The race against time being undertaken by regimes as they face popular uprisings with oppression and more violence only resembles shooting oneself in the foot. It is true that internal balances of power in each country witnessing these uprisings, along with the huge mechanism of oppression and military capabilities, represent factors that enable some rulers and regimes to wager on the time element in order to guarantee domestic protection for them, which they can enhance with a foreign policy stance that allows them to play on international contradictions. However, the experience of Libya and Yemen indicates the opposite, whatever the difficulties of seeing an alternative to the regimes in Tripoli and Sanaa take shape. The desire to cling to power and insistence on using means of force to confront the rising waves of popular protest have only provided these waves of unrest with more force and momentum. Like a virus that has struck these countries, from Tunisia and Egypt, the unrest has spread to additional segments of society that were hesitant or fearful when the protests began. Over time, these new segments have joined the protests, which have come to have a bigger impact and seen the protestors raise the ceiling of their demands. What appeared to be a popular movement that was engaged in a big gamble or was highly enthusiastic at first, with no political future for its revolutionary and opposition stance, has become a snowball. As the snowball rolls, it is joined by new segments and regions of the countries in question. Those who launched the fire of protest have had no problem dealing quite pragmatically with political forces, leading figures, and groups of people that had stood by the regimes against which people are rising up in order to change. Over time, they accepted these people's joining their ranks, and the protest movement has become a majority after beginning as a minority. Time was on the side of the uprising masses in Libya and Yemen. Inside the country, despite the bloodshed, society factions have become more unified and arrived at common denominators, despite the contradictions inherent among them and their relative lack of political expertise. And it is the opponent, namely the existing regimes that helped in this process. These regimes left no opportunity for the other side other than this unifying of ranks and engaging in compromises, since the rulers rejected compromise. Experience has proven that time is on the side of the two uprisings, in Libya and Yemen, in terms of the stances taken by the outside world. The United States and Europe were quick to adapt themselves to the domestic changes underway. Meanwhile, the change in the Russian and Chinese stances on Libya, through recognizing the Transitional Council, were an indication of the evolution in the position of these two countries, after they had opposed United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which imposed an air embargo and protected civilians. Moscow and Beijing have become fairly unconcerned with seeing NATO forces travel beyond the borders of Europe, after receiving authorization from a UN resolution, despite their verbal opposition to such a step. Washington has become less anxious about seeing al-Qaeda benefit from the fall of the regime of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Sanaa. The regional system in which Yemen is located, particularly the countries of the Gulf, are playing the role of sponsoring the transition to a new phase (without this eliminating the complexities and dangers in both countries). In this time element, there is a dialectical relationship between two broad items. The first is the entrenchment of the stance and orientation of domestic pro-change groups, in response to the regime's oppression, and their agreement on a unified program. The second is the change in the foreign powers' stances, in the favor of these groups. When leading countries "stall" in deciding their stance on changing regimes, they are interested in negotiating on future policies with the alternatives, which are preparing themselves to take power when the old regimes reach their expiry dates. These negotiations encompass the future policies and the countries' regional relations with their neighbors, with regard to the interests of outside countries in these states. When the outside world's negotiations with the new groups in these countries move forward, and foreign countries become reassured about their interests, the international stance on the old regime takes shape. Likewise, the gradual nature of foreign countries' positions, with which Moscow and Beijing were out of step at first, is linked also to the negotiations among leading powers and regional countries over dividing up influence and interests in the states facing change. This is when time "runs out." The old regimes should be greatly worried when foreign states begin to exchange compromises among them in dealing with the Arab revolutions. This applies to Syria, after the amendments introduced by European countries to the Security Council draft resolution on Syria, to keep Moscow happy. It is a signal, without this meaning that time has run out.
