Is Yemen going through political vacuum following the injuring of President Ali Abdullah Saleh and senior officials in the Yemeni government? Is President Saleh's legitimacy still valid on the constitutional level in light of his “forced” absence, the continuation of the confrontations, sit-ins, protests and disobedience and the demands of the oppositionists for his departure sooner than later? How is the “Happy Yemen” doing following the failure of the Gulf initiative and in light of the turmoil witnessed in the country throughout consecutive months? Is Yemen safe and stable or is it troubled, boiling and complaining about all the flaws? Are the “powerful” still throbbing or did the Al-Nahdain Mosque explosion affect the heart and the eye? Is it true there is a Gulf-American “scenario” to thwart the revolution of the Yemenis? Is Yemen – with its tribal structure – capable of overcoming the complications and building a state of civil institutions? In the context of a seminar recently organized by the Abaad Research Center in Sana'a, many answers were given to all these questions, as the participants were Yemeni political researchers. They know about their country, the extent of the necessity to deal with the outside based on Yemen's future interests and can differentiate between those who want to see the success of the popular revolution and those wishing to obstruct it. This seminar, which was held on Change Square – the favorite and symbolic location of the protesters and demonstrators who are rejecting Saleh's stay in power – was headlined “The Yemeni revolution, between the domestic repercussions and the external interferences.” It discussed the Yemeni situation, whose solutions were presented in the context of the Gulf initiative. However, some researchers stressed the necessity of seeing the escalation of revolutionary action, the elimination of any political calculations before the revolution reached its goal and the seizing of the historical opportunity that would lead the country toward the shores of safety through the imposition of “revolutionary legitimacy” instead of that of the “collapsed regime.” For example, researcher Thabet al-Ahmadi believed that foreign interference in the Yemeni crisis was coming from three directions, i.e. the American, European and Gulf ones, while each was building its position toward the revolution based on its own interests. However, what Al-Ahmadi overlooked was the fact that Yemen needed an independent mediator that would be acceptable to all the warring sides following the obstruction of the domestic solutions. This was the main goal of the Gulf mediation, in case it is perceived by some Yemenis as being a form of interference in their country's affairs. Moreover, the researchers who participated in the seminar considered that American interference was a “key obstacle” facing the Yemeni revolution's attempts to achieve its goals. They thus said: “Washington dealt with Saleh based on the principle that the one you know is better than the one you don't. There are several reasons for the United States to interfere, including Yemen's geopolitical position on and control over the navigation line, in addition to its partnership in the war on Al-Qaeda organization.” Researcher Al-Ahmadi also considered that the most prominent player in Yemen was Saudi Arabia, adding: “This presence is not new and has long affected the decision-making process in the country.” However, what raised doubts over the neutrality of the researcher was his contradictory analysis in which he said: “Saudi Arabia wishes to thwart the Yemeni crisis through its interference via what is dubs the Gulf initiative.” He added: “It gave artificial respiration to the regime in Yemen.” I think that the researcher should have gone through the trouble of reading the headlines and content of the Gulf initiative and the Saudi official statements even following President Saleh's injuring – whom it did not support - more closely. He would have noticed that Saudi Arabia supported Yemen, the state and the people, and that it constituted the solution for Saleh's departure. However, Al-Ahmadi apparently spoke based on emotions and on a certain ideology, far away from the course of scientific research and the pace of the mediation since the escalation of the situation until the president's injuring. Moreover, one cannot ignore the central role of any army in any state. And had the Yemeni army wished to defeat the revolution, it would have settled the situation swiftly as it was done by the military commands in Egypt and Tunisia to hasten the victory of the revolution in these two countries, i.e. not the way it was done by Colonel Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar through his dissidence. On the legal level and regarding whether or not was in a state of constitutional vacuum, Attorney Abdul Rahman Barman believed that his country was indeed witnessing constitutional vacuum, pointing out that “according to article 116 of the constitution, the president's post is void, especially one month after the Al-Nahdain Mosque incident and the unavailability of any information regarding the president's health condition.” He indicated: “Parliament, to which the authority should go, is no longer legitimate following the expiry of its extension term which is set to one time.” There is no doubt that Yemeni wisdom and the peacefulness of the revolution spared the country's skies and squares from the escalation, which could render the internal loyalist and oppositionist stands more difficult. But what is certain is that the concept of the state is completely absent from popular awareness, and is replaced by the concepts of tribal bigotry, partisan loyalty and sometimes even stubbornness. Among the reasons behind this problem are President Saleh's policies, as he continued to fuel the loyalties in his favor and in that of his entourage with clear “narcissism” to bequeath power to the son, while some of those surrounding the president lacked sightedness and rendered the concern of building the state and its institutions absent from the list of priorities. We should not forget at this level the spread of corruption, the bad economic and educational conditions and poverty. The “alarming” situation in Yemen requires Saleh's departure, the surrender of power to a transitional council and the implementation of a developmental economic plan and educational cognitive system with the help of the Gulf states and Western countries. Otherwise, Yemen will become a copy of the Somali situation, a failed state whose problems and troubles will multiply and affect its neighbors, incapable of facing the challenges and the infiltrations of the groups of political Islam and unaffected by all the solutions, initiatives and mediations.
