The decision by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to accept Jordan as a member and to invite Morocco to join it came as a surprise for most observers. It is a surprise because taking such a step represents a departure from the GCC's conservative nature, as well as the start of a process of overcoming difference between its member-states, which share similar types of ruling regimes. Most importantly, those countries have gone beyond shared geographic space and towards shared political and ideological space. The surprise becomes even greater when one compares regimes of rule. Indeed, if we were to put aside monarchy, the common denominator between those states, we would find that everything else is different, from the most basic institutions of rule to the most complex (with the exception of Kuwait). In Jordan, as in Morocco, there is a parliament elected on the basis of modern laws, as well as attempts at reform aimed at attaining constitutional parliamentary monarchy. There are also in these two countries labor unions and political parties, the politics of which are very often at odds with state policies. And that is completely different from the Shura (consultative) councils of Gulf countries, even if such councils are considered to be equivalent to parliaments. Without going into any more detail, the differences between regimes of rule necessarily reflect differences in the social structures that should be producing them. The GCC has adopted political proximity as a standard for membership. It is a standard connected to foreign policy, and one that disregards the differences in domestic policy, be they economic or organizational. The stance on regional alignments is the most important factor shared by the GCC with Jordan and Morocco. The policies of those two countries are in perfect harmony with the GCC's stance on Iran, and it is no secret that they have strong ties to GCC states in terms of collaborating in matters of security. Suffice it to remind of their stances opposing Iran's attempts to strengthen its influence in the Arab region, especially in Iraq and in the Gulf. Their joining this regional coalition reinforces such a direction and represents an obstacle to Iran's ambitions. For the Gulf Arabs, Iraq before the US invasion, and before the fall of its regime, represented an impenetrable shield in the face of Iran, and the guardian of the Eastern gateway to the Arab World, as Saddam Hussein used to say. Today, on the other hand, it represents Tehran's gateway into the region. And if Iraq's ruling regime remains what it is today, and becomes closer to Syria after the US withdrawal, it will turn into the center of a strong alliance, one which the Gulf Arabs consider to represent an imminent threat to them. Furthermore, with such a qualitative shift, the Gulf Arabs can compensate for what they could lose if the situation in Egypt develops in a direction different from what it had been in the past, after strong indications have come out of Egypt of restoring relations with Iran and normalizing them with Damascus. The legitimate question to be asked here is: does the step taken by the GCC return the Arab World to the politics of alignments that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s? History does not repeat itself. But things are different in the Arab World.
