It would not require researchers, experts or followers of the affairs of Islamic movements to know that the next target of those who demonstrated in support of Osama Bin Laden following the Friday sermon in Cairo, will be those against whom the leader of Al-Qaeda once formed a combat front. The latter - or colleagues of theirs - cut off the ear of a man, assaulted mosques, occupied others and attacked Al-Azhar and its fatwas. It is likely that they will proceed with his behavior, thus exploiting the new climate in Egypt in light of the unclear foundations of the next stage. What is said about direct reasons behind the targeting of churches and Christians cannot be separated from the practices of these extremists, regardless of what they call themselves. As for what is said regarding an interference to thwart the Egyptian revolution through the fueling of sectarian strife or the accusations made against the former regime of being implicated in this attempt, they do not annul the fact that these extremists are present, that their activities and base are expanding, and that they want to impose their viewpoint over the Egyptian society. Egyptian officials announced that what happened in Imbaba revealed that Egypt was in danger. Consequently, many called for the corroboration of national unity, at a time when the government threatened to strike with an iron fist. However, all these measures remain in the context of the post-handling of a major security incident. But the problem will continue to stand as long as the controversy over the nature of the upcoming regime and the adoption of the appropriate constitution for it has not yet been settled. Indeed, the continuation of the problem is the reason why individuals are taking it upon themselves to carry out what they perceive as being their duty, and are implementing what should have been implemented by the Egyptian state without any consideration for civil norms. At this level, it is not a coincidence that this phenomenon surfaced in parallel to the escalation of the controversy over the constitutional amendments, which were settled by the referendum in a way that weakened the demands for a civil state and equality between the citizens in accordance with the constitution. In that sense, it was noticed that the campaign of support in favor of the referendum focused on the religious laws' facet rather than on the political facet of these amendments. This gave a pretext to the extremists to impose their own interpretation, and might have encouraged them to proceed with their defiance of the political and civil meanings of the constitution. In other words, the climate that accompanied the fall of the former regime and was characterized by the strong return of the Islamists – with their different belongings – encouraged the fundamentalists to go even further in their attempts to impose their tendencies. True, the former regime under Al-Sadat and Mubarak tried to exploit the Islamists in its domestic battles, but the structure of the regime did not allow them to exceed the red lines it had drawn up for them. The first thus fell with their bullets, and the second engaged in fierce armed confrontations against them, reaching the point of subjecting them to an ideological reviewing. As for the current climate, it brings back to mind the Pakistani experience in which the army set the beat of the alliance with the Islamists. At this level, former President Pervez Musharraf paid the price for his attempts to secure a civil character for the state, especially following the case of the Red Mosque whose sheikhs and students started applying their own sanctions, thus monopolizing the accusations, the issuance of the sentences and the implementation of these sentences. Today, alongside the movements affiliated with the Taliban and engaged in armed confrontations with the government and its symbols, Pakistan is facing extremist Islamic movements that are imposing their own interpretations of the Shariaa, reaching the point of carrying out executions against those whom they deem to be infidels. Pakistan is now a quasi-Emirate whose daily affairs are subjected to the interpretations of their “Walīs” and not to governmental management. In other words, the Pakistani army's sponsorship – since the independence and especially following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan – of the extremist and fundamentalist Islamic movements, contributed to the internal division and the retreat of the civil state. So far however, the Pakistani regime has only been able to confront the fundamentalists because it possesses nuclear weapons, whose fall in the hands of the extremists is causing an international state of terror. And although the situation in Egypt has not yet reached this Pakistani level, the general climate governing the nature of the relations between the temporary authority and the Islamists might push in that direction, unless the bases of the civil state are swiftly set up.
