The detonation of the situation in Sana'a is leading Yemen toward a dangerous stage that is bringing it closer to the situation witnessed in Libya since the first weeks of its revolution. The two sides have exchanged the same policies, and it is now the regime's turn to resort to what was used by the opposition to no avail. The regime did not learn from the latter experience. The members of the Joint Meeting Parties resorted early on to the weapons of the First Armored Division led by General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar with the support of the Hashid tribe that is controlled by the Al-Ahmar family. They aimed at pressuring the authority and the political sides, domestically and in the region, from Washington to the Gulf capitals which were trying to arrange the transitional stage at the beginning of the action, in a way suiting their interests. They were hastening change the Egyptian or Tunisian style. And now, the regime is trying to follow the same path, after the positions changed and after it has become urgently required that the president “immediately leaves.” It is thus trying to reshuffle the cards and improve the conditions of the negotiations for its exit or for its participation to guarantee the future, by use of military force. But the regime's implication in a wide-scale war with the opposition might open the appetite of some forces - which not too long ago were calling for secession - to go back to that option. On the other hand, some are blaming sides in the opposition of not hastening the political settlement or of obstructing the settlement based on the Gulf initiative, just like the beneficiaries among the supporters of the regime believe that any political solution will undermine their privileges and positions. The forces within these sides, in the North, the South and in between, believe that the implication of the authority and the revolutionary powers in a comprehensive confrontation will weaken the two parties, and consequently allow them to fill the vacuum in their own regions, by establishing their authority which might turn into a fait accompli that would be difficult to disregard by any upcoming regime in Sana'a. Moreover, the open conflict over power, especially between Al-Ahmar family and that of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, will definitely weaken the two parties and allow other forces to take a share of power that was not available to them when the Hashid alliance was part of the regime's camp. A quick look into the developments in this country clearly reveals a complicated map of various and mobile clashes from one province or city to the other. To each “war” its facets and repercussions, not the most dangerous of which being what is happening in the Abyan province between elements from Al-Qaeda organization and the army, or what is erupting from time to time between the Houthis and others. What is mostly dangerous nonetheless is what is happening between the First Armored Division that has become part of the “army” of the sons of Abdullah Bin Hussein al-Ahmar and the Presidential Guard led by the president's son, considering that the official military elements are clashing with the fighters of the tribes that are divided between both sides. At this level, there is no arguing about the fact that the regime is still holding the card of the army which is providing it with some sort of leverage in the military balance, if one were to add to it the other tribal forces that are not to be taken lightly. It is as though everyone is preparing for the post-President Saleh phase - if the Gulf initiative is able to pave its way between the canons and the bombs - or preparing for the toppling of the initiative once and for all between the fires of the first and the second. Since the beginning of the action, there seemed to be a concern not to slide into the Libyan model. This is why the military skirmishes between both sides remained a means through which each one tried to weaken the other and enhance its own position in a political settlement that has been and still is demanded by the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council states. But the events witnessed during the last few days in Sana'a herald a slide toward an open war, which is much easier than regaining the initiative and discontinuing the fighting. At this level, the mobilization of the tanks and the canons looks like it would have guaranteed results. Indeed, no side can settle the situation in its favor, which is a recipe to hasten the country's fall into anarchy and a civil war that will not stop at its border and will expand to the neighbors. At this point, there is no need to recall the Houthis war in which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iran and others got implicated on the political and military levels. The repetition of the American call on President Saleh to step down reflects Washington's fear vis-à-vis the repercussions of the situation in Yemen. The same could be said in regard to the Gulf states' insistence on their initiative and their condemnation of the attack carried out against the oppositionists' square by use of tanks, as they reflect fear of seeing the country sliding into an open and comprehensive war which will spread anarchy and will allow many sides to achieve goals going against the wishes of the United States and the Gulf countries. It is undeniable that what the Gulf initiative and the United States perceive as being their interests and those of Yemen, are not necessarily so to some of the warring sides. This is the predicament facing the Gulf, international and American efforts in particular, and what is making the regional and international powers incapable of affecting the course of events or imposing the best solution to the problem. At this level, neither the attempts of GCC Secretary General Abdul-Latif al-Zayani succeeded, nor those of the UN secretary general's advisor and envoy to Yemen, Jamal Ben Omar, managed to achieve any progress worth mentioning. As for the American emissaries and envoys, they could not achieve any breakthrough at the level of the alignment wall that is mobilized for war by the two sides. Some of the opposition forces in the JMP might have drawn their inspiration from what happened to Gaddafi and his regime and are not about to accept a political settlement. For their part, those in power might have feared a fate similar to that of Gaddafi and have consequently been forced to engage in a different confrontation with the squares and the streets. However, the bombs which they – along with their military elements – launched against the protesters on Change Square and in the other squares and streets, are bombs which are also being launched by the regime against itself since they enhance the protesters' rejection of any possible settlement with it. This is happening although both sides are well aware of the fact that the political, social and tribal structure in Yemen is different than the one in Libya, and that the balance between the different powers and the regime in Sana'a are different than the ones which existed in Tripoli, even if some like to compare between the two. But had this been the case, the opposition would have been able to seize power when the regime's figures, from the president to various other personalities, were out of the country for three months to receive treatment! Yemen's only choice is to exit the stage of each side's anticipation of the defeat of the other, because this anticipation will carry additional violence, division and dissent. Moreover, it is no longer useful to exchange accusations and try to “outsmart” the other, because the Gulf initiative drew up a clear path for a peaceful settlement meeting the aspirations of the youth and preventing the tumbling of the current and former regime officials who sided with the street. The Al-Ahmar family, military leaders and officials in the parties and political movements were all part of the regime and constituted an element of strength for it. Did the regime not realize that their turning away from it benefitted the opposition? The president and his aides should have read into this step's content and signed the Gulf initiative early on before pulling out calmly. However, he chose resistance and accused his opponents of being power-seekers, knowing they were in power and were seeking it with thousands of youth. Or else, what would have been the meaning of this revolution which is calling for change? It aims at changing the regime and its authority. The Gulf initiative guaranteed a peaceful transition of power and was supported by Washington, which is interested in preventing Yemen from sliding toward the unknown or into Al-Qaeda' fist, or from turning into a second Somalia to complete the siege over Bab al-Mandab, threaten this vital artery, obstruct the passage of three million oil barrels per day and undermine the neighboring state's security and stability. On the other hand, the youth's frustration due to the impossibility of change might push them to show additional extremism and prompt them to turn toward powers whose threat was always blown out of proportion by the regime and its oppositionists. Hence, the regime's attempts to end the opposition by use of tanks will not work, just as it is the case of the opposition's attempts to hide behind the First Armored Division. The solution lies in the implementation of what was featured in the Gulf initiative, in preparation for the emergence of a new formula that does not call for the return to ruling and administrative methods governed by the allocation of positions and interests. Any other step will fuel the political, sectarian, tribal and regional conflict, will distance Yemen from the GCC and bring it closer to Somalia!
