Four days before the killing of Osama Bin Laden, the specter of terrorism made a stop in the Moroccan city of Marrakesh. And this was perhaps the first time the authorities observed the virtue of silence until the completion of the investigation, which international experts and specialized judges participated in. Reactions differed between the shock of May 16, 2003 in Casablanca and the shudder of the 29th of last month in Marrakesh. Indeed, the astonishment and awe has gone, and the logic of justice has prevailed – justice that is required of the security apparatus, which had been striking in every direction, in hopes that something would emerge out of the screams to help it get its hands on those implicated. But the death of Bin Laden raises renewed questions about the future of the extremist organizations orbiting around Al-Qaeda in North Africa and the Southern coast of the Sahara. And whether they continue to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda at the organizational level or at the level of the spread of extremist ideas, the prevailing belief has been leaning towards Al-Qaeda positions moving to the coastal area. That is, on the one hand, because the security, borders and geographic environment there helps them to conceal themselves, and, on the other, because movement and attracting recruits to send to Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and even Afghanistan had not been easy. Certainly the killing of Bin Laden in what he considered to be a safe haven near Islamabad will reduce the opportunity to rely of the space of Pakistan, in spite of its geographical importance, tribal structure and interconnected relations. There are several hypotheses concerning the state of affairs and the future of outlaw organizations in the region. Either they will put their weight into settling on the Southern coast of the Sahara, taking advantage of the cases of security breakdown and of the wide spaces that seem impossible to constantly monitor, as this would require constantly mobilized troops and vehicles; or they will reconsider the spaces available for their potential spread, on the basis of Al-Qaeda's new post-Bin Laden strategy, even if Bin Laden has been absent since his years in hiding and his fleeing the US airstrikes that continued to hound him. A constant of Al-Qaeda's methods of recruitment and planning has been that it allows its members the freedom to prepare their own attacks, in light of the difficulties revealed by its continuing to play a central role, after its cells have disseminated in different places. Nevertheless, the developments that affect rearranging its situation in North Africa, in particular Libya's crisis, Algeria's fears and Morocco's caution, are all elements that help make the coast prominent as an alternative safe haven. Most likely the dismantling of terrorist cells by Moroccan authorities has shown the region's importance in exporting potential recruits to centers of tension, after having trained them in camps on the Southern coast of the Sahara. The relationship between extremist organizations in North Africa and Al-Qaeda has taken on a more “spiritual” than organizational form, with the oath of allegiance to Bin Laden embodying the symbolic nature of such a relationship, leading one to wonder about the fate of the oath of allegiance as an ideological commitment. Indeed, the disappearance of the leader of any organization will certainly have consequences, whether at the level of the more radical elements taking control, or at the level of changing priorities, especially as Al-Qaeda has opened up multiple fronts, within which it has made no distinction between enmity towards the West and striking against Arab and Muslim countries. Inasmuch as the logic of enmity towards Arab regimes draws supporters and the dissatisfied who fall into the trap of joining what has become referred to as “Jihad against the Infidels”, the changes witnessed by the Arab World reduce the chances of engaging in plans of such obscure features. Yet the general direction of events, within which moderate Islamist movements may play a central role within the framework of the legitimate mechanisms of political activity, will lead radical organizations to lose the initiative. In fact, the battle may unfold on a broad scale between rival brethren. The weapon of constitutional and political reform represents the other face of the war on terror. At the very least, integrating in peaceful democratic changes would strengthen stability, and Al-Qaeda, ever since it was first formed, has always wagered on environments where the absence of stability provided it with safe havens.
