If Lebanon is my country of fact, then Egypt is my country of fancy. I have known Egypt since my adolescence, and have never stopped visiting the country except for the five years that I lived in the U.S., which felt to me like exile. But my interest in Egypt goes beyond personal affection, and is rather governed by the old and still valid view, which says that Egypt is the Arabs' leading nation: If Egypt is well, then we are well, and if Egypt is ailing, then we are ailing. Egypt's youths have said their word and ousted the regime of Hosni Mubarak. The verdict of millions of Egyptian youths must be respected, for they represent the future. While I realize that a popular revolution, any revolution, cannot succeed in a day, month or even a year, I find that, as I monitor Egypt in the pursuit of its interests and those of the nation, there is some cause for concern. True, I more than once said that I am the worrying type of people since birth, spending my time (figuratively) at the edge of my seat biting my nails. But I still believe that my concerns are nonetheless warranted. The United States had no role whatsoever in Egypt's youth revolution. Yet I hear Likudnik American commentators and pro-Israeli think tanks calling for political reforms in Egypt to be supported, by endorsing this or that party or opposition, or exploiting divisions within the one party. If reform in Egypt or any Arab country were to come through the United States, then I do not want such reform. Reform can never come through America, because any local party that the U.S. deals with, under any administration, would immediately become the object of suspicion. Even if I were to overlook the subversive American role, I still find that Egypt is sharply divided into two camps, with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists on one side, and all the other parties and factions on the other side. Further, there are disputes within the Muslim Brotherhood itself. When Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh announced his candidacy for the presidency, the Muslim Brotherhood dismissed the four thousand members who supported his bid. The Muslim Brotherhood's youths also established the Egyptian Current, as though it would compete with the official Freedom and Justice Party, and another group established the Al-Reyada Party. The Muslim Brotherhood was a unified bloc when they had one common enemy, i.e. the regime. So the question is, has the absence of an enemy revealed internal contradictions within the group? Also, how can the Muslim Brotherhood benefit from the alliance with the Salafists, who organized the one million beards campaign? While I do not object to even two millions beards, I ask, like al-Mutannabi did, “Is the main purpose of your religion to shave your moustaches?” I want the Muslim Brotherhood to be an element of stability in the country, not an element of instability. There are also the security services that lost the confrontation with the revolution's youths, and which now want revenge. So was the release of some of the most dangerous criminals a part of the counter-revolution, and is the failure of the security services to pursue criminals a deliberate decision, so that the people would pay the price for their revolution? All Arab security services are oppressive. But the problem with Egyptian security is that it is comprised 1.5 million members, or three times the size of the regular army. Furthermore, the ruling military council has discharged thousands of officers, which increased my concern regarding the oppressive elements and their absence. As a reminder, when the U.S. occupation disbanded the Iraqi army, attacks by the resistance increased exponentially while a massive wave of terrorism was unleashed. Here, I ask myself: What will the security service members who were discharged do to support their families, and could the Iraqi scenario be repeated in Egypt? The ruling military council itself is another cause of concern. The majority of its decisions were reactions rather than actions. These decisions are often reached through secretive processes, all while the council is trying civilians before military tribunals, putting pressure on journalists, and trying to appease the youths after each protest, as was seen in the decision to jail Hosni Mubarak and his sons, and the trial of figures from the former regime, or the dismissal and appointment of ministers at the behest of the youths. Every decision was thus taken after, and not before, a protest. Now that I hear that the military council is on its way to declare fundamental principles that would govern the drafting of the new constitution, the question that comes to my mind is this: Does the army want to subjugate the country's national sovereignty to its will? The military council had promised legislative elections in September. Now, I am reading that these elections may be delayed one or two months. The council had also pledged to hold presidential elections before the end of the year, so will these elections, too, be postponed? And while the referendum of last March showed that 78 percent of the Egyptians approve of the amendments of the Constitution of 1971, and that legislative elections should be held first, after which the parliament would work on drafting a new constitution, the military council's current direction is far from reflecting the results of the referendum. This begs another question: Is the military institution, which runs many economic interests ‘autonomously', intending to steer clear of parliamentary or judicial oversight? All of the above are my causes for concern for Egypt, and the [Arab] nation beyond it. [email protected]
