American Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman did not offer anything to the sides involved in the Yemeni crisis other than what was offered by the Gulf initiative. He thus insisted on the implementation of this initiative and stressed the necessity of agreeing over a peaceful power transition with the participation of everyone and the elimination of all forms of tensions. The two sides thus met, from Vice President Major General Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi to the leaders of the Joint Meeting Parties, going through Commander of the Presidential Guard and son of the president General Ahmad Ali Saleh and his rivals, i.e. commander of the First Armored Division General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and leader of the Hashid tribe Sadeq al-Ahmar. During his visit to Sana'a, the American diplomat did not present any new approach. Therefore, the current stalemate might be sustained and the balance of powers might continue for a long time, unless surprises were to emerge. This is true even if President Ali Abdullah Saleh does not return from his curative trip to the Kingdom of Saud Arabia, which many believe – or hope – will be his last trip away from power. Indeed, the peaceful solution is not linked to the president's return, considering that the ruling Congress Party is still in place, along with the forces supporting the regime. In the meantime, the statements of those rejecting the American action – or the “American interference” as they call it – revealed their fear from the venture of accomplishing the required coup which could lead the country toward anarchy, seeing how they aimed at exerting pressures on the American and Gulf efforts to hasten the removal of President Saleh and secure his deputy's temporary assumption to power. The balance between the different forces is the factor consecrating the stalemate on one hand, and increasing the chaos on the other. The Joint Meeting Parties signed the Gulf initiative, and so did the ruling Congress Party. The only signature missing is that of President Saleh, whose absence revealed that his opponents cannot impose a solution without the consent of his supporters. Until now, the latter still enjoy the upper hand in the armed forces and are present in all the tribes which are also suffering divisions preventing their agreement over one position. This is massively obstructing the country's slide toward civil war, considering that wherever the JMP has bases in this or that tribe, the Congress Party has similar ones that have displayed their strength on the squares. Consequently, they cannot be overlooked in the context of whichever settlement. Moreover, the president's supporters accuse those calling on him to step down of being “power-seekers” who failed to achieve their goals during the last presidential elections in which Ali Saleh reaped around 80% of the votes, while the opposition's representative got the rest. The members of the Joint Meeting can attribute this victory to falsification or tampering, but the facts reveal that the opponents are incapable of achieving the desired “coup” as long as the regime is maintaining its strength on the ground and as long as the state institutions are still controlled by the president and his team, despite the absence of the state! In addition to these factors, the Gulf states and the United States do not seem to be in favor of such a coup for numerous reasons, namely the absence of any agreement over the alternative and the vagueness affecting the future of the situation in a country where the command of Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula has established its headquarters. At this level, the Yemeni army is waging battles to restore Zinjibar from the armed men of the organization who expanded their activities from the Abyan to the Aden province where a suicide attack was carried out a few days ago via a booby-trapped car in front of a military post in the directorate of Mansoura. Moreover, these states converge with a group of young people who do not belong to parties or to the JMP at the level of their discomfort toward what they dub the Islamists' “leadership” over the opposition's platform and the political scene and rhetoric on the squares. Furthermore, since the beginning of the political action in Yemen, many youths expressed their disgruntlement toward the statements of leader in the Gathering for Reform Sheikh Abdul-Majid al-Zindani, who announced back then during a crowded demonstration on Change Square before Sana'a University that the revolutions sweeping the Arab world heralded the establishment of the “Islamic Caliphate” in 2020. It is no secret at this level that Washington accuses Al-Zindani of supporting “terrorism” and has considered for a long time that the “Al-Iman University” which he founded and supervises is a school that incubates extremists and radicals. Its graduates thus contributed to the “fighting” of the leaders of the Socialist Party that governed South Yemen before unity at the beginning of the nineties, and include Nigerian national Umar Farouk who was accused of having attempted to blow up an American commercial plane in 2009. The United States does not want the cooperation agreement with Sana'a over the fighting of Al-Qaeda to be affected or halted, just as the Gulf states do not want the organization to exploit the anarchy and establish positions that could threaten navigation in the Gulf of Aden or Bab-el-Mandeb, considering that this would tighten the siege over the area between Yemen and Somalia, which constitutes the main passageway for the Gulf's oil toward the Canal of Suez and from there to Europe! Not to forget the threat that these positions could pose on the stability of the Gulf Cooperation Council states. Among the reasons that have made and are still making the Gulf states and the United States insist on the Gulf initiative and the peaceful transition of power, is these states' fear from the eruption of a conflict over power between the members of the current opposition. Indeed, some of them are dubious about the others, while only a few months ago, they were fighting and engaged in confrontations in the North and the South. However, they have realized that none of them can govern alone, and that consequently, the collapse of the state will lead to economic repercussions whose flames will affect all the sides without any exception. True, the action reintegrated the Houthis and the Southern powers on the public squares and the streets, but the latter are still suspicious about the future. Therefore, although aware of the threat of seeing the country sliding toward anarchy, they are not showing any care or concern, as it was detected by Ambassador Feltman. The only goal combining them is reform, but also the toppling of the president and his rule. As for the rest, it will be determined by the days to come! The suspicions prevailing over the opposition are due to the 33 years during which the regime was in place. Indeed, the president encouraged partisan, tribal and regional contradictions and disputes, even fueled them, so that he is able to continue running the game. He thus benefitted from these divisions to monopolize power and retain it in the hands of his children, relatives and a faction of opportunists and beneficiaries. His opponents blame him for the fact that this policy of his triggered six wars in the North with the Houthis, and rekindled the aspirations of the secessionists in the South whose Hirak perceives the northerners as being “occupiers.” However, the president's exaggerated division of his opponents led to their unification against his authority once they got the chance to do so in light of the general Arab action, in addition to the youth who joined them on the squares. Furthermore, the regime's reliance on the Yemeni Gathering for Reform - and what it includes in terms of tribal and Islamic powers - during the secession war in 1994 and then the war with the Houthis, enhanced the Gathering's influence at the expense of Southern opposition, namely the Socialist Party which governed the South before unity. Consequently, the Gathering now controls the squares that are opposed to the regime which it supported throughout the previous years. Still, this does not eliminate the discrepancies between the leaders of the Joint Meeting Parties, but also between them and parts of the “youth of the squares.” Some sides believe that the transfer of power to the vice president will allow the Congress Party to prepare its successor to the president. Therefore, many called – before the president's curative trip – for the non-acceptance of a long transitory phase, in order to get rid of all the symbols of the regime and render the new centralized authority unable to confront the aspirations of some northerners in Saada, and the aspirations of some in the Southern Hirak and provinces. Since the beginning, Washington supported the removal of President Saleh but only after enough time to arrange the transitory phase and more importantly to secure the backyard. Nothing has changed, although Washington is now demanding the exploitation of the president's absence to hasten the transfer of power to his deputy. But what is certain is that it will not accept – along with the GCC states – a move toward the unknown, or one toward comprehensive chaos the Somali style or infighting the Libyan style!
