtain of the democratic process, or even at its expense. It is the headline of the next confrontation in Egypt. Indeed, an army that considers itself to be the guardian of a regime would consider the toppling of such a regime to be the toppling of the state. It would not be easy for an institution like the Egyptian army, which has led the Land of the Nile since the July 23 Revolution (1952), to hand over Egypt to the quarreling civilian and Islamist forces. And it seems that the threats facing the right of the people to manage its own affairs and to choose its representatives, whatever their inclination, will need more that January 25.
