When an American official denies that the decision taken by the Obama administration to return the American ambassador to Damascus had anything to do with the days that shook Iran following the presidential elections, this denial does not eliminate the justification for posing the question. Why is Obama hastening to achieve almost complete rapprochement with Syria while he is reintroducing all the vocabulary for condemning the “grievances” in the Islamic Republic, keeping in mind the dialogue table he will inaugurate with Ahmadinejad? The strategy aimed at separating the Syrian and Iranian tracks or hastening the “collapse” of the alliance between Damascus and Tehran, gains precedence in Obama's policy in as much as the American administration feels that the repercussions of the turbulence afflicting the image of the Iranian regime will force Leader Ali Khamenei to think long and hard about the chances of the resurgence of the confrontations with the reformists in the street. These chances are enough in any case to force the Leader and President Ahmadinejad, his favored servant, to suspend the policy of flexing their muscles against America and the West by waving around the nuclear card. These chances might be enough to force Iran to retreat temporarily and stop “harassing” the American diplomacy in the Middle East. Thus Mir Mousavi, the defeated candidate in the Iranian presidential elections, would have achieved one of the goals of his campaign, which he outlined in a simple manner when he asked about the economic cost of this “harassment” and about the poor in Iran being forced to shoulder the burden of supporting the “defiant” forces. The Arabs are of course divided over the Iranian developments and the crisis of the revolution in the Islamic Republic. Some saw the revolution as a supporter of their causes, while others perceived it as an exploiter of their causes, especially Palestine. The success of the Obama administration in achieving a breakthrough with its diplomacy of dialogue with Damascus is not lessened by Syria's advice to those who are wagering on the collapse of the Iranian regime not to waste their time or by its insistence, before the end of the Mousavi “uprising,” that the only condition for settling the Arab-Iranian differences (who is talking about them now?) is “having a clean conscience.” It is as if Syria feels the Arabs gloating at the ruling regime in Tehran which they accuse of destabilizing the legitimacies in various areas in the region. The momentum in the policy aimed at separating the two tracks is not weakened by Damascus looking at the American decision to return its ambassador to Syria as a “reward” for it even after the Obama administration justified this step by saying that Syria has responded to the demands for supporting stability in Iraq and Lebanon. That same “reward” will shake Tehran's nerves because the Syrian ally, who was spared by Netanyahu's extremism from the burden of indirect negotiations without a timetable and without a roof recognized by the Israelis, is reconciling fast with the American opponent who is playing the card of the sudden “uprising” before launching the “nuclear” dialogue. Yet that ally has not reneged on its commitments as a result of its rapprochement with the United States, as it is waiting for the Leader to test the dialogue's feasibility and benefits in cementing Iran's regional influence which it believes to be a blessing for the Muslims, while many Arabs and Muslims perceive it as a burden. It does not concern the Leader that the Arabs are divided over describing the crisis confronting the country of the revolution 30 years after its inception. His main concern, after “exporting the revolution,” is to export the crisis of the presidential elections to get it out of the streets. Among the signs that are encouraging for the regime in Tehran, there is Mohsen Rezaei's decision to withdraw his complaint about irregularities, which left Mousavi alone with the “troublemakers” who say “God is Great” every night yet are considered by the revolution as the tools of the CIA. Khamenei has succeeded so far in transforming much of the elections-related crisis into a confrontation with the “conspiring” outside world which infiltrated the society of the revolution with “spies.” But Obama was not wrong when he advised Iran to stop playing the same “old” tune. He is not lying when he says that Washington is not interfering in Iran's affairs because the issue of human rights is not a “sovereign” issue. But, who does not look at Obama's and Netanyahu's commendations of the “courage” of the protestors in Tehran as wistful expressions of hopes for a new revolution to replace the old one which is trying to get into the club of the mighty despite their will? There are many tools in the hands of the Leader to end the protests, but no one can estimate the price for using force if protests break out again. Thus Iran is busy putting out its own fires while Washington woos Damascus with more than good intentions and expresses hopes for Iraq to join the Gulf Cooperation Council. Thus we have a new map of the regional forces and alliances and this is the least of what the Obama administration is aspiring for. All of this is shaking the nerves in Tehran, along with the teargas grenades.
