Is the time still right for the Arab League initiative to succeed in defusing the crisis in Syria? Or is it only a maneuver and an attempt to stall for time, by both the Syrians and the Arab League, as a prelude to seeing the crisis go further, by escalating into something bloodier and more violent? In this latter scenario, any way out will become more difficult, and the formula of "either the regime crushes the opposition and survives, or it falls," as in Libya, generating fears and negative repercussions for Syria and the entire region, will become more firmly entrenched. A delegation from the Arab League visited Syria Wednesday, increasing the number of worrying questions and generating few answers. If the lack of transparent answers is due to the vagueness surrounding the results of the Arab League's mission, headed by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassem Al Thani, the wait for a second meeting of the Arab League Committee on Sunday, to obtain the answers from Syria, and the Arab world, has only increased this sense of vagueness. The central point in the committee's initiative is based on seeing the Arab League sponsor dialogue, at its headquarters in Cairo. Damascus earlier responded to this option by insisting that dialogue take place on Syrian territory. The opposition, especially outside the country, first responded by saying it was not ready to engage in dialogue with the regime, after the killing and bloodshed that have taken place since the uprising broke out on 15 March of this year. If one assumes that an agreement can be reached on this point, the early signs do not bode well. President Bashar Assad has said that there will be no dialogue with saboteurs, and Takfiri and Salafist Muslims, during speeches by him at the end of March and on 20 June. By using these terms, he meant the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus rejected all of the mediation efforts and attempts to see him recognize the group's existence. This response was understood by the mediators - including the Turks, who believe that the group is part of Syrian society and cannot be ignored, since it has continued to exist despite attempts to eliminate it since the 1982 Hama massacre - as a refusal by the regime to engage in dialogue unless it is with those it recognizes, either because they have limited popular support, or because they do not want regime change, but merely reforms. The opposition, especially the Syrian National Council, based outside the country, has rejected dialogue with the regime, due to the continued crackdown and killing. However, the most significant element that accompanied the move by the Arab League in the direction in Damascus is that the latter did not agree to receive the league's secretary general, Nabil al-Arabi, in September, until after an agreement that the visit would not see the announcement that there was an Arab Initiative, or what it contained. According to this agreement, discussions of the elements of the initiative would take place in closed meetings during the visit. This compromise was devised by one of the mediators so that the Syrian leadership would agree to a visit by the Arab League secretary general at the time. The delegation's visit on Wednesday was also subject to this requirement; there was no announcement of what had been put before the Syrian leadership, or what its response was. This stance by Syria vis-à-vis the initiative gives Damascus the ability to deny its existence, especially since Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem said so at the time. Moreover, this is due to the Syrian leadership's confidence that it is able to control the situation; it earlier informed its allies that it had retaken the initiative and that the dangers to the regime had disappeared. It affirmed, to those concerned, that it had only used 20 percent of its capacities in confronting the popular demonstrations. Meanwhile, the Syrian intifada is increasingly determined to act, despite the harsh, oppressive measures and the bloody consequences, while defections in the army continue. These latter have begun to pile up, even though they are limited. The gap between rebellious regions of the country and the regime is growing. As time passes, the difficulties facing an agreement to settle the crisis are on the rise. On 20 June, the Syrian president announced his intent to discuss amending the Constitution, and the committee tasked with this was only formed in the middle of this month, or four months later. In contrast, the amendment of the Constitution to lower the age required to be elected president of Syria, in order to elect Assad, took only 48 hours. In his speech on 20 June, the Syrian president talked about the possibility of holding local elections in August or September; this poll has now been pushed back to the beginning of next year. As for the ideas contained in the Arab League Initiative, Item 10 talks about "forming a coalition national unity government headed by a prime minister acceptable to the opposition, which is involved in dialogue. This government will work with the president and its mission will be limited to conducting transparent elections for parties and individual candidates, overseen by the Syrian judiciary. The poll will be open to election observers and the government will complete its task before the end of the year." This is provided that "the head of the biggest parliamentary bloc will be tasked with forming a government." Naturally, it also covers an end to acts of violence against civilians and the end to seeing arms in the streets, along with offering compensation for the victims and a release of prisoners. The irony is that the Arab League move is an alternative to foreign intervention and an internationalization of the crisis in Syria. Will the items on the Arab League Initiative become the items in the internationalization of this crisis, if the committee fails in its mission on Sunday? After all, Moscow has supported the Arab League in this initiative, and China has asked the Syrian leadership to speed up reforms.
