When the Lebanese President Michel Suleiman urges the new parliament to reform the electoral law, when speaker Nabih Berri calls for “rebuilding state institutions as soon as possible” in the post-election phase, and when the head of the parliamentary majority and leader of the Future Movement MP Saad Hariri responds to an old demand for the opposition, which remained a minority in the parliament just as legitimate as the majority, and calls a government that represents all parties, the Lebanese people cannot but hope that they might escape the sinkhole of strife. Suleiman is worried about “sectarian polarization” which no one can defend if the real goal here is to protect Lebanon's unity. Berri is worried about Israel's hypocrisy as the Jewish state continues to sow strife among the Lebanese, after the March 14 great victory in the parliamentary elections, casting doubts on the intentions of the victors. Saad Hariri is worried about a recurrent experience of the national unity government which lost its powers in the cage of the minority vote. Perhaps that government's most notable achievements are of security not political nature. It managed to organize exceptionally heated yet tranquil elections and capture Israeli spy rings which have long undermined Lebanon's security to sow strife here and there. The positive Syrian stance towards the results of the Lebanese elections and its abstention of questioning the great victory achieved by the March 14 forces in general and the Future Movement in particular eliminate to some extent Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's attempts to seek a “regional” vote in favor of the March 8 forces. For a smooth formation of a new government, Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah must accept the extended hand policy endorsed by Hariri who proposed an expanded government inclusive of all parties. With the sportsmanship expressed by Nasrallah in recognizing the choice of the Lebanese voters, even though he distinguished between a parliamentary majority and a popular majority, he is likely to respond to Hariri's gesture with a similar one. He might accept dialogue to agree on the guarantees that the head of the Future Movement hinted at in return for shelving the minority vote and terminating the Doha Agreement in a unanimously endorsed measure. While it is impossible for the March 8 forces to quickly overcome their trauma, they who have promised to defeat the other camp in closely watched elections worldwide, expecting them to renounce the obstructing third depends on the nature of the guarantees offered by the victorious party. These guarantees will lure the loser to take part in the government that must not be left paralyzed, with the issue of Hezbollah's weapons entrusted to the national dialogue committee. While this divorce favors a prominent role for President Suleiman during the dialogue sessions and in his capacity of arbiter between the majority and opposition, Suleiman's insistence on stepping up political reform and pursuing the implementation of the Taef Agreement will certainly turn into the main advocate of reform. Saad Hariri, who described those who voted for Hezbollah as “part of the country,” tried for his part to absorb their shocking loss by pushing for a new dialogue initiative instead of expressing euphoria about his victory. Thus he seemed to have absorbed Walid Jumblatt's warning of isolating any faction while the bitter polarization cements a marriage between sectarianism and politics. All the forces disown this marriage, yet it produces more “mania” about the sole leader, his uncontested opinion, and the “holy” truth which causes more problems to Lebanese pluralism and sects. Unveiled in a Lebanese presidential statement, the consultations between the two Lebanese and Syrian presidents over the anticipated international effort in the region favor a prolonged truce in Lebanon and a circumvention of all future obstacles. Amidst the continuous Syrian-Saudi openness and Cairo's certainty that the struggle in Lebanon will not undermine security stability, the wager remains on Hezbollah accepting the guarantees of the parliamentary majority offered by Hariri. The most prominent of these guarantees are an expanded government without a minority vote and the referral of the weapons of the resistance to the dialogue sessions away from political struggle. After Suleiman's speech, Berri and Jumblatt's accord, and Hariri's initiative, everyone seems to be aware of the threat posed by the trap that Israel and maybe other factions are setting for Lebanon. The bad news after the Lebanese euphoria at surviving the elections in peace is that America has sided with the “Jewishness” of Israel and that some eminent changes are looming in the horizon. Will Hezbollah respond to this dialogue initiative to allay regional damages?
